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ince our nation’s founding, the promise of economic opportunity has been a
central component of the American Dream. An economy that grew to be the
world’s biggest and most dynamic also held out the promise that hard work,
vision, and risk—regardless of family background—would be rewarded. Perhaps the most
remarkable byproduct of the growth of the American economy over the past century
has been steady growth in the share of Americans who have been able to achieve a
comfortable life and have every hope of seeing their children do even better.
While the American Dream remains a unifying cultural tenet for an increasingly 
diverse society, it may be showing signs of wear. Growing income inequality and slower
growth suggest that now is an important moment to review the facts about opportunity
and mobility in America and to attempt to answer the basic question: Is the American
Dream alive and well?
With funding and leadership from The Pew Charitable Trusts, and involving scholars 
from The American Enterprise Institute, The Brookings Institution, The Heritage
Foundation and The Urban Institute, the Economic Mobility Project was created to
explore these and other questions fundamental to gauging the health and status of 
the American Dream. This volume, authored by a team of scholars at The Brookings
Institution, is one in a series of major research products that aim to enlighten further
the public dialogue on economic opportunity. While it offers reassuring findings 
in some areas, in many others there is room for concern.
Our hope is that by arming the public and policy makers with facts about the status 
of opportunity in America today, we will stimulate and frame a debate about which
policies are likely to be most effective in ensuring that the American Dream endures 
for the next century.
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BY ISABEL V. SAWHILL,1 The Brookings Institution
or more than two centuries,
economic opportunity and
the prospect of upward
mobility have formed the bedrock
upon which the American story has
been anchored. Indeed, a desire to
escape from the constraints of more
class-based societies was the driving
force luring many of our ancestors 
to this New World, and millions of
immigrants continue to flood our
borders in search of the American
Dream. Americans continue to believe
that all one needs to get ahead is
individual effort, intelligence, and
skills: coming from a wealthy family
is far from a necessity to achieve
success in America. 
Many Americans are even
unconcerned about the historically
high degree of economic inequality
that exists in the United States today,
because they believe that big gaps
between the rich and the poor and,
increasingly, between the rich and 
the middle class, are offset by a 
high degree of economic mobility.
Economic inequality, in this view, 
is a fact of life and not all that
disturbing as long as there is constant
movement out of the bottom and 
a fair shot at making it to the top. 
In short, much of what the public
believes about the fairness of the
American economy is dependent 
on the generally accepted notion that
there is a high degree of mobility 
in our society. 
Are those beliefs justified? Is there
actually a high degree of mobility in
the United States? Is America still the
land of opportunity? With new data
and analysis, this volume addresses
these questions by measuring how
much economic mobility actually
exists in America today.
In sum, the research reviewed in 
this volume leads us to the view 
that the glass is half empty and 
half full. The American Dream 
is alive if somewhat frayed. Most 
people are better off than their
parents, but slower and less broadly
shared economic growth has made
the economy more of a zero-sum
game than it used to be, with very
high stakes for the winners. Some
subgroups, such as immigrants, are
doing especially well. Others, such as
African Americans, are losing ground. 
Americans have generally been
tolerant of unequal outcomes in the
past, even as gaps between the rich
and the poor have risen, since most
believe that opportunities to get
ahead are abundant and that hard
work and skill are well rewarded. 
We find considerable fluidity in
American society. One’s family
background as a child, measured 
in terms of either income or wealth,
has a relatively modest effect on 
one’s subsequent success as an adult,
especially if one grew up in middle-
class circumstances. Those at the top
or bottom of the ladder are somewhat
less mobile. In addition, there is no
evidence that opportunity has increased
in a way that might offset the slower
and less broadly shared growth of
income and wealth that families have
experienced. Nor is there evidence
that the United States is in any 
F
way exceptional when compared 
to other advanced countries. Indeed, 
a number of advanced countries
provide more opportunity to their
citizens than does the United States.
UNDERSTANDING
ECONOMIC MOBILITY
Broadly defined, economic mobility
describes the ability of people to 
move up or down the economic
ladder within a lifetime or from one
generation to the next. Most of the
chapters in this volume measure
mobility in the United States in terms 
of family income; however, wealth
also plays an important role in the
story, a topic examined in Chapter IV.
Mobility also has a time dimension.
One can talk about mobility over 
a lifetime, between generations, or 
over a short period such as a year or
two. Unlike analyses that investigate
shorter-term fluctuations or volatility
in incomes, this volume focuses mainly
on intergenerational mobility—the
extent to which children move up or
down the income ladder relative to
their parents. This intergenerational
focus is intended to capture the spirit
of the American Dream, in which
each generation is expected to do
better than the one that came before.
We also need to distinguish between
changes in income across a generation
that are the result of absolute and relative
mobility and differentiate both of
these from changes in income that 
are due to rising or falling inequality. 
Imagine the economy as a ladder
upon which we are all perched at
some level. This ladder may be
getting taller, boosting everyone’s
incomes, as the result of economic
growth. In this volume, we refer 
to this as absolute mobility. At the
same time, the rungs on the ladder
may be getting closer together or
further apart as incomes become
more or less equally distributed. 
We call this a change in the degree 
of income inequality. Finally, the
ability of people to move from one
rung to another may be changing 
as well, depending on the extent 
of opportunity. We call this a 
change in relative mobility.
Much prior research and public
discourse has focused on the rate 
of economic growth or on the fact
that income inequality has been
increasing in recent decades. Much
less has been written about relative
mobility since it requires following
what happens to specific individuals’
incomes over their life course or over
several generations. But knowing
more about the degree of relative
mobility in the United States is
essential to judging the fairness 
of our society. 
To illustrate the importance of
relative mobility, consider three
hypothetical societies with identical
distributions of wealthy, poor, and
middle-class citizens.2
• The Meritocratic Society:
In this society those who work the
hardest and have the greatest talent,
regardless of class, gender, race, 
or other less-germane characteristics,
have the highest income. 
• The Fortune Cookie Society:
In this society, where one ends up
bears no relation to talent or energy,
and is purely a matter of luck.
• The Class-Stratified Society:
In this society, family background is 
all-important—children end up in the
same relative position as their parents.
Mobility between classes is small to
nonexistent. 
Given a choice between the three,
most people would choose to live in 
a meritocracy, which is, by its nature,
fairer and more just. In a meritocracy,
success is dependent on individual action
whereas in a class-stratified or fortune
cookie society, they are buffeted by
forces beyond people’s control. Even
if the level of income inequality were
identical in each of these societies,
most people would judge them quite
differently. In fact, most individuals
might well prefer to live in a meritocracy
with more income inequality than in
a class-stratified or fortune cookie
society with a more equal income
distribution. It is worth noting, however,
that even in a meritocracy people are
born with different genetic endowments
and are raised in different family
environments over which they have 
no control, raising fundamental
questions about the fairness of even 
a perfectly functioning meritocracy.
These circumstances of birth may 
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be the ultimate inequalities in any
society. That said, a meritocracy with 
a high degree of relative mobility is
clearly better than the alternatives. 
In what follows we give special
emphasis to relative mobility, 
but since changes in an individual
family’s fortunes also reflect what 
is happening to economic growth
(absolute mobility) and how broadly that
growth is shared (changes in income
inequality), we first examine all three
sources of change and then return 
to how, in combination, they have
affected the economic well-being of
individual Americans. 
Economic Growth
A growing economy ensures that 
each generation is better off than the
previous one. Economic growth is an
important source of upward mobility.
A middle-class family in 2008 has
access to many goods and services
that were either not available in 
the past (computers, cell phones,
microwaves) or were considered
luxuries (air travel, air conditioning,
television). 
But economic growth and the upward
absolute mobility it brings families
has slowed. From 1947 to 1973, the
rate of growth of the typical family’s
income was unusually rapid, roughly
doubling in a generation’s time.
However, since 1973 the increase
over a generation’s time has been
much smaller, about 20 percent, as
noted in Chapter II. In other words,
the tide lifting all boats has weakened
with the result that improvements 
for the youngest generation have 
not kept pace with what their parents
and grandparents experienced. 
Underlying this trend have been
changes in the earnings of both men
and women. Especially surprising is
the finding that men in their 30s
today are earning less than did the
men of their father’s generation (men
who were in their 30s in the 1970s).
As documented in Chapter V, in 2004
the inflation-adjusted incomes of men
in their 30s were 12 percent less, on
average, than the incomes of men in
their father’s generation at the same
age. Clearly this group of younger men
has not benefited from the economic
“up-escalator” that has historically
ensured that each generation would
do better than the last.
And yet in spite of declining incomes
for young men, family incomes have
continued to rise over the past several
decades, albeit slowly. Families are
better off because more women have
gone to work, and the rise in women’s
earnings has outpaced the decline for
men. No longer can the typical family
depend on a single earner to move
them up the economic ladder. 
However, a number of factors
complicate the interpretation of 
these and other data on family incomes.
The first is the declining size of the
American family which means that
the average family has fewer people
to support and thus is financially
better off for this reason alone. The
second is the time squeeze and extra
costs for child care or other work-
related expenses associated with the
loss of a full-time homemaker within
the family. The third is the growing
importance of non-cash benefits, such
as health insurance provided by
employers or the government. The
fourth is our focus on what is happening
to the typical family, whose fortunes
may improve little in a period when
most of the gains from growth are
going to people who are concentrated
at the top of the distribution. Finally,
there has been a substantial decline in
marriage rates over the past generation.
If having two earners is critical to the
economic success of many of today’s
families, then this decline, by depriving
many families of a second earner, has
reduced economic mobility. Thus, family
size and structure both play a critical
role in the mobility story, with the
growth of the two-earner family being
the primary factor that has saved the
typical family from downward mobility. 
All of these complexities should be
kept in mind as one reads this volume,
but none of them should, in our view,
overturn the basic conclusion that
family income growth has slowed. 
In the process, income inequality 
and relative mobility have become
increasingly important sources of the
changing fortunes of individual families.
Inequality
As suggested above, one reason the
average family has not fared better 
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in recent decades is economic 
growth has not been broadly shared.
Inequality of both income and wealth
has been increasing, as documented 
in Chapters II and IV. Inequality 
of family incomes fell until the late
1960s but has risen steadily ever
since. Wealth is even more unevenly
distributed than income, and the
concentration of assets at the top 
of the income distribution has been
growing at least since 1989. 
Relative Mobility
These facts about inequality tell 
us nothing about who is rich or poor.
Today’s rich may become tomorrow’s
poor or vice versa. So the more important
question may be how much opportunity
exists for individuals to move up and
down the economic ladder. That is,
how much relative mobility do we
have in the United States? Do the
advantages of birth persist into a
second generation or do they dissipate
as each generation makes its own way
in the world? Does the child born in
Newark have anything like the life
prospects of a child born in Beverly
Hills? Just how much opportunity do
children from families with varying
amounts of income and wealth have to
get ahead? If all or most children have
a decent shot at the American Dream,
then the fact that the dream may
produce very large fortunes for some
and very small fortunes for others
may not cause much concern. Indeed,
large prizes for success may simply
stir the kind of ambition and striving
necessary to a dynamic economy. 
These questions about relative mobility
are especially relevant during a period
in which inequalities of income and
wealth are on the rise. If there were
little or no economic inequality and
all incomes across society were similar,
discussions of relative mobility would
have little resonance: people could not
improve their economic status significantly
by changing ranks. Put differently, 
if the rungs on the economic ladder
were closer together, then occupying
one rung rather than another would
have few consequences. However, in 
a society with a high level of economic
inequality, in which the rungs on the
ladder are increasingly distant from
one another, where one stands on 
the ladder matters a great deal. As
income inequality has grown and 
the ability of economic growth to make
each generation better off than the
last has weakened, the question of
how much opportunity each individual
has to move up or down the ladder 
is critical.
Americans strongly believe that hard
work and talent lead to economic
success. This underlying belief in 
the fluidity of class and economic
status has differentiated Americans
from citizens in the majority of other
developed nations. As documented in
Chapter III, compared to their global
counterparts, Americans are far more
optimistic about their ability to control
their own economic destiny. They are
far more likely to believe that people
get rewarded for intelligence, skill,
and effort and far less likely to believe
that it’s the government’s responsibility
to reduce differences in income. The
public believes, in short, that we should
have a society based on equality of
opportunity, not equality of outcomes. 
So what is the state of opportunity or
relative mobility in the United States?
Just how fluid a society do we have?
In this volume, we approach this
question by examining in detail, and
with new data, the extent to which
family background determines where
one ends up in the overall distribution
of income and wealth. 
As shown in Chapter I, the view that
America is “the land of opportunity”
doesn’t entirely square with the facts.
Individual success is at least partly
determined by the kind of family 
into which one is born. For example,
42 percent of children born to parents
in the bottom fifth of the income
distribution remain in the bottom,
while 39 percent born to parents in the
top fifth remain at the top. This is
twice as high as would be expected 
by chance. On the other hand, this
“stickiness” at the top and the bottom 
is not found for children born into
middle-income families. They have
roughly an equal shot at moving 
up or moving down and of ending 
up in a different income quintile 
than their parents.
One method that scholars use to
determine how much relative mobility
or fluidity exists in the United States is
to estimate statistically the extent to which
a parent’s economic status affects the
economic position of their adult children.
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The most common measure, called
intergenerational income elasticity,
has been calculated by numerous
researchers, with varying results, 
but most estimates of this measure
find that it is in the neighborhood 
of 0.5. This number means that, on
average, if a child’s parents’ income 
is 20 percent higher than the average
family in the parents’ generation, then
the chances are that as an adult the
child will have an income that is 10
percent higher than the average for
his or her generation. In short, if this
mobility measure is 0.5, about half 
of the advantage of growing up in a
more affluent family is transmitted
from parents to their children. 
Two chapters in this volume, Chapters
V and VI, consider whether this
advantage is different for men and
women or for blacks and whites. 
For both men and women, but
especially for women, there is an
additional route to upward mobility
beyond earning a good income:
marrying well. If a child marries
someone whose income prospects 
are similar to the child’s own parents,
then marriage may help to preserve
the initial advantages or disadvantages
conferred by one’s family background.
Whatever the mechanism by which
parents transmit their advantages 
to their children, the evidence
suggests that sons and daughters 
have fairly similar rates of mobility
across generations. 
The story for black families is 
more disturbing. Not only are the
mobility prospects for poor black
children worse than the prospects 
for poor white children, but in
addition, the majority of black
children born to middle-income
parents in the late 1960s have less
family income than their parents did.
In short, they have been downwardly
mobile. Although this finding is based
on a fairly small sample, this failure
of middle-income black families to
pass their advantages on to their
children does not suggest that 
racial economic gaps will close 
any time soon. 
It is not only parents’ income but also
their wealth in the form of financial
assets such as stocks and bonds, and
nonfinancial assets such as equity in a
home, that can provide advantages to
the next generation. Parents may use
their assets to improve their children’s
chances of getting ahead, for example
by paying for their education, or they
may make direct transfers to their
children either before or after death.
Chapter IV, which reviews the current
data on wealth and its effects on
intergenerational mobility, concludes
that parent-child wealth correlations
are similar to parent-child income
correlations but that each generation
does have a reasonable shot at
accumulating assets. Moreover, 
the author cautions against thinking 
that the positive advantages wealthy
parents confer on their children
primarily reflect the direct inheritance
of wealth between generations: only
about one-quarter of families actually
receive inheritances. Whatever benefits
wealthy parents pass on to their
children, they are more subtle or
indirect than simple gifts of cash 
or other assets. 
What are we to conclude from the
research on relative mobility? Does
the United States have the kind of
equality of opportunity so often
heralded in our public discourse?
After all, some association between
the incomes of parents and children 
is to be expected since children will
always inherit certain advantages
from their parents, if for no other
reason than because they share similar
genes. Thus, we should not expect 
the correlation between parents’ and
children’s income or wealth to be zero. 
While there is certainly room for
more research and debate in this
area, the international comparisons
analyzed in Chapter III reveal that
there is less relative mobility in the
United States than in many other 
rich countries. One well-regarded
study finds, for example, that the
United States along with the United
Kingdom have a relatively low rate 
of relative mobility while Canada,
Norway, Finland, and Denmark 
have high rates of intergenerational
mobility. France, Germany, and
Sweden fall somewhere in the middle. 
Finally, most of the historical analysis,
detailed in Chapter II, reveals that there
has been no strong trend in relative
mobility since about 1970, although 
a few studies suggest that relative
mobility may have declined. In sum,
E C O N O M I C  M O B I L I T Y  P R O J E C T : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
O V E R V I E W Getting Ahead or Losing Ground: Economic Mobility in America5
inequalities of income and wealth
have clearly increased, but the
opportunity to win the larger prizes
being generated by today’s economy
has not risen in tandem and has, 
if anything, declined. 
THE AVERAGE FAMILY’S
EXPERIENCE
What does all of this mean for the
average family? How have absolute
and relative mobility along with growing
economic inequality affected individual
families over the past three decades? 
The first thing to note is that Americans
have become quite pessimistic of late
about economic prospects for their
children. Less than one-third of voters
in exit polls after the 2006 election
said that they thought life would be
better for the next generation.3 But 
is such pessimism warranted? How 
does this attitude stack up against 
the historical evidence? 
Based on new data, Chapter I finds
that two out of three people have
more inflation-adjusted income than
do their parents. Thus, most adult
children are doing better than their
parents did. And yet there is a downside
to this good news: one out of three
Americans has a family income that 
is below what their parents’ was a
generation ago. These changes in
inflation-adjusted income may
understate improvements in well-
being since families tend to be smaller
now and because various benefits that
have increased in value, such as health
insurance, are not included in the
income measures used for the research
in this volume. 
However, more of these families must
rely on two earners to get ahead and
pay the extra costs for child care and
other work-related expenses that this
entails. To some people, a finding 
that despite the increased work hours
associated with the growth of two-earner
families, one-third of American families
are worse off than their parents is
disturbing. They will argue that had
economic growth been higher and
more broadly distributed over the past
30 years, many more of today’s adults
would have been able to climb the
economic ladder. Others will emphasize
the fact that two out of three people
are better off than their parents. From
this second perspective, there is much
to celebrate and the hand-wringing
about rising inequality of income could
be viewed as unwarranted. 
The Special Case of Immigrants
There is one group for whom the
story is especially positive: immigrants.
Virtually all of the research on the
fortunes of American families cited
thus far is based on a sample of those
who were born in this country. Immigrant
families are not included in the surveys
for the simple reason that if one’s parents
were born in another country, data on
their income is not readily available.
But as noted in Chapter VII, devoted
specifically to the immigrant experience,
for this group the American Dream 
is alive and well. 
About 1.5 million immigrants (two-
thirds of them legal and one-third
illegal) come to the United States
every year, hoping to improve their
lives and those of their families.
Because wages and standards of living
are often higher in the United States
than in their country of origin, most
of them experience a big jump in their
economic prospects. Those who come
from industrialized countries earn more
than their native-born counterparts
while those who come from less
industrialized countries, like Mexico,
earn less than non-immigrants in the
United States but still far more than
they could have earned in their home
country. And by the second generation,
their children, on average, are doing
even better than their parents.
To be sure, the low levels of education
among recent immigrants from Mexico
and similar countries means that some
immigrants, although upwardly mobile
relative to their parents, are still earning
less than the average American. Still,
it seems fair to conclude that the United
States remains the land of opportunity
for those born in many other parts of
the world. 
Looking Forward: The Role 
of Education
What can we as a society do to ensure
that today’s children have the kinds
of opportunities needed to improve
the fortunes of individual families over
the coming generation? There is a widely
held belief in America that education
is the great leveler, and there is strong
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evidence that education contributes
substantially to earnings and that it
can boost the mobility of children
from poor and low-income families.
As noted in Chapter VIII, a college
degree is increasingly the ticket 
to improving or maintaining one’s
relative position in the economy. 
If it is obvious that education has
great potential to boost the economic
mobility of the less fortunate, it is
important to ask whether the nation’s
schools do enough to promote economic
mobility. An examination of preschool,
K-12, and undergraduate and graduate
education in the United States reveals
that the average effect of education 
at all levels is to reinforce rather 
than compensate for the differences
associated with family background
and the many home-based advantages
and disadvantages that children and
adolescents bring with them into the
classroom. There is no reason to
expect change in the disappointing
effect of education on economic
mobility unless effective reforms 
are aggressively pursued at all levels.
Any detailed discussion of such
reforms is beyond the scope of this
volume, but the issue should be front
and center for those concerned about
expanding opportunity. 
A GUIDE TO THE REST 
OF THE VOLUME
The purpose of this volume is not 
to address these policy challenges 
but rather to provide as objective 
and comprehensive a look at the data
as possible. The chapters that follow
include far more information than 
is reflected in these introductory
comments, including a great deal 
of new data and analysis. For this
reason, the reader is encouraged 
to dip into the succeeding chapters, 
each of which is briefly summarized
below. 
“Economic Mobility of 
Families Across Generations” 
by Julia Isaacs
This comprehensive view of
intergenerational mobility looks 
at how the three sources of change 
in an individual family’s fortunes
have contributed to their economic
position. In examining each of these,
Chapter I finds a mixed story for
mobility in the United States.
The current generation of adults 
is better off than the previous one,
but their incomes are more unevenly
distributed. Median family income 
for adults who were children in the
late 1960s and are now in their 30s
or 40s increased 29 percent, from
$55,600 for parents to $71,900 for
their children, adjusting for inflation.
The biggest gains have occurred at
the top of the distribution and the
smallest at the bottom. 
Two out of three of today’s adults
have higher levels of inflation-adjusted
family incomes than their own parents.
Compared to their parents, they also
live in families or households that 
are smaller and where there is often 
a second earner. The higher one’s
parents’ income, the less likely one is
to surpass it. If one’s parents’ income
was high, the only way to surpass it is
through economic growth. Adults whose
parents were lower on the ladder can
see an increase in their incomes, both
because of economic growth and because
they move up the ladder relative to
their parents, and many do. Indeed,
four out of five children whose parents
were in the bottom fifth of the income
distribution end up with higher incomes
than their parents. 
Contrary to American beliefs about
equality of opportunity, a child’s
economic position is heavily influenced
by that of his or her parents. Forty-two
percent of children born to parents in the
bottom fifth of the income distribution
remain in the bottom, while 39 percent
born to parents in the top fifth remain
at the top. Children of middle-income
parents have a near-equal likelihood
of ending up in any other quintile,
presenting equal promise and peril 
for those born to middle-class parents.
Only 6 percent of children born to
parents with family income at the
very bottom move to the very top.
Finally, the chapter combines the
concepts of absolute and relative
mobility to create four new categories:
about one-third of Americans are
“upwardly mobile” and as such have
surpassed their parents’ income and
their parents’ economic rankings.
About one-quarter of Americans are
“riding the tide,” remaining in the
same relative economic position 
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but making more than their parents
in absolute terms. A small group of
individuals (5 percent) are “falling
despite the tide,” having surpassed
their parents’ income yet having fallen
behind their parents in economic
standing. Finally, about one-third 
of Americans are “downwardly
mobile” and as such are both 
earning less than their parents and
have failed to rise above their parents’
economic position. That the portions
of the country that are upwardly
mobile and downwardly mobile 
are about the same highlights the
conclusion that the mobility story
for American families is quite 
mixed: while the economy is working 
for some, many others are still being
left behind.
“Trends in Intergenerational
Mobility” by Isabel Sawhill
Knowing what the trends have been
for mobility is useful for interpreting
other developments in American
society, such as rising economic
inequality, and in assessing the degree 
to which the opportunity to get ahead
may have changed in recent decades.
Chapter II further details trends in the
three sources of change that together
determine a family’s fortunes: economic
growth, income inequality, and
relative mobility.
The chapter finds that throughout
American history families have moved
up the ladder primarily as a result 
of economic growth. In short,
absolute mobility was high for 
much of the nation’s history. But 
for the most recent generations, those
born after about 1970, economic
growth has had less impact on the
average family and absolute mobility
has declined.
While absolute mobility has been
declining, income inequality has been
rising. Economic growth is no longer
as broadly shared as it was in the
1950s and 1960s, so growing gaps
between the rich and poor have been
forming since the 1970s.
These growing gaps along with slower
growth make it more important than
ever that children have an opportunity
to improve their relative status by
moving up the economic ladder. Solid
studies, such as those by Gary Solon
and Christopher Jencks, suggest that
there is little evidence that relative
mobility has increased or decreased
since about the 1970s. However, the
research base for coming to any firm
conclusions is limited and the studies
do not all agree. For example, according
to studies by Bhashkar Mazumder
and colleagues, relative mobility 
has declined.
Looking forward, there is not 
yet sufficient data to say with any
confidence what the experience 
of subsequent generations will be. 
However, it is clear that with growing
economic inequality and slowing
economic growth the effects of family
background on one’s ultimate
economic success are more important
than they used to be. 
“International Comparisons 
of Economic Mobility” by Julia
Isaacs
A comparison of mobility in America
with mobility in other countries reveals
another aspect of the opportunity to
get ahead. Chapter III concludes that,
for the most part, the widely held
assumption of greater economic
mobility in the United States is 
not borne out by the evidence, despite
the fact that Americans have more
faith in their ability to get ahead than
do many people abroad.
The chapter summarizes the work 
of Miles Corak who, in a comparison
of mobility in the United States with
mobility in several developed European
nations, concludes that America is a
low-mobility country in which about
half of parental earnings advantages
are passed onto sons. The United
Kingdom is also classified as a low-
mobility country, while France, Germany,
and Sweden are mid-range, and Canada,
Norway, Finland, and Denmark are
considered high-mobility countries,
where less than 20 percent of income
advantages are passed onto children.
The chapter also reviews research 
by Markus Jäntii and colleagues that
delves more deeply into this question
by examining how the relationship
between the earnings of parents and
children varies for individuals who
are on different rungs of the economic
ladder. They find that starting at the
bottom of the earnings ladder is more
of a handicap in the United States
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than in other countries. In other words,
though there is stickiness at the top
and bottom of the earnings ladder in
all countries, there is a particularly
high amount of stickiness at the
bottom for Americans. 
There is some good news, however,
from this research. First, workers in
the middle of the earnings distribution
are fairly mobile across all countries,
and occupational mobility appears to 
be higher in the United States than 
in Europe. Second, the United States
seems to rank high when compared
with some less developed countries 
in terms of intergenerational mobility.
And finally, U.S. workers seem as
likely as European workers to move 
up or down the earnings ladder in a 
5- or 10-year period. 
The chapter notes that the international
literature focuses only on relative
mobility measures and ignores the
important effects of economic growth.
It thus calls for future cross-country
research investigating both absolute
and relative mobility in order to gain
a more comprehensive view of the
opportunity of people in different
countries to get ahead. 
“Wealth and Economic Mobility”
by Ron Haskins
Previous chapters have shown that
there is a substantial relationship
between the income of parents and
the income of their adult children.
Does the same relationship exist 
for the wealth of parents and their
children? Ron Haskins examines 
this relationship and concludes that
parent-child correlations in the amount
of wealth families hold are similar 
to parent-child correlations in 
their incomes. 
What have the trends in wealth been
over the past few decades? Haskins
shows that from 1989 to 2004, the
growth of wealth in the United States
was unusually strong but also very
unevenly distributed. This was especially
so for financial assets, with the top
one percent of households controlling
an average of 50 percent of all financial
assets in 2004. 
Indebtedness, which reduces net
assets and thus wealth, has also been
increasing. Since 1949, total debt as 
a percentage of disposable personal
income has increased nearly fourfold.
Haskins shows that those likely to
experience trouble with excessive debt
are concentrated at the bottom of the
income distribution, so the lower the
income, on average, the higher the
rate of excessive debt.
How wealth is distributed in the
current generation is important, 
but equally important is whether 
the winners in a given generation 
can pass their winnings on to their
children or use their winnings to
boost the economic prospects of their
children. The intergenerational wealth
elasticity, similar to the intergenerational
income elasticity discussed in other
chapters, expresses the percentage
variation to expect in a child’s wealth 
in connection with a percentage
variation in his or her parents’ wealth.
Recent studies have found wealth
elasticities between .32 and .50 in 
the United States, indicating that 
the wealth of children is quite strongly
correlated with the wealth of their
parents. 
The greatest wealth similarity is
between parents and offspring at the
extremes of the income distribution.
For example, children whose parents
are in the top quintile of the wealth
distribution have a 36 percent chance
of also being in the top quintile and a
60 percent chance of being in one of
the two top quintiles in their adult years.
However, there is still considerable
movement by adult children to wealth
quintiles other than the one occupied by
their parents. For example, 35 percent
of adult children of parents in the lowest
wealth quintile moved up to the top
three quintiles, while over 40 percent
of those born to parents in the top
wealth quintile moved down to the
bottom three quintiles. This suggests
that there is a much greater level of
intergenerational fluidity than has
been suggested by recent accounts 
in the popular press.
Given the relatively strong relationship
between parents’ wealth and the wealth
of their children, it is important to
question why this relationship exists.
There are two possible reasons: 
parents could help their children
achieve wealth by making investments
in their development or by giving them
money directly. However, the majority
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of families do not receive substantial
gifts or inheritances from their parents
or others, suggesting that more indirect
influences are at work. This finding
combined with the data cited above
indicates that the American economy
continues to facilitate the production
and accumulation of wealth in each
new generation.
“Economic Mobility of Men 
and Women” by Julia Isaacs
If Chapter I provided new data on
how today’s families are faring relative
to their parents, Chapters V, VI, and
VII look beyond the story for all families
to examine how mobility may have
varied for men and women, for blacks
and whites and for immigrants and
native-born Americans. 
In Chapter V, Isaacs examines how men
and women have fared economically
over the past few decades and whether
the transmission of economic advantage
from parents to children has differed
for sons and daughters.
Isaacs finds that women in their 
30s today have substantially higher
personal income than comparably
aged women in their mothers’
generation but still make less than
their male counterparts. Men have
experienced something entirely
different. Inflation-adjusted median
income for men in their 30s fell by 
12 percent between 1974 and 2004.
These two trends together led to a
slight increase in family incomes 
over the same time period.
Unlike personal income growth, relative
income mobility for sons and daughters
has been quite similar. One exception
is lower mobility rates for the daughters
of low-income parents as compared
with the sons of low-income parents,
a difference that is at least partly 
due to the fact that the daughters are
more likely to become single parents.
Isaacs finds that the intergenerational
transmission of advantages for men is
primarily driven by a relatively strong
relationship between the earnings of
fathers and sons. For both sexes, but
especially for women, intergenerational
transmission is also affected by the
tendency to marry those whose income
prospects are similar to one’s parents.
The findings highlight the importance
of recognizing that economic mobility
generally occurs within the context 
of families and is not solely a result 
of individuals operating as lone
economic agents.
“Economic Mobility of Black and
White Families” by Julia Isaacs
Throughout history blacks have had
lower median incomes and higher
poverty rates than whites in the United
States. Some progress in closing these
gaps has occurred, but the pace of
change has often been slow or even
moved in the wrong direction. While
Isaacs shows that median family incomes
have risen for both black and white
families over the past 30 years, they
have risen less for black families, in
part because of declines in the incomes
of black men combined with low
marriage rates in the black population.
The result was no steady progress 
in reducing the family income gaps
between blacks and whites between
1974 and 2004. In 2004, median
family income of blacks ages 30 to 39
was only 58 percent that of white
families in the same age group. 
The data also reveal a significant
difference in the extent to which
black and white parents are able 
to pass their economic advantages
onto their children. Isaacs finds that
not only are white children more likely
to surpass their parents’ income than
black children at a similar point in
the income distribution, but they are
also more likely to move up the ladder,
while black children are more likely
to fall down. Indeed almost half of
black children whose parents were
solidly middle class in the late 1960s
end up falling to the bottom of the
income distribution, compared to 16
percent of white children. And black
children from poor families have poorer
prospects than white children from
such families: more than half (54
percent) of black children born to
parents in the bottom quintile remain
there, compared to 31 percent of
white children.
There is still much work to be done 
in this field, and Isaacs cautions that
the current analysis is hindered by the
small number of minority households
in the longitudinal surveys used to
measure intergenerational mobility.
She calls for analysis of additional
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data sets as well as more extensive
research on factors contributing to
racial differences to better understand
the different mobility experiences of
blacks and whites.
“Immigration: Wages, Education,
and Mobility” by Ron Haskins
The American engine of economic
assimilation continues to be a powerful
force, but the engine is incorporating
a fundamentally different and larger
group of immigrants than it did in
earlier generations. Immigration rose
during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s,
and has remained at a high level of
nearly one million legal immigrants
entering the country each year
throughout the 1990s. In addition to
legal immigrants, it is estimated that
about 500,000 illegal immigrants
now arrive each year.
The effects of a much larger number 
of immigrants on the wages and
employment prospects for native-
born Americans is a hotly contested
issue, and one which has not been
resolved. One side, represented by
George Borjas of Harvard, argues that
increases in less-skilled immigrants
have reduced wages and employment
and increased incarceration rates for
blacks. The other side, represented by
David Card of Berkeley, argues that
immigrants have affected the demand
for goods as well as the supply of 
labor and that the American economy
has had little difficulty absorbing
immigrant labor without imposing
costs on the native-born. 
While the debate over the impact of
immigration on native-born Americans
is by no means resolved, there is little
debate that these immigrants have
improved their circumstances by
coming to the United States and are
experiencing strong upward mobility
between generations. Not only is the
first generation to arrive in the United
States likely to be much better off
than their parents in the home country,
dramatically so in the case of immigrants
that come from less industrialized
countries, but the second generation
(the children of immigrants) also
experiences upward mobility on average.
The story for second generation
immigrants is largely determined by
the large degree of assimilation that
takes place between the first and
second generation. While first generation
immigrants from non-industrialized
nations tend to earn less than average
non-immigrant workers, those from
industrialized nations tend to earn
more. By the second generation the
wages of both groups move toward
average non-immigrants wages, so
second generation immigrants from
non-industrialized nations generally
experience upward relative mobility,
while those from industrialized nations
tend to move in the opposite direction.
As a much larger number of today’s
immigrants come from less industrialized
countries, in the aggregate, there is a
clear trend of upward mobility amongst
second generation immigrants.
At the same time, because these
immigrants from less industrialized
countries are becoming more numerous
and have a relatively low level of
educational attainment, the relative
wages of first and second generation
immigrants have been declining over
the last 60 years compared to non-
immigrants. In 1940, new immigrants
were earning almost 6 percent more
than non-immigrant workers; in
1970, recent arrivals were still
earning 1.4 percent more than their
non-immigrant counterparts; in 2000,
first generation immigrants earned 
20 percent less than the typical non-
immigrant worker. Relative wages for
second generation immigrants have
declined similarly.
Although there is considerable
assimilation, immigrants in the
United States resemble their non-
immigrant counterparts in the way 
in which certain advantages persist
between generations. However, as
recent immigrants have become more
educationally disadvantaged, the
challenge of assimilation for the
second generation will be greater.
“Education and Economic
Mobility” by Ron Haskins
In this chapter, Haskins reviews the
basic facts showing the strong correlation
between education and income, with
every additional degree from high
school through graduate or professional
school improving one’s income. He
notes that although Americans are
becoming more educated on the
whole, the upward trend has slowed
in recent decades, especially for men.
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In addition, whites and Asians have
significantly higher rates of graduation
from both high school and college
than do blacks and Hispanics. 
Furthermore, data support the
assumption that because education
has such a strong influence on income,
it has a strong influence on economic
mobility across generations as well.
Haskins shows that a greater percentage
of adult children with college degrees
exceeded their parents’ income than
those without a college degree across
the entire income spectrum. Thus,
whatever one’s family background,
education provides an important
boost to one’s future prospects. But
education does not erase the effects 
of family background. Strikingly,
children from low-income families
with a college education are no more
likely to reach the top of the income
ladder than children from high-
income families without a college
education. In short, education is
critical to success in today’s economy
and an important explanation of 
why some groups get ahead while
others are left behind, but it cannot
completely erase the effects of family
background on one’s ultimate success.
While most Americans view education
as the great leveler and a key factor 
in increasing the mobility of individuals
and their families, Haskins finds, as
have others, that education in the United
States is not doing as much as it could
to improve the fortunes of individual
Americans. Indeed, Haskins concludes
that at every level from preschool, to
the K-12 system, to the nation’s
colleges and universities, the average
effect of education is to reinforce the
differences associated with family
background. This conclusion is based
on the fact that test score gaps by
race and income are large even at 
an early age, and despite many efforts
at reform, educational achievement
has changed little and the gaps
between more and less advantaged
students have closed only modestly.
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ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF
FAMILIES
ACROSS GENERATIONS
BY JULIA B. ISAACS, The Brookings Institution
or most Americans, seeing
that one’s children are better
off than oneself is the essence
of living the American Dream. Indeed,
much of the American spirit is grounded
in the belief that with determination
and hard work, one can rise from
humble beginnings and achieve a
comfortable, middle-class life, if 
not great wealth. 
Do children in America, in fact,
advance beyond their parents in terms
of family income? Do children from
different family backgrounds have 
an equal shot at rising in society? 
This chapter seeks to answer these 
two central questions about the
economic mobility of families across
recent generations. To explore these
questions, the analysis focuses on
measures of absolute mobility, or
how overall trends in economic
growth lead to increased economic
well-being, and measures of relative
mobility, or how easily Americans 
of different family backgrounds move
up or down the income ladder, in
relative economic standing.
A Note about Method
As explained in the overview chapter, 
economic mobility has increasingly
become a family enterprise. Accordingly,
this study focuses on family incomes of
both the parents and children in this
sample. In chapters that follow, outcomes
by gender, race, and education are
analyzed for these same families.
The primary source of data for this
analysis is a nationally representative
sample of children who were ages
0–18 in 1968. These children and
their parents have been tracked for
more than 36 years through the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), allowing comparison of the
children’s income as adults with
their family’s income in childhood. 
Specifically, total family income of
the now-grown children averaged across
five recent years (1995, 1996, 1998,
2000 and 2002) is compared with
the five-year average of their parents’
income in 1967–1971. (Further
methodological discussion of the PSID
data sample and how family income
is defined is provided in Appendix A.) 
Any analysis that seeks to compre-
hensively assess the health of the
American Dream and economic
opportunity must consider both
absolute and relative mobility.
Traditional measures of absolute
mobility involve comparisons of
growth at different points in the
income distribution. This chapter
introduces a new measure of mobility
that directly compares children and
parents when assessing growth in
real income. For analysis of relative
mobility, parents and children are
ranked by family income and then
divided into five equal-sized groups,
or quintiles. The analysis then measures
the extent to which families move
from one quintile to another.
In addition to analyzing absolute and
relative mobility independently, the
study introduces a new typology that
integrates these two key concepts and
describes how Americans experience
economic mobility in America today.
REAL INCOME GROWTH:
THE CURRENT GENERATION 
IS BETTER OFF THAN THE
PREVIOUS ONE 
Adults who were children in 1968—those
who were in their 30s and 40s at the
end of the century—tend to have
more income than did their parents’
generation at the same age.
F
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Median family income rose by 29
percent between the two generations,
from $55,600 in inflation-adjusted
dollars to $71,900.1 Mean or average
family incomes, which are more
strongly influenced by incomes at
the top of the income distribution,
grew even more rapidly, from $61,600
to $88,000 (a 43 percent increase). 
Income growth occurred not only 
at the median but throughout the
income distribution, as shown in
Figure 1. When parents and children
are each ranked by family income
and divided into quintiles, the dividing
lines between groups are always
higher for the children’s generation
than the parents’ generation. 
For example, those parents in the
top fifth in 1967–1971 have family
income of $81,200 or higher; the
comparable benchmark is $116,700 
or higher for the adult children’s
generation. Parents with a family
income of $50,000 place in the 
middle-income group, but in the 
next generation, that family income
ranks in the second-to-bottom quintile.
Further, as many observers have
pointed out in recent years, the
amount of growth has been unevenly
distributed over the past few decades,
with the most rapid growth concentrated
at the top of the income distribution.
This trend is also visible in Figure 1,
which shows income growth at the
median of each fifth of the income
distribution. Median family income
in the top quintile grew by 52 percent,
compared to only 18 percent for the
bottom fifth. (Note that this figure
does not directly compare adult children
with their own parents: families who
are in the top fifth of the children’s
generation may not have been in the
top fifth in the parents’ generation.)
Other data sets with more detailed
information on individuals at the very
top suggest that growth rates were
even higher at the top 1 percent. The
Congressional Budget Office found
that income of the top 1 percent rose
176 percent, based on after-tax personal
income between 1979 and 2004.2
Four important points about 
the overall increases in income
should be noted: 
(1) Incomes and income 
growth are particularly high 
in this study, which is based on 
a sample of native-born adults 
at prime earning ages. Family
incomes in the PSID sample were
measured in 1967–1971, when
parents had an average age of 41
years, and again in 1995–2002, 
when their adult children had an
average age of 39 years. The growth
in median family income between
1969 and 1998 was only 9 percent
when using the Census Bureau’s
Current Population Survey (CPS),
which includes a greater age range
and immigrants. When CPS data 
are restricted to native-born family
heads, of prime-earning ages, the
growth rate in median family income
is similar to the 29 percent observed
in the PSID data.3
(2) The growth in family 
incomes over this time period 
was accompanied by a shrinking
in family size. According to Current
Population Survey data, the average
family size for adults in their 30s
shrank from 4.5 to 3.2 persons 
between 1969 and 1998. Taking into
consideration the smaller family 
size as well as the growth in family
income, families are generally better
off economically today.4
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FIGURE 1
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data on family income averaged over several years.
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(3) Much of the growth in family
income is because more women
have gone to work. Moreover,
average earnings have increased
for those women who do work.
In contrast, earnings of men in their
30s have remained surprisingly flat
over the past four decades. (See
Chapter V “Economic Mobility 
of Men and Women.”) 
(4) Non-cash contributions 
may affect upward mobility.
These analyses of changes in family
income do not include the effects 
of fringe benefits, such as employer-
provided health insurance and
retirement benefits, nor do they
include the effects of taxes and non-
cash benefits such as food stamps.
Data constraints prevent these
variables from being easily added 
to the detailed analysis, but there
is some evidence to suggest that
upward mobility over the past four
decades would be somewhat higher 
if these non-cash contributions were
included. (For further discussion of
non-cash contributions to economic
well-being, see Appendix B). 
ABSOLUTE MOBILITY: 
MOST AMERICANS HAVE
MORE INCOME THAN 
THEIR PARENTS
While a comparison of median
family incomes suggests how one
generation is faring relative to earlier
generations, it does not describe how
individuals fare relative to their own
parents. To address this question,
levels of family income were compared
between matched pairs of children 
and parents, rather than between
aggregate statistics for one generation
and an earlier one. The simplest
version of this new measure is a
“yes/no” determination of whether
children have higher income than
their parents. 
Two out of three Americans have
higher family incomes today than
their own parents had some 30
years ago.
More specifically, 67 percent of
Americans who were children in
1968 had higher levels of real family
income in 1995–2002 than their
parents had in 1967–1971 (see
Figure 2).5 The remaining one-third
of Americans had income equal to or
less than their parents’ income, after
adjusting for inflation. Americans’
optimistic views about mobility and
opportunity in America may stem
from the fact that two out of three
children have higher levels of absolute
income than their parents. That family
incomes rise over a 30-year period is
not surprising. In fact, more children
might have advanced beyond their
parents’ income if economic growth
had been higher and more equally
distributed over the past 30 years.
While it would be instructive to
compare this statistic to earlier
generations, the PSID only began
collecting data in 1968. Nor has this
type of measure been done for other
countries to allow for international
comparisons. It is thus hard to say
whether it is “good news” that two
out of three children have incomes
above the income of their parents, 
or “bad news” that the statistic is
not higher. 
Children born to parents in the
bottom fifth are more likely to
surpass their parents’ income
than are children from any other
background.
More than four out of five children
born to parents in the bottom quintile
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FIGURE 2
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
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have greater family income than their
parents. In contrast, less than half (43
percent) of those whose parents are 
in the top fifth of income surpass their
parents. The higher one’s parents’
income, the less likely one is to rise
above it. 
An associated view of income growth
is provided in Figure 3, which shows
the extent to which children of parents
in each quintile surpass their parents’
income. This approach provides a
picture of the economic performance
of the typical child from each of the
five groups of family background. 
The higher the parents’ income, the
higher the income of the adult child.
If there were no connection between
parents’ and their children’s
income—that is, if there was perfect
mobility—the median family incomes
for each group of children would be
$71,900, the same as the median
family income for the overall population.
Instead, the incomes of adults whose
parents were in the top fifth of the
income distribution exceed the incomes
of children from all other economic
backgrounds, and each subsequent
group has somewhat lower income.
Those whose parents are at the
bottom of the income distribution
have less than half as much family
income as those whose parents were
at the top ($46,100 compared to
$99,700). 
However, the higher the parents’
income, the lower the amount 
by which children surpass their 
parents.
Median family income for children of
parents in the highest income group
is actually the same as their parents’
median family income. Economically
privileged children usually grow up
to have high incomes relative to other
adult children, but not relative to
their own parents. At the other end
of the spectrum, children whose
parents were in the bottom fifth have
almost twice as much income as their
parents—though not enough to bring
them abreast of their contemporaries.6
A comparison of parental and adult
child incomes in actual dollar levels
provides a basic measure of mobility
that may be consistent with how many
people think about their own economic
progress. Such measures are strongly
affected by overall levels of economic
growth, and how this economic growth
has translated into income growth.
However, a child with an income
that is $10,000 above his or her
parents may not be doing well if
most of his or her childhood peers
have gained $20,000, because the
child may perceive he or she has
fallen in relative economic status.
Thus it is also important to examine
relative mobility, a topic of considerable
study by economists and sociologists. 
RELATIVE MOBILITY:
CHILDREN’S PROSPECTS
ARE LIMITED BY FAMILY
BACKGROUND
Do children from different family
backgrounds have an equal shot 
of rising to the top or falling to 
the bottom of the income ladder?
Measures of relative mobility 
address the question of how children
move up and down in social rank,
relative to their initial starting point
or family background. For this
analysis, individuals were assigned to
one of five income groups, from lowest
to highest, first according to their
parents’ income and then according
to their own income as adults. 
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FIGURE 3
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data on family income averaged over several years.
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The two rankings were then
compared to see if children have
moved up or down in income
ranking. 
All Americans do not have 
an equal shot at getting ahead, 
and one’s chances are largely
dependent on one’s parents’
economic position. 
A graphic representation of the
probabilities of transitioning from
one income group to another over a
generation is presented in Figure 4,
which shows that the probability 
of ending up in a particular income
quintile as an adult depends on
where one’s parents were in the 
income distribution.
Children born to parents in 
the top quintile have the highest 
likelihood of attaining the top,
and children born to parents 
in the bottom quintile have the
highest likelihood of being in 
the bottom themselves.
This phenomenon is referred to as
“stickiness” at the ends of the income
distribution. As shown in Figure 4, 
it is fairly hard for children born in
the bottom fifth to escape from the
bottom: 42 percent remain there and
another 42 percent end up in either
the lower-middle or middle fifth.
Only 17 percent of those born to
parents in the bottom quintile climb
to one of the top two income groups.
At the other end of the distribution, 
39 percent of children born to
parents in the top fifth attain the 
top themselves with an additional 
23 percent landing in the fourth
highest quintile. 
Surprisingly, American children 
from low-income families appear 
to have less relative mobility than
their counterparts in five northern
European countries, according 
to a recent international study 
of earnings of fathers and sons.
Whereas 42 percent of American
sons whose fathers had earnings in
the bottom quintile had low earnings
themselves, the comparable percentages
ranged from 25 to 30 percent 
in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom
(see Chapter III, “International
Comparisons of Economic Mobility”).
The chances of making it to 
the top of the income distribution
decline steadily as one’s parents’
family income decreases.
Middle-income children are only half
as likely as children from the top
fifth to climb to the top themselves
(19 percent compared to 39 percent).
Moreover, only 6 percent of children
born to parents with family income
in the bottom fifth move to the very
top of the distribution, indicating that
the “rags to riches” phenomenon of
moving from the bottom to the top
of the income ladder is infrequent.
Nonetheless, there is a fair amount
of mobility, and those born at the
top of the income distribution have
no guarantee of staying there. While
39 percent of those born into the top
fifth of the income distribution stay
there, more than half—the remaining
61 percent—move downward in the
income ranking.7
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FIGURE 4 Children’s Chances of Getting Ahead or Falling Behind,
by Parents’ Family Income 
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Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data
on family income averaged over several
years and reported in 2006 dollars. 
Note: The bars show the probability 
of reaching an income ranking for children 
of a certain parental ranking. For example,
the first bar shows that 42 percent of those
whose parents were in the bottom quintile
ended up in the bottom quintile themselves,
23 percent of them ended in the second
quintile, 19 percent in the middle quintile,
11 percent in the fourth quintile and 
6 percent in the top quintile. 
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Children born to middle-income
parents are close to the “perfect
mobility” condition of being
equally likely to move to any
quintile in the income distribution.
Children whose parents are in the
middle quintile are about as likely 
to stay in the middle (23 percent) 
as to jump to the top (19 percent) 
or fall to the bottom (17 percent).
One reason that children in the
middle show more mobility than
those at the tails of the distribution
is that one can move either up or
down from the middle, whereas 
those who start at the top or bottom
can move in only one direction.
A number of other researchers have
found similar results when analyzing
intergenerational mobility through 
a transition matrix such as the one
presented in Figure 4.8 Researchers
also have developed summary
statistics that capture intergenerational
mobility information in a single
number that summarizes the society-
wide relationship between parent and
child incomes. The most common
such measure, “intergenerational
income elasticity,” would be 0.0 in 
a hypothetical society where parental
income has no effect on a child’s
economic prospects and 1.0 where
there is a one-to-one correspondence
between parental income and adult
child income.9
Recent estimates of the intergenerational
income elasticity in the United States
range from about 0.4 to 0.6, meaning
that about half of the difference in
income between families in one
generation persists into the next
generation.10 This aggregate measure
of relative mobility is particularly
useful when comparing the United
States to other countries, or when
comparing different points in time
and is used in other chapters in this
volume. However, it measures income
of both parents and children relative
to the average for their own generation
and is silent on absolute growth
across generations. 
A NEW TYPOLOGY: ONE-
THIRD OF AMERICANS MOVE
UP IN BOTH ABSOLUTE AND
RELATIVE TERMS 
Since many Americans think of the
American Dream in terms of both
gaining higher incomes and rising in
society, it is important to demonstrate
how Americans move beyond their
parents in both absolute and relative
terms. 
To examine the chances that children’s
movement consists of both changes
in absolute income levels and relative
economic standing, the mobility
measures used for this analysis 
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Higher income and 58 52 36 26 N/A(1) 34 
up 1 or more quintiles
Riding the tide
Higher income and 24(2) 20 23 32 34(1) 27
same quintile
Falling despite the tide
Higher income and N/A(2) 1 7 9 10 5
down 1 quintile
Downwardly mobile
Lower income and 18 26 34 33 57 33
lower/same quintile(3)
Total all children’s families 100 100 100 100 100 100
Parents’ Family Income Rank
TABLE 1 Children’s Chances of Experiencing both Absolute and
Relative Mobility, by Parents’ Family Income 
(percent in each category)
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
Notes: (1) Those in the top quintile cannot
meet this definition of “upwardly mobile,”
because there is no quintile above the top
quintile.11
(2) Those in bottom quintile cannot meet
this definition of “downwardly mobile,”
because there is no quintile below the
bottom quintile.
(3) Any observation with income exactly
equal to parents is also classified as
downwardly mobile.
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were combined in a new, four-part
typology, presented in Table 1.12
This typology suggests that while
many Americans are getting ahead
in absolute terms, they are not
necessarily moving up the income
distribution. As incomes have grown,
the whole distribution has shifted
upward over time. 
One-third of all children are
upwardly mobile under the 
new typology.
These children are getting ahead of
their parents in real family income
and also moving up ahead of their
parents in economic ranking (by one
or more quintiles). This means that
of the 67 percent of Americans who
have higher family incomes than
their parents, only half move ahead
of their parents in income ranking.
About half of the children in the
bottom and second quintiles are
upwardly mobile.
About one-quarter of children
are riding the tide.
The next generation is getting ahead
of their parents’ income in absolute
terms but remaining in the same
economic position as their parents.
Making up 27 percent of Americans
overall, those riding the tide are more
likely to be in the two top quintiles.
A small group of children, 
5 percent, are falling despite 
the tide.
They get ahead of their parents’
income in absolute terms but fall
below their parents’ economic
position.13 Close to one tenth of
individuals born into the middle,
fourth and top quintiles are falling
behind despite having more income
than their parents. This trend may
contribute to the much-discussed
anxiety of middle-class Americans
today.
One-third of Americans 
are downwardly mobile.
The next generation is falling
behind their parents in both real
family income and relative rank.
One-third of the families in the
middle and fourth quintiles are
downwardly mobile, and more than
half of those in the highest income
group are downwardly mobile. 
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, studies of economic
mobility have looked at either absolute
or relative mobility, but not both.
Both types of mobility are important
to assessing the health of the
American Dream. 
By all measures, many Americans
do get ahead of their parents in real
income. Assessing absolute mobility
across these two generations reveals
that median family income has
increased, as would be expected 
in a period of a growing economy.
Moreover, a direct intergenerational
comparison shows that two-thirds 
of Americans make more family
income in real terms than their
parents did. However, the other 
one-third fails to surpass the 
income of their parents, leaving
room for further improvement. 
Economic position is strongly 
influenced by parental economic
standing. Children of low-income
parents and middle-income parents
are much less likely to make it to
the top quintile than are children
born to parents in the top quintile.
Further, a high percentage of 
low-income children remain in the
bottom fifth, calling into question
the dream that all children have
equal chances of achieving economic
success. 
A new typology of mobility that 
integrates elements of absolute and
relative mobility reinforces the finding
that some Americans experience an
increase in real income over their
parents without moving up in relative
standing. This typology indicates
that only half of the two-thirds of
Americans who make more family
income than their parents are upwardly
mobile in the sense of also moving
up one or more quintiles. Another
one-third of Americans are either
“riding the tide,” that is, moving up
in income without changing relative
standing, or falling in relative rank
despite making more than their
parents in family income. Finally,
one-third of Americans are actually
downwardly mobile in both income
and economic rank.
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NOTES
1 Unless noted otherwise, all incomes are reported in 2006 dollars, using the CPI-U-RS to adjust for inflation. Family incomes are somewhat
higher in this PSID sample than in traditional Census Bureau statistics, for reasons discussed in note 3. 
2 Congressional Budget Office, 2006. Though using a somewhat different income measure and time period, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) finds a similar pattern of higher growth at the top than the bottom. Specifically, CBO reports that between 1979 and 2004, after-tax
income rose by 69 percent for the richest one-fifth and 176 percent for the top 1 percent, compared to 41 percent overall and only 6 percent
for the poorest fifth of the income distribution. See note 20 for fuller description of the after-tax income measure used in the CBO analysis. 
3 Comparisons of the PSID and CPS indicate that the PSID estimates of income are generally higher than those in the CPS, but follow similar
trends over time. (See Gouskova and Schoeni, 2007; and Yong-Seong Kim and Stafford, 2000). Also, family incomes and income growth are
high in this analysis because it focuses on families with children in the United States in 1968, excluding the elderly and very young adults, as
well as those without children in 1968 and the large number of immigrants who have arrived since 1968. (For information on immigrant
mobility, see the chapter “Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility”). While the CPS has lower incomes, it has similar growth rates when
the analysis is restricted to a subsample of CPS families that resemble the PSID families in age, presence of children, and native-born status,
as shown in the table below: 
4 Family income adjusted for family size (by dividing family income by the square root of family size) grew by 33 percent after inflation, from
$22,400 to $29,800, according to CPS data for all families in 1969 and 1998.
5 The percentage of children who are better off than their parents would increase from 67 percent to 81 percent if family incomes were
adjusted for family size, because the children’s generation has smaller family size. Also note that the same analysis was done on a restricted
sample, of adults ages 33–48 (instead of 27–52), to explore the sensitivity of the results to the age range at which the incomes of adult
children were measured. Under the tighter age sample, the number of adult children who exceeded their parents’ income was slightly higher
but still rounded to 67 percent. 
6 Note that the analysis classifies individuals into five groups based on parental income status, and then measures change from that parental
income status. One would therefore expect some increase from the lowest parental income status, consistent with a tendency called “regression
to the mean”; those with extreme scores at one point in time due to random chance or luck will tend to have less extreme scores when
measured later. Some of the parents who are classified into the bottom category may be experiencing atypically low income in those five years,
relative to their life-time experiences or the experiences of their children. Using five years of income rather than one introduces fewer
distortions, as the one year might represent abnormally low income. 
7 This downward movement by 61 percent of children born at the top helps explain the finding (presented in Figure 3) that the adult family
median incomes of children from the top fifth is slightly below the median income for their parents. This occurs despite the fact that the 
39 percent who remain at the top are doing extremely well—recall from Figure 1 that income growth was highest at the top of the income
distribution. However, the downward mobility of the others brings down the median income of this group, particularly when compared 
to their parents, 100 percent of which are, by definition, at the top fifth of the parental generation. 
8 See Hertz, 2005; and Jäntti, Bratsbert, Roed, Rauum et al., 2006 for two recent analyses using the PSID data; see Peters, 2002 for similar
analysis using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLS). Administrative data offers another opportunity to track incomes
longitudinally, but such analyses are generally limited to individual earnings, not family income.
9 The intergenerational elasticity (IGE) measure comes from a linear regression equation estimating the relationship between children’s and
parents’ income, with both child and parental income expressed in logarithmic measures. It measures the percentage difference in expected
child income associated with a one percent difference in parental income. The same technique can be used to measure the intergenerational
elasticity of earnings as well as income. In societies where there is more inequality in the children’s generation than the parents’ generation, 
the IGE can fall outside the 0 to 1 range. To interpret the IGE, imagine a group of parents whose income is 80 percent higher than average. 
If they are in a society with an IGE of 0.5, then their children will, on average, have incomes that will be 40 percent higher than average 
(80 percent x 0.5). If they live in a society where the IGE is only 0.2, then their children’s income would average only 16 percent above
average (80 percent x 0.2). And at the extreme of an IGE of 0, any large group of children would have average incomes unrelated 
to the income of their parents.
PSID Longitudinal Sample of 
Those who were children in 1968 $55,600 $71,900 29
CPS Cross-Sectional Samples of Family Heads ages 
30–48, who have children and who are native-born $48,003 $63,233 32
CPS Cross-Sectional Sample of All Family Heads 
(including unrelated individuals as head of family of one) $38,022 $41,463 9
Early Years
1967-1971 (PSID)
1969 (CPS)
Late Years
1995-2002 (PSID)
1998 (CPS)
percent
Median Family Income
Change in
Family Income
Family Income Comparisons
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10 Corak, 2006; and Sawhill and McLanahan, 2006. 
11 A more detailed analysis finds that the 34 percent in the top quintile who are “riding the tide” includes 8 percent who move upward 
to the top decile from the ninth decile. Similarly the 24 percent in the bottom quintile percent with higher income and the same quintile
includes < 1 percent who move down from the second to the bottom decile.
12 John E. Morton and Ianna Kachoris of Pew’s Economic Mobility Project collaborated with the author in developing the typology presented 
in Table 1.
13 Imagine, for example, a family where the parents made $50,000 and the children made $60,000. Despite a $10,000 increase in absolute
income, such a family would drop in ranking, from the middle fifth in the parents’ generation to the second-to-bottom fifth in the children’s
generation, as shown in the display of quintiles in Figure 1.
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TRENDS
IN INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
BY ISABEL V. SAWHILL, The Brookings Institution
he previous chapter 
showed that because 
of economic growth and
because people are free to move up
and down within the ranks, there is
considerable economic mobility in
American society. It is also true that
one’s relative economic status as an
adult is significantly influenced by 
the income of the family in which 
one grew up. 
To what extent, however, has
intergenerational mobility changed
over time? Are Americans more
or less mobile across generations 
than they were in the past? To 
answer this question, this chapter
focuses primarily on the last half
century, for which the best data
exists, but uses evidence from 
earlier periods in order to place 
the findings in historical context. 
People will disagree about the ideal
amount of intergenerational mobility
and thus about how to interpret any
trend. Still, knowing what the trends
have been is useful for interpreting
other developments in American
society and in assessing the degree 
to which the opportunity to get 
ahead exists. 
This chapter concludes that over 
the long sweep of American history,
families have moved up the ladder
primarily as a result of the nation’s
economic growth. In short, through
much of the nation’s history, absolute
mobility was high. But for the most
recent generations, those born after
about 1970, economic growth has
had less impact on the average family
and absolute mobility has declined. 
In some periods, economic growth 
has been broadly shared as it was 
in the 1950s and 1960s, and at 
other times, such as from the 1970s
until now, it has led to growing gaps
between rich and poor. This increasing
inequality along with slower economic
growth make it more important than
ever that children have an opportunity
to improve their relative status by
moving up the economic ladder. 
But has relative mobility increased?
Although the research base for
coming to any firm conclusions is
limited and the studies do not all
agree, taken as a whole, the current
literature does not suggest that the
rate of relative mobility has changed
much since about 1970. If anything,
relative mobility may have declined. 
WHY MOBILITY CHANGES 
Imagine a society in which all 
upward mobility was the result 
of economic growth but in which
everyone stayed in the same relative
position as their parents: 
• If the growth were broadly 
and equally shared, everyone’s
income would increase by the 
same percentage. 
• If growth were not broadly 
shared, then everyone’s income
might still rise but by different
percentage amounts, and income
gaps at the end of the period 
would be larger if inequality 
were increasing or smaller 
if it were declining. 
• If there were no growth, but 
simply a change in individual
fortunes, or relative mobility, 
some people, mainly the poor,
would be better off and others,
mainly the rich, would be worse 
off at the end of the period. 
What makes studying economic
mobility so difficult is that in actuality,
all three sources of change in people’s
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fortunes—growth, inequality, 
and mobility—are occurring at 
the same time. The ladder may 
be getting taller as the result of
economic growth; the rungs on 
the ladder may be getting further
apart or closer together as the result
of changes in inequality; and the
ability of people to move from one
rung to another may be getting
more or less constrained as the 
result of relative mobility. By
considering trends in each source 
of change separately we can gain 
a better understanding of what has
been happening to the ladder over 
the past few decades and thus see
more clearly what determines the
economic well-being of individual
Americans.
TRENDS IN GROWTH 
OR ABSOLUTE MOBILITY 
Since 1880, the U.S. per capita 
gross domestic product has increased 
at an average of about 70 percent 
over each generation (roughly every 
25 years).1 Focusing on the period
since 1947, when data on household
incomes first became available, 
Table 1 shows that the rate of 
growth of the typical family’s income
increased unusually rapidly in the
first few decades of this period and
then slowed after 1973. For example,
between 1947 and 1973, incomes
roughly doubled. Since 1973, the
increase over a generation’s time 
has been much smaller, about 
20 percent. For this reason alone,
upward mobility in recent decades
has slowed, and relative mobility 
and income inequality have become
more important sources of a family’s
economic status.
Efforts to measure intergenerational
mobility going back to the nineteenth
century have had to rely on imperfect
data, some of it far more qualitative
than what is available for recent
decades. However, such studies
generally found higher rates of
absolute mobility in the United 
States than in Europe or in Britain.
Much of the greater intergenerational
mobility in the United States noted 
in these historical studies was due 
to the faster rate of growth that 
the United States experienced as
compared with the older economies 
of Europe. In other words, there 
was a high rate of absolute mobility. 
A farmer’s son could become a 
skilled factory worker, and the 
factory worker’s son could become 
a computer programmer. 
Relative mobility during this 
period also rose as educational
opportunities reached more and 
more Americans, discrimination
against formerly excluded groups
diminished, and employment
practices shifted toward placing
greater emphasis on merit and 
less on social connections of 
various kinds.3
The research on this earlier period, 
in addition to being less detailed or
reliable than the research since 1960
when better data became available,
typically uses occupation or education
rather than income to measure
socioeconomic status.4 Its significance
lies in the fact that it shows that one
reason that the United States has
often been described as “the land 
of opportunity” is because the nation
experienced strong economic growth
through much of its history. 
TRENDS IN INEQUALITY
Although President Kennedy
famously noted that a rising tide 
lifts all the boats, in a period of 
rising inequality, some boats rise
more than others. As illustrated in
Figure 1, inequality of individual
Generational Income Ratio2Annual Growth Rate
TABLE 1
Trends in Real Median Family Income
1947-1973 2.8% 2.0
1973-1999 0.9% 1.2
1999-2005 -0.3% NA
Source: Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2007; and U.S. Census Bureau, Table F-6.
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earnings, which fell from the 1930s
until the mid-1950s in the United
States, has been rising ever since.
Inequality of family income continued
to fall until the late 1960s and has
risen sharply since that time.5
In a society in which all incomes 
are virtually the same, relative
mobility would be irrelevant since
people could not improve their
economic status significantly by
changing ranks. But in a society 
with very unequal incomes where 
one stands on the ladder matters 
a great deal. The stakes associated
with winning or losing are high.
Because the United States is now 
a country where inequality is high 
by historical standards, relative
mobility matters much more 
than it did in the past.
Some people believe that increased
inequality in the United States has
been offset by high or rising relative
mobility over the past few decades.6
When researchers note that 
the rich are getting richer and 
the poor are getting poorer, they 
base such statements not on the 
paths of specific individuals over 
time but instead on what has
happened to different income 
groups (typically divided into 
five equal-sized fifths or quintiles).
But people move between income
groups. Those in the bottom quintile
at the beginning of a period are not
necessarily the same people who 
are in the bottom quintile at the 
end of the period. The fact that 
the bottom quintile as a whole 
may have experienced fewer gains
than those higher up in the income
distribution tells us nothing about
what is happening to particular
individuals who may have started 
out in the bottom quintile and 
ended up somewhere else. It could 
be that those in the bottom quintile 
in 1970, for example, had all 
moved into the middle quintile 
by 2000. 
So when one compares the change 
in average incomes by quintile it
provides an incomplete picture of
what is happening to actual families
or the individuals within them. 
Think of a hotel in which some 
of the rooms are luxurious executive
suites while others are small and
modest. The executive suites may 
be getting fancier over time and 
the modest rooms ever more modest. 
But if a different group of people
occupies the executive suites each
year, and everyone has a decent 
shot at staying in these fancier 
rooms, people have less reason 
to complain. Relative mobility 
is similar to this kind of room-
changing. In particular, if relative
mobility had increased at the same
time that income inequality has 
risen, then there would be less reason
for concern about rising inequality.7
If the inequality of family incomes
has been rising since the late 1960s,
is there any evidence that this has
been partially or completely offset 
by a change in relative mobility or 
in one’s chances of moving up or
down relative to one’s parents?
TRENDS IN RELATIVE
MOBILITY
After considering some of the 
reasons for possible changes in 
relative mobility and the difficulty 
of measuring the trend, this section
concludes with a summary of 
what the research suggests about 
such trends. 
FIGURE 1 Trends in Inequality of U.S. Worker Earnings 
and Family Income, 1937–2005
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Table F-4; and Kopczuk, Sawz, and Song, 2007. Based on Social Security
earnings data for all employees, aged 18 to 70, in commerce and industry with earnings above minimum
threshold ($2,575 in 2004).
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Possible Reasons for 
Changes in Relative Mobility
There are several reasons why 
we might expect relative mobility 
to have increased over the past 
half century. First, government
investments in children that target 
the less advantaged and effectively
enhance their productivity relative 
to children from more advantaged
backgrounds would tend to increase
mobility. 
On the other hand, greater family
investments, which usually favor
more advantaged children given 
their parents’ greater financial and
non-financial resources, would have
the opposite effect. 
Recent decades have seen some 
of both effects. The 1960s War on
Poverty and increased spending on
means-tested programs, along with
the opening of opportunities for
women and minorities that followed
the activism of that period, might
have increased mobility for children
born in the 1970s and 1980s who 
are in their young adult years now.
Examples of family investments that
may have decreased relative mobility
include a widening gap in marriage
rates between more and less educated
mothers and the different develop-
mental trajectories this implies for
their children.8 Another example 
is parental investments in higher
education that are increasingly
correlated with parents’ income.9
As seen in Chapter VIII “Education
and Economic Mobility,” these
differential investments in higher
education are coming at the same
time that the returns to higher
education have risen. Thus unequal
parental investments in higher education
could reduce intergenerational relative
mobility. The net effects of these 
or other developments over the past
few decades are difficult to predict. 
Measuring Trends in 
Relative Mobility
Relative mobility can be measured 
in two ways. The first is by inspecting 
a mobility table much like the one
found in Chapter I “Economic Mobility
of Families Across Generations.” It
shows that a child growing up in 
a family at the bottom of the income
distribution has much less of a chance
of rising to the top than one who has
middle-income origins, for example. 
A second measure of mobility 
is “intergenerational income
elasticity.”10 This measure attempts 
to capture in a single number the
strength of the overall relationship
between a child’s parents’ income 
and that child’s income as an adult.
Most estimates of this measure find
that it is in the neighborhood of 
0.5. This means that, on average, if 
a child’s parents’ income is 20 percent
higher than the average family in the
parents’ generation, then the chances
are that the child will have an income
that is 10 percent higher than the
average for his or her generation. 
In short, this mobility measure 
is 0.5, about half of the advantage 
of growing up in a more affluent
family is transmitted from parents 
to their children. 
There have been only limited 
studies of trends in intergenerational
income mobility, and those that exist
do not all agree with one another.
Research in this area has been
plagued by the limited data available.
Obtaining a good answer about
trends requires data covering several
different generations of adults for
whom information on their family’s
economic status when they were
children is available. 
What the Research on 
Relative Mobility Has Found
A pioneering study using the more
sophisticated data and techniques
now available indicates that there 
was an increase in occupational and
income mobility among men born
in the 1930s or 1940s (who reached
maturity in the 1960s) in comparison
to earlier cohorts.11
After that period, income mobility
appears to have leveled off, at least
for men.12 Among women, relative
mobility appeared to increase
somewhat between the 1970s and 
the 1990s. This may be because in
the earlier period far fewer women
were in the labor market, with 
the result that their family income 
was determined more by whom 
they married than by their own
achievements. The increase in
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mobility for women suggests 
that parental background is more
important in determining marriage
outcomes than labor market
outcomes. 
Recently, several researchers 
have used particularly innovative
techniques to tease more out of 
the limited data that exists. One 
such study, by Lee and Solon, uses
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
to study children born between 
1952 and 1975, who were 25 to 
48 in 2000, the last year for which
data were available. This study 
finds no evidence of any major
change in intergenerational income
mobility over this period for men.
Figure 2 shows the intergenerational
income elasticities for sons and
daughters who reached adulthood
(age 25) between 1977 and 2000.
The results for daughters show some
decrease in mobility for this group
early in the period, in contrast to 
the findings discussed above, but 
this result may be anomalous.13
Using the same data, Hertz similarly
finds no evidence of a long-term
trend for those children born 
between 1952 and 1975 who 
were observed as adults between
1977 and 2000.14
Not all researchers accept these 
two studies as the last word on 
the topic. Using another approach 
to measuring trends, Levine and
Mazumder, for example, come 
to a different conclusion. They 
look at the extent to which siblings
who grow up in the same family 
and thus have similar family
backgrounds have adult incomes 
that reflect this common background
or whether their incomes diverge
substantially as they make their 
own way in the world. If the
correlation between the incomes 
of siblings has decreased that would
be an indication that mobility has
risen. Conversely, if the correlation
has risen, it would suggest that 
family background is becoming 
more important and that mobility 
is declining. 
Using this approach, Levine 
and Mazumder conclude that
intergenerational mobility has
decreased over the past few decades.
Adults who are now in their 40s, 
for example, seem to have experienced
less mobility than those of the previous
generation who are now in their late
50s and early 60s. 
Specifically, they find that the
correlation between brothers’ 
annual incomes has risen from 
0.21 for brothers born between 
1944 and 1952 who entered the 
labor force in the 1970s to 0.42, for
those born between 1957 and 1965
who entered in the late 1980s. This
doubling of the correlation coefficient
strongly implies that there has been
less relative intergenerational income
mobility for the younger cohort
of adults.15 In another recent paper,
Aaronson and Mazumder attempt 
to circumvent the lack of data
covering multiple generations by
creating synthetic parents (based 
on age, ancestry, and state of
residence from census data) for
children who reach adulthood in
different years.16 They find an
increase in intergenerational 
mobility between 1940 and 
1980 but declines thereafter.
Overall, the most direct evidence 
of relative mobility across generations
does not suggest any strong trend, 
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FIGURE 2
Income Mobility for Sons and Daughters, 1977–2000
Source: Lee and Solon, 2006. Based on family income data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for
children born between 1952 and 1975. Family income is observed when the children are at least 25 years old.
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but as these last two studies indicate,
some research points to a decline 
in recent decades. 
CONCLUSION
As inequality has increased, the
debate about the extent of mobility 
in American society has heightened.
As income gaps have widened, the
opportunity that children have 
to do better than their parents is
increasingly important. Children 
often move up or down the income
ladder relative to their parents.
Whether they do so at a faster or
slower rate than they did in the 
past is not a settled question. But
since the rungs of the ladder are
further apart than they used to be,
the effects of family background 
on one’s ultimate economic success
are larger and may persist for 
a longer period of time. 
Over the next decade, as the 
children who grew up in the 
1980s and later reach their prime
earning years, the story could 
change, but there is not yet sufficient
data to say with any confidence 
what their experience will be.
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NOTES
1 Per capita real GDP increased by 63 percent between 1880 and 1905 (25 years), by 49 percent between 1905 and 1929 (24 years), and 
by 89 percent between 1929 and 1955 (26 years). The generational income ratio was thus roughly 1.7 over this period. These data are from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, supplemented by Maddison, 1982. The reason we do not always use exactly the same number of years to
measure “a generation’s time” is that abnormally high or low unemployment rates can skew the results unless some adjustments in the length
of the period are made. For more on the role of growth in creating upward mobility across generations see Hout, 1988; and McMurrer and
Sawhill, 1998, pp. 48-49.
2 The two earlier subperiods in the table each cover 29 years, roughly the length of a generation. The income ratio is median family income 
at the end versus the beginning of the period.
3 See Biblarz et al., 1996; Ferrie, 2005; and Grusky, 1989. Also, see Beller and Hout, 2006, for evidence on occupational mobility from 1930
through 1979 but note that these data reflect changes in occupational structure over this period and thus reflect both absolute and relative
mobility. For one attempt to sort out the role played by changes in absolute versus relative mobility for a portion of this period, see Hout, 1988;
and McMurrer and Sawhill, 1998, chapter 6, pp. 45-50. 
4 For the most part, these alternative measures do not tell a fundamentally different story than income, and so we can use them to flesh out
the picture of what has happened across several generations. See Harding et al., 2005, p. 121, for evidence that this is a reasonable assumption.
5 These figures use the Gini coefficient to measure inequality. If incomes were completely equal the coefficient would be zero. If one person had
all of the income, the coefficient would be one. Thus an increase in the coefficient signals an increase in inequality.
6 The Wall Street Journal editorial page notes, for example, that claims of rising income inequality are “so much populist hokum” because the
United States is “marked by rapid and mostly upward mobility.” The editorial cites a Treasury study as evidence for this assertion. Wall Street
Journal, November 13, 2007.
7 This chapter does not review the extensive literature on what has been happening to intragenerational mobility—that is, to movements up
and down the income scale over one’s career—but the same issue arises in thinking about intergenerational mobility.
8 On the marriage gap, see Ellwood and Jencks, 2004; on the different developmental trajectories that this gap implies, see McLanahan et al., 2005. 
9 See Ellwood and Kane, 2000; and Haveman and Smeeding, 2006.
10 There are two measures of relative mobility that are commonly used in the literature. This chapter emphasizes intergenerational income
elasticity. Another common measure is the correlation between parents’ and children’s incomes (or other measures of socioeconomic status).
The difference between the two is that the elasticity incorporates any change in inequality over the relevant time period. That is, the elasticity
equals the correlation between parents’ and child’s income times the standard deviation of the log of children's income divided by the log of
parents’ income. See Harding et al., 2005, p. 144. While the two measures are the same if there is no change in inequality over the observed
time period, they can show different trends in a time of growing inequality. When inequality is growing, then even historically normal rates 
of positional mobility can lead to more persistence of income differences across generations based on parental advantages.
11 Featherman and Hauser, 1978.
12 Harding et al., 2005. Table 3.2, p. 120; note that Harding et al.’s measure of mobility is the multiple correlation between a son or daughter’s
family income at age 30 to 59 with a set of background characteristics that include income, occupation, education, race, ethnicity, region, and
number of siblings.
13 The findings show an increase in intergenerational income elasticity and therefore a decrease in mobility up until about 1983 for daughters
but the authors are reluctant to call this a true decrease given the sample size and other methodological problems. See Lee and Solon, 2006, p. 13.
14 Hertz, 2007.
15 Some of the correlation in the incomes of brothers is due to factors other than family income, such as school or community influences or
shared genetic or cultural influences within the same family that are unrelated to family income. However, there is not much reason to believe
that these have changed very much over this period. The sibling correlation coefficient is equal to the square of the intergenerational income
elasticity plus factors that are uncorrelated with family income. For more details, see Solon, 1999, p. 1777.
16 Aaronson and Mazumder, 2007. For example, in the 1970 census, children born between 1936 and 1940, were 25 to 29 and the family
income of their synthetically matched parents can be estimated from the 1940 census, when they were ages 0 to 4, and the 1950 census, when
they were 10 to 14. The results in the text refer to trends in the intergenerational elasticity. There is less of a trend in the intergenerational
correlation. The latter measure suggests increased mobility in the 1970s but a return to historical levels in the 1980s and 1990s.
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INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS OF
ECONOMIC MOBILITY
BY JULIA B. ISAACS, The Brookings Institution
reedom from the constraints
of aristocratic society lured
many of our ancestors to 
cross the ocean to the New World.
European visitors such as Alexis 
de Tocqueville marveled at the
economic dynamism and social
mobility of American society in 
the first half of the nineteenth
century.1 More recently, immigrants
continue to cross our boundaries 
in search of the promise of the
American Dream. Given this 
history, many Americans believe 
that the opportunities for moving 
up the economic ladder are greater 
in the United States than they are
in other countries. But is this widely
held assumption of greater economic
mobility in the United States borne
out by the evidence? A review of
international surveys and cross-
country research on economic
mobility yielded the following
answers to this question. 
AMERICANS ARE 
MORE OPTIMISTIC 
THAN OTHERS ABOUT
THEIR CHANCES OF
GETTING AHEAD
Americans have more faith than 
do people in other countries that 
they will receive economic rewards 
for individual effort, intelligence, 
and skills. About two-thirds of
Americans (69 percent) agree 
with the statement that “people 
are rewarded for intelligence and
skill,” the highest percentage 
across 27 countries participating 
in an international survey of social
attitudes conducted between 1998
and 2001.2 As Figure 1 indicates,
only about one-fifth (19 percent) 
of Americans believe that coming
from a wealthy family is essential 
or very important to getting ahead;
the median response among all
countries was 28 percent. 
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FIGURE 1
Perceptions of Mobility and Inequality in 27 Countries
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Widespread belief in one’s ability 
to get ahead may explain why
Americans are more accepting of
economic inequality than are people
in other countries. While there are
large gaps between rich and poor 
in the United States, and a majority
of Americans (62 percent) agree with
the statement that income differences
in this country are too large, in other
countries much greater majorities
hold this belief: 85 percent is the
median response and 96 percent 
is the maximum response. Another
strong cultural difference is that
Americans are less likely than others
to believe that the government should
take responsibility for reducing
income disparities; only one-third
of Americans (33 percent) hold 
this view, compared to percentages
ranging from 46 percent (in Canada)
to 89 percent (in Portugal) in the
other countries. 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
OF FAMILIES ACROSS 
GENERATIONS IS LOWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES
THAN IN MANY OTHER
COUNTRIES
While Americans have an optimistic
faith in the ability of individuals to
get ahead within a lifetime or from
one generation to the next, there 
is growing evidence of less inter-
generational economic mobility 
in the United States than in many
other rich industrialized countries, 
at least according to the relative
mobility measures commonly used 
in economic research. 
The earnings of American 
men are more closely tied to 
the earnings of their fathers 
than are those of men in 
other countries. 
Both the United States and the 
United Kingdom stand out as having
higher associations between fathers’
and sons’ earnings—and therefore
less economic mobility—than do
seven other industrialized countries,
according to a comprehensive 
review by Corak. After reviewing
dozens of studies of the earnings
relationship between fathers and 
sons in the United States and other
countries, and adjusting the statistics
for comparability to the extent
possible, Corak ranked the nine
countries in the order shown by 
the bars in Figure 2. 
• Low-mobility countries.
In the United States and the 
United Kingdom, about half 
(50 percent) of parental earnings
advantages are passed onto sons. 
If trends hold consistent, it would
take an average of six generations 
Most studies of intergenerational economic mobility focus 
on relative mobility, measuring the extent to which fathers
who are low (or high) in the overall earnings distribution 
tend to have sons who also are low (or high) in the earnings
distribution.3 Hence, the research ignores the question of
cross-country differences in absolute mobility, that is, the
likelihood that individuals in a given country will have higher
standards of living than their parents due to national rates 
of economic growth. 
In general, intergenerational economic mobility research is
based on longitudinal surveys or administrative data records
that follow the same families within countries for several
decades, permitting data linkages between individuals and
their parents. Estimates of mobility are quite sensitive to the
way that data are collected and measured in each country 
and the methodological decisions made by researchers.4
Moreover, little is known about the experience of immigrants
to different countries, because the available data sets focus
primarily on native-born citizens.5
Two recent studies that have attempted to carefully address
issues of cross-country comparability are summarized in this
chapter. Both studies, like most international reviews, have 
a primary focus on the earnings of fathers and sons, because
data sets on male earnings are more readily available and
comparable than data sets on family income. While these
studies represent the best available evidence to date, there 
is still margin for error around the precise estimates and 
the exact rankings of countries by mobility status. 
Caveats Regarding Cross-Country Comparisons of Intergenerational Mobility
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for family economic advantage 
to disappear in the United States
and the United Kingdom.
• Mid-range countries. France,
Germany, and Sweden were in 
the mid-range of mobility measures
for these nine countries.6
• High-mobility countries.
Paternal earnings had the least
effect on sons’ earnings in Canada,
Norway, Finland, and Denmark,
where less than 20 percent of
income advantages are passed 
onto children. The implication 
of these statistics is that in these
countries it would take three, 
not six, generations, to essentially
cancel out the effects of being 
born into a wealthy family. 
Recent studies suggest that Italy 
may be in the same “low-mobility”
range as the United States and the
United Kingdom, while both Spain
and Australia join the list of countries
with higher rates of mobility than 
the United States.7
The notion of “American
exceptionalism” is given 
new meaning in a second
international study that also 
finds less—not more—mobility 
in the United States.
Markus Jäntti and a team of
researchers also found that relative
mobility across generations is 
lower in the United States, based 
on a recent study that used
standardized data sets and a
consistent approach to measure
mobility in each of six countries.8
While the research team’s efforts 
to follow a common methodology
strengthens the credibility of 
their findings, the study group 
is limited to Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. 
For the most part, Jäntti et al.
provide similar estimates of the
association between fathers’ 
and sons’ earnings as Corak’s
statistics shown in Figure 2.9
The one exception is that the 
United Kingdom was in the 
mid-range of mobility in the 
six-country study, more closely
resembling Sweden than the 
United States.
In their in-depth analysis, Jäntti 
et al. were able to probe beneath 
the surface and examine how the
relationship between earnings 
of parents and children varies for
individuals at different rungs on the
economic ladder. Consistent with the
mobility matrices presented in other
chapters in this volume, they find
there is more stickiness at the top 
and bottom of the earnings ladder 
in all countries. That is, men whose
fathers have particularly low earnings
are more likely than other men to
have low earnings themselves, and
men whose fathers are at the top 
of the earnings distribution are likely
to attain that top status themselves. 
Starting at the bottom of the
earnings ladder is more of a
handicap in the United States
than it is in other countries.
What is new and striking about these
findings, however, is a particularly high
amount of stickiness at the bottom 
FIGURE 2 Sons’ Earnings are More Closely Tied to Fathers’ Earnings 
in the United States than in Canada and Much of Europe
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High Mobility
for American males. Specifically, 
men born into the poorest fifth of
families in the United States in 1958
had a higher likelihood of ending up 
in the bottom fifth of the earnings
distribution than did males similarly
positioned in five Northern European
countries—42 percent in the United
States, compared to 25 to 30 percent
in the other countries (see top half of
Table 1).10 Furthermore, in the United 
States, only 8 percent make the “rags
to riches” climb from bottom to top
rung in one generation, while 11 to
14 percent do so in other countries.11
However, when making this comparison,
it is important to note that the
Americans who climb from bottom 
to top in one generation are climbing
further in absolute dollars than their
counterparts in Europe, given the
broad income dispersion in the United
States. Still, according to this measure,
rising on one’s own bootstraps is harder
in the United States than it is in
several northern European countries. 
There also was stickiness at the top
for American men: 36 percent remain
at the top quintile. However, this
finding was typical of all six countries
studied; the percentage ranged from
30 to 37 percent across the countries,
as shown in bottom half of Table 1. 
Workers in the middle of the earnings
distribution were fairly mobile across
all countries, and daughters generally
had more earnings mobility than sons,
as well as fewer cross-country differences
(data not shown).12 The authors speculate
that the high relative mobility of
middle-class workers in the United
States, combined with overall increases
in the standard of living over time,
may help explain the mobility
assumptions held by many Americans.
In addition, in an earlier paper, two 
of the authors summarize sociological
evidence suggesting that occupational
mobility appears to be higher in the
United States than in Europe, even 
as economic data indicate lower
economic mobility. 13
The mobility literature does 
not tell us which country has the
highest rates of income growth
between fathers and sons.
As noted above, the economic
literature on cross-country
comparisons of mobility focuses 
on relative mobility measures that
examine the ranking of individuals in
economic status relative to others in
their own generation. Such measures
do not factor in the important effects 
of economic growth. For many
Americans, “getting ahead” may
mean enjoying a higher standard of
living than one’s parents, regardless 
of whether one is high or low in the
income distribution. 
Between 1973 and 2001, the U.S.
economy expanded at an average rate
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TABLE 1 Mobility Outcomes for Men Whose Fathers Are at the
Bottom and Top of the Earning Distribution 
Remained in 
bottom fifth 
Climbed 1 to 3
income positions
Climbed to 
top fifth
Percent of Men Whose Fathers Were in Bottom Fifth 
of the earnings distribution: 
Denmark *25 % 61 % *14 %
Finland *28 61 11
Norway *28 60 *12
Sweden *26 63 11
United Kingdom *30 57 *12
United States 42 50 8
* Statistically different from outcome in the United States. (Statistical testing was not done on the middle
column). Row percentages may not total to 100 due to rounding. Sons in all six countries were born near
1958 (1957-1964 in the United States), and earnings of both fathers and sons were estimated near age
40. Sons’ earnings are generally measured between 1992 and 2002 (in 1995 and 2001 in the United
States). Source: Jäntti et al., 2006, Table 4, p. 18 and Table 12, p. 33.
Dropped to 
bottom fifth
Dropped 1 to 3
income positions
Remained in 
top fifth 
Percent of Men Whose Fathers Were in Top Fifth 
of the Earnings Distribution: 
Denmark *15 % 48 % 36 %
Finland *15 50 35
Norway *15 50 35
Sweden *16 47 37
United Kingdom 11 60 30
United States 10 55 36
of 2.9 percent a year, a higher annual
growth rate than most western
European economies.14 However,
when measuring growth on a per
person basis, there was little
difference—both the United States
and Western Europe experienced 
per capita growth of about 1.9
percent annually between 1973 
and 2001.15
Still, one might wonder whether
economic growth would lead
American men to advance beyond
men in other countries, in terms 
of absolute increases above what 
their fathers earned. The answer
might vary depending on where
men lie on the earnings distribution,
given the uneven distribution of
economic growth in the United 
States in recent years. It would be
useful if future research on mobility
in different countries compared
absolute growth in earnings as 
well as relative mobility up and 
down the economic ladder. 
INTERGENERATIONAL
MOBILITY IS LOWER 
IN SOME DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
The influence of family 
background may be even higher 
in some developing countries than 
it is in the United States and other
rich nations, although the data are
scarce and the evidence is still
emerging. Parental economic status 
is more influential in Ecuador and
Peru than in the United States,
according to a careful comparative
study by Grawe.16 Brazil is a third
Latin American country with low
relative mobility, with the elasticity
between fathers’ and sons’ earnings
estimated at about 0.7,  considerably
higher than the levels shown in
Figure 2.17 Other developing countries
appear more similar in mobility levels
to the United States. For example,
Grawe estimated that parents in
Pakistan and Nepal provide their 
sons with an earnings advantage 
that appears to be within the range 
of that transmitted to sons in the 
United States.18
Note that mobility statistics for 
less developed countries are even
more uncertain and difficult to
estimate than those presented 
in Figure 2 because developing
countries do not have longitudinal
surveys spanning three or more
decades. Parents’ income therefore
has to be estimated using various
extrapolations. These cross-country
comparisons are further hampered 
by such measurement challenges 
as comparing studies conducted
independently by researchers using
different approaches, varying estimates
for individual countries, and differences
in the ages at which earnings are
measured.19 Still, the available
evidence suggests that while the
United States ranks low in mobility
when compared with many European
countries, it ranks high compared
with some less developed countries,
including at least three countries 
in Latin America. 
THE UNITED STATES
RESEMBLES OTHER
COUNTRIES IN SHORTER-
TERM MOBILITY MEASURES
While most of this volume focuses 
on mobility over generations, this
review of cross-country comparisons
concludes by examining intragenerational
mobility—mobility within a lifetime. 
The United States falls in the
mid-range for rates of mobility
over 5- or 10-year periods. 
A number of studies have found that
the United States has fairly similar rates
of relative mobility to other countries
when measured over a 5- to 10-year
period. For example, a seven-country
study by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
found the United States was in the
middle with regard to 5-year mobility
patterns between 1986 and 1991.
About half (49 percent) of full-time
workers in the United States were in
the same relative place in the earnings
distribution after five years, with the
other half moving up or down one or
more quintiles. The percentage who
stayed in the same place in the seven
European countries ranged from 44
percent in Finland to 57 percent in
France.20 Another study, by Mercedes
Sastre and Luis Ayala, found that the 
United States fell into the intermediate
range of income mobility in a study
tracking income mobility between
1992 and 1996 in the United States
and five European countries.21 Earlier
studies using data from the 1980s
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also found overall similarities in
mobility patterns over 5- and 10-year
periods, in studies comparing the 
United States to Germany or to
Scandinavian countries.22
The two studies comparing workers
in Europe and the United States also
examined how much earnings and
income increased in absolute terms
over 5-year periods. The OECD 
study found that full-time workers 
in the United States generally
experienced more absolute growth 
in earnings and income than their
European counterparts. However,
low-paid full-time workers in the
United States had less earnings
growth between 1986 and 1991 
than low-paid full-time workers in
the European countries. Sastre and
Ayala also found a mixture of good
and bad news. Rates of income and
earnings growth between 1992 and
1996 were higher in the United 
States than in other countries for
middle-income individuals, but lower
for low-income individuals.23 Again,
the cross-country comparisons suggest
an American pattern of low mobility
at the bottom of the income ladder. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings from cross-country
research challenge the traditional
view of the United States as a 
land with more mobility and
opportunity than other countries. 
While cross-country comparisons 
of relative mobility rely on data 
and methodologies that are far 
from perfect, a growing number 
of economic studies have found 
that the United States stands out as
having less, not more, intergenerational
mobility than do Canada and several
European countries. American
children are more likely than other
children to end up in the same place
on the income distribution as their
parents. Moreover, there is emerging
evidence that mobility is particularly
low for Americans born into families
at the bottom of the earnings or
income distribution. 
Though based on shakier evidence,
mobility rates in less developed countries
appear to be lower than in the United
States in some instances, but not
significantly different in others. 
There are fewer differences between
the United States and European
countries when examining mobility
within a worker’s career, as opposed
to the transmission of economic status
between parents and children. Overall,
American workers seem as likely as
European workers to move up or
down the earnings ladder in a 5- or
10-year period. However, there is again
evidence of a troubling pattern of less
upward mobility for Americans starting
at the low end of the economic ladder. 
The existing literature does not 
speak to the opportunities for income
growth across the generations or the
economic assimilation of immigrants
in different countries. Nor does this
review consider how cross-country
differences in income distributions,
labor market and compensation
policies, educational systems, and
other institutional factors may
contribute to the observed differences
in mobility. These are all important
topics for further research. 
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NOTES
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, cited in Ferrie, 2005. 
2 The 27 countries participating in the 1999 Social Inequality III module of the International Social Survey Program (ISPP) include Australia,
Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New
Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. The
polling data were collected in 1998–2001 (2000 in the United States); more recent data are not available. 
3 The most common statistical measure of relative mobility, intergenerational elasticity (IGE), comes from a linear regression equation
estimating the relationship between children’s and parents’ earnings (or income), with both child and parental earnings expressed in
logarithmic measures. It measures the percentage difference in expected child earnings associated with a one percent difference in parental
earnings. The earnings elasticity measure is calculated and interpreted in the same way as the income elasticity measure reported in previous
chapters. To interpret the IGE, imagine a group of fathers whose earnings are 80 percent higher than average: if they are in a society with an
IGE of 0.5, then their children would, on average, have earnings 40 percent higher than average (80 percent x 0.5). And at the extreme of an
IGE of 0, any large group of children would have average earnings unrelated to the earnings of their parents.
4 Estimates are quite sensitive to such decisions as the age at which earnings are measured and whether earnings are measured over one 
year or averaged over multiple years. 
5 As discussed in “Immigration: Wages, Education, and Mobility” another chapter in this volume, earnings data suggest that 
second-generation immigrants to the United States close about half the gap between their parents’ earnings levels and median earnings 
for native-born Americans. The intergenerational mobility studies reviewed in this report are silent on the question of whether immigrants 
to other countries have more or less mobility across generations than is observed in the United States.
6 With an earnings elasticity of .41 (and a range of reasonable estimates ranging from 0.35 to 0.45) France could be classified as a low-mobility
country if one used 0.4 to 0.5 as range for identifying lower-mobility countries: see Corak, 2006. More generally, there is a range of estimates
for each country, and so data and methodological refinements could lead to some adjustment to the precise ranking shown in Figure 2. 
7 Piraino, 2007; Mocetti, 2007; d’Addio, 2006, p. 33 (drawing on Hugalde for Spain); Leigh, 2007. 
8 Jäntti et al., 2006. To increase consistency, the team focused on a cohort of sons born near 1958 (the exact year differed by country) and
measured fathers’ earnings in one year (when the son was age 16 if possible) and the sons’ earnings as an adult in two years (as close to ages
33 and 41 as possible). Some cross-country variation remained. One notable difference is that in the United States, sons’ position in the
earnings distribution was compared to parents’ position in the family income distribution, whereas the other five countries had earnings
information for both sons and fathers. However, husbands’ earnings were a large component of family income for most families in 1978. 
9 The intergenerational elasticities for father-son earnings in this study were .52 for the United States, .31 for the United Kingdom, .26
for Sweden, .17 for Finland, .16 for Norway and .07 for Denmark. The six-country study included a comparison of daughters’ earnings 
to fathers’ earnings; cross-country differences were smaller, but again the United States had less mobility than the other countries. 
10 Jäntti et al., 2006. The authors report that stickiness at the bottom among males persists in the United States, even when excluding black
and Hispanic families. The percentage of the non-Hispanic whites remaining at the bottom is 38.1 percent. 
11 A somewhat smaller (6 percent) estimate of the climb from “rags to riches” is presented in the chapter on “Economic Mobility of Families
Across Generations.” The two estimates are based on different data sets, population groups, and time periods: The 6 percent estimate is based
on Panel Study of Income Dynamics family income data for men and women born in 1950-1968 while the 8 percent estimate is based on
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth earnings data for men born between 1957 and 1964. 
12 See “Economic Mobility of Men and Women” for further discussion of the fact that while men and women in the United States have similar
rates of overall income mobility, women have more earnings mobility, partly due to their more intermittent participation in the labor force.  
13 Björklund and Jäntti, 2000. The authors contrast the growing body of economic literature, which is finding that the United States ranks 
low compared to European countries in terms of earnings and income mobility, with the considerable body of sociological research, which
finds that the United States ranks fairly high in terms of both class and occupational mobility (e.g., sons are less likely to hold the same
occupation as their fathers in the United States than in Europe). This apparent contradiction suggests that the association between fathers 
and sons in earnings levels in the United States is partly driven by unobserved factors other than occupation. The authors also argue that both
sociologists and economists could benefit from greater study of each other’s approaches to the study of intergenerational mobility. 
14 The average growth rate in Western Europe was 2.2 percent overall, and Norway was the only country in Table 1 that grew at a faster 
rate (3.3 percent) than the United States. Maddison, 2003, Table 8b, p. 640. 
15 Maddison, 2003, p. 643. 
16 Grawe, 2004. Grawe estimated the intergenerational earnings elasticity between fathers and sons in Peru and Ecuador to be 0.67 and 1.13,
respectively, measured at the median. 
17 Dunn, 2007; and Ferreira and Veloso, 2003. 
18 Grawe, 2004. The estimates of 0.46 and 0.44 for Pakistan and Nepal are based on Table 4.8, which excludes business and farm income. 
19 Corak, 2004, pp.17-19.
20 OECD, 1996. See especially chapter 3, “Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment and Earnings Mobility.”
21 Sastre and Ayala. 2002. The five European countries were France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
22 Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin, and Rhody, 1997; and Aaberge, Björklund, Jäntti et al., 2002. 
23 Low-paid was defined as below 65 percent of median earnings in the OECD study; low-income was defined as below 75 percent of mean
income in the study by Sastre and Ayala, 2002. In both studies, absolute gains were measured relative to percentages of median or mean
income in each country, rather than absolute dollar levels.
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WEALTH
AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY
BY RON HASKINS, The Brookings Institution
he growing concern about
economic inequality voiced
by scholars, policy makers,
and journalists has been addressed
primarily to inequality of income. And
with good reason: as noted throughout
this volume, studies confirm that over
the last three decades there has been
a marked rise in income inequality 
in the United States. 
In tracking trends in economic
inequality, less attention has been
given to inequality of wealth and 
the relation of wealth to economic
mobility. Yet any full consideration 
of economic well-being, inequality,
or economic mobility must include
careful attention to wealth.
Wealth is a vital component of family
economic well-being and has the
potential to contribute to economic
mobility. Wealth often produces a
flow of cash that families can use 
for current consumption. Wealth can
also provide collateral for loans to
boost consumption, make investments
in businesses or human capital
development, or provide security
during periods of unemployment 
or other disruptions of income. In
addition, wealth can provide security
for retirement. It can also be passed
to children or others. Parents can use
their wealth to boost their children’s
prospects and well-being; they can
increase their children’s human capital
by paying for higher education or
helping them invest in business ventures
or other enterprises. Similarly, negative
wealth or debt is a major determinant
of well-being. In the extreme, persistent
debt can lead to bankruptcy, which
not only results in loss of most assets,
but usually constitutes a formidable
barrier to future credit. 
Understanding wealth is important 
to fully comprehend economic mobility
in the United States, especially the
effect of wealth on economic mobility
across generations. Because the incomes
of parents and children are highly
correlated, it is important to ask
whether there is a similar correlation
between the wealth of parents and
their children and, if so, what the
modes of wealth transmission might be. 
THE TOOLS FOR
UNDERSTANDING WEALTH
Wealth is assets minus debt. Assets
are typically understood as having
both a financial dimension (checking
accounts and stocks and bonds) and
a non-financial dimension (real estate
holdings, businesses, jewelry, art, boats,
and vehicles). Debt includes home
mortgages, loans against real estate,
credit card balances, and installment
loans. Retirement assets that are not
liquid are not included in most
calculations of family wealth,1 nor 
is the value of future payments, such
as those from Social Security and
most pension plans.
There are two primary sources 
of information about wealth in the
United States. The first and most
representative of the entire U.S.
population is a triennial survey
conducted since 1989 by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board. The Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) includes questions
about the income, assets, and debt 
of around 4,500 randomly selected
families.2 A second survey is
especially useful in tracing changes 
in wealth across generations. The
University of Michigan’s Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) has 
been following an original sample 
of 5,000 American families and their
offspring (and their families when
they become adults) since 1968.3
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TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH
AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
From 1989 through 2004, the growth 
of wealth in the United States was
strong but unevenly distributed (see
Table 1). SCF data show that total
wealth doubled over this period,
growing from $25.9 trillion to $50.2
trillion.4 However, there were large
differences between families in 
wealth accumulation. 
At every position in the distribution,
net worth improved between 1989
and 2004. But, net worth at the 
10th percentile was minuscule.
Though wealth increased at the 
10th percentile, families near the
bottom of the wealth distribution 
had great difficulty accumulating
assets that exceeded their debts and
their net worth typically hovered
around zero.
By contrast, families at the top did
not have any difficulty accumulating
wealth. Figure 1 plots the percentage
of total U.S. wealth owned by families
occupying various sections of the
wealth distribution for selected years
between 1989 and 2004. During this
time, the bottom 50 percent of
families controlled an average of
around 3 percent of personal wealth 
in each year. By contrast, the top 
1 percent of families controlled 
30 percent or more of the wealth 
each year. Though its share of 
wealth peaked in 1995 and then
declined slightly, over the entire
period from 1989 to 2004 wealth
held by the top 1 percent increased
by about 3 percentage points—an
amount roughly equal to the entire
wealth owned by the bottom half 
of the distribution. Combining the
three sections for families above 
the 90th percentile shows that these 
10 percent of families controlled
about 70 percent of the wealth in 
a typical year. The remaining 30
percent of wealth was distributed
among 90 percent of families.
GROWTH AT THE TOP OF
THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
The growth of wealth at the top 
of the distribution is confirmed 
in computations performed by
Edward Wolff of the Levi Institute 
of Economics in New York City, 
who counted the number of households
worth at least $1 million, $5 million,
and $10 million in the SCF in each 
of the survey years between 1989 
FIGURE 1 Percent of Wealth Held by Various Percentile Groups,
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TABLE 1 Average Wealth of Households at 10th, 25th, Median, 75th, 
and 90th Percentiles of the Distribution of Wealth, 
Selected Years 1989-2004 (Thousands, 2004 Dollars)
Note: The means for the respective years from 1989 through 2004 are 277.9, 246.1, 260.7, 328.5, 423.9,
and 448.0.
* < 0.1
Source: Kennickell, 2006, p. 9.
10th * * 0.1 * 0.1 0.2
25th 8.1 9.6 12.3 11.5 13.6 13.3
Median 68.8 65.3 70.8 83.2 91.7 93.1
75th 216.2 194.6 197.8 242.2 301.7 328.5
90th 539.5 470.2 469.0 572.9 782.2 831.6
1989 1992 1995 1999 2001 2004
Wealth
Percentile
Year
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and 2004. Table 2, based on Wolff’s
findings, shows that the growth in
millionaires of various degrees is
consistent with the data on changes 
in the entire wealth distribution
shown in Table 1 and Figure 1. 
If the rise in millionaires over the period
is impressive, more than doubling in
raw numbers and increasing by more
than 75 percent as a percentage of the
population (from an index of 3.25 to
5.77), the rise in households worth
$10 million or more is more impressive
still, from an index of 0.07 to 0.31,
increasing more than fourfold.
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
Assets, the raw material of wealth,
consist primarily of stocks and other
financial instruments and non-financial
property, especially housing.6 Not
surprisingly, both types of assets are
unequally distributed, but financial
assets much more so. 
Based on an analysis of SCF data 
by Wolff, Figure 2a describes the
financial and Figure 2b describes 
the non-financial assets controlled 
by the top 1 percent, the next 9
percent, and the bottom 90 percent 
of the wealth distribution in 2004.5
The top 1 percent of households
controlled an average of 50 percent 
of all financial assets and over 60
percent of both financial securities
and business equity (Figure 2a).
Adding the top two sections of the
total bar graph shows that the top 
10 percent controlled 85 percent 
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TABLE 2 Number of Millionaires and Multimillionaires, 
Selected Years 1989–2004
Number and Index of Households 
with Net Worth Exceeding:
*The index is computed by dividing the number of households with net worth of $1 million, $5 million, or
$10 million in each year by the total number of households in that year and multiplying by 100.
Source: Wolff, 2007, p. 43.
$1 Million $5 Million $10 Million
1989 93,009 3,024 3.25 297 0.32 65 0.07
1992 95,462 3,104 3.25 277 0.29 42 0.04
1995 99,101 3,015 3.04 474 0.48 190 0.19
1998 102,547 4,783 4.66 756 0.74 239 0.23
2001 106,494 5,892 5.53 1,068 1.00 338 0.32
2004 112,107 6,466 5.77 1,120 1.00 345 0.31
Number
(Thousands) Index*
Number
(Thousands) Index*
Number
(Thousands) Index*
Total
Number of
Households
(Thousands)Year
FIGURE 2a Percent of Several Financial Assets Held by 
Various Wealth Groups, 2004
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FIGURE 2b Percent of Several Non-Financial Assets Held by
Various Wealth Groups, 2004
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of all financial assets, leaving around 
15 percent for the bottom 90 percent
of the distribution. 
In contrast to financial assets, 
non-financial assets are more equally
distributed (Figure 2b). Even so, 
the top 10 percent controlled nearly
half the assets. The most equally
distributed asset was housing, with
the bottom 90 percent controlling 
over 60 percent of housing value 
and the top 1 percent controlling 
less than 10 percent. 
HOUSING AND 
FAMILY WEALTH
Housing is central in accounting 
for the wealth of most Americans.
Table 3 illustrates this point by
showing the percentage of families 
in selected income groups that own
their home and the median value 
of the homes they own. Although 
they own few stocks and other 
assets, over 40 percent of the 
bottom quintile of families own 
their homes and the median value 
of their homes is $70,000. 
Examining the income distribution 
in ascending order, we see that the
likelihood of home ownership
increases systematically, rising 
from 40 percent of families in the
bottom quintile to 95 percent of
families in the top decile of income.
The value of homes increases
similarly, reaching a median of
$225,000 for families in the ninth
decile and $450,000 for families in
the top decile. Thus, consistent with
all the data on wealth and assets
examined here, there is a substantial
increase in the likelihood of owning 
a home and in the value of the 
home at the higher end of the 
income distribution. 
Still, a bigger share of families own
their home than any other asset, and
nearly all the wealth of many families
is tied up in their homes. In this sense,
housing is probably the most important
bulwark against rising inequality in
the United States. However, recent
difficulties in housing credit are creating
serious problems with home ownership
in the bottom of the distribution.7
NEGATIVE WEALTH: 
DEBT AND BANKRUPTCIES
As the 2007 crisis in housing credit
illustrates, debt plays two roles in family
wealth. Some debt, especially a home
mortgage, is often considered good
debt because families are purchasing
a place to live and making a long-
term investment simultaneously.
However, a lot can go wrong with
both homes and home mortgages,
especially variable interest mortgages:
home owners can have an unexpected
loss of income, the housing market
can decline leaving home owners with
more debt than the market value of
their house, variable interest rates 
can rise more than expected, and
owners can misjudge the difficulty of
maintaining their mortgage payments
over the long term. Nearly all of this
happened in the recent housing finance
crisis. Nonetheless, investment in housing
works out well for most families. 
There is a fine line between ensuring
that low-income families have access
to credit to purchase a home and
luring families into borrowing under
terms that put them at excessive 
risk. Where to draw this line will
always be a problem. Most Americans
would probably prefer a modest 
level of bankruptcy rather than less
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TABLE 3
Housing Ownership and Value by Income Group, 2004
Note: The median value is based on the houses owned by families and does not include zeroes.
Source: Bucks et al., 2006, p. A22.
Lowest Quintile 40.3% 70
Second Quintile 57.0 100
Middle Quintile 71.5 135
Fourth Quintile 83.1 175
Ninth Decile 91.8 225
Top Decile 94.7 450
Percentage of Families
that Own Homes
Median Home Value 
($ thousands)
Income
Group
bankruptcy at the cost of maintaining
credit markets that are so tight that
low-income families are unable to
purchase homes.
Non-mortgage debt, especially of the
high-interest variety like credit cards,
can also get consumers in over their
heads and lead to financial crisis and
even bankruptcy. Figure 3a provides
a summary of total debt, mortgage
debt, and consumer credit debt expressed
as a percentage of disposable personal
income in selected years since 1949.
There are almost no exceptions to the
pattern of continuous increases in debt
of all types since 1949. Total debt 
has increased nearly fourfold over the
period. As shown in Figure 3b, even
expressed as a percentage of all
household assets, which were also
rising during this period, debt rises
virtually every year.
Although Figures 3a and 3b show that
indebtedness has increased in recent
years, the SCF seems also to show
that Americans are not borrowing
primarily to purchase consumer goods.
Figure 4 summarizes the purposes for
which families took on debt in selected
years between 1995 and 2004. 
Note the stability across the decade 
in the reasons families borrow money.
In every year, about 70 percent of
family debt is incurred to purchase 
a home and another 2 percent to
make home improvements. In most
years, about 8 percent or 9 percent 
of debt is assumed to purchase
residential property other than 
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FIGURE 3a Household Debt as Percent of Disposable Income,
Selected Years 1949–2005
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FIGURE 3b Household Debt as a Percent of Assets, 
Selected Years 1949–2005
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FIGURE 4 Percent of Debt Incurred for Various Purposes, 
Selected Years 1995–2004
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the primary residence. In all probability,
a sizable number of these purchases
are made as investments. About 3
percent of borrowed money in each
year is used to invest in education and
another 7 or 8 percent to purchase
vehicles. Thus, families are incurring
debt primarily to buy their homes,
purchase cars, or make investments 
in property or human capital. Only a
little over 5 percent of debt is incurred
to buy consumer goods and services, and
this figure has been stable for a decade.
DEBT AND INCOME LEVEL 
Figure 5 summarizes the types of
debt incurred in 2004 by families 
of various income levels. Here we 
see a close relationship between a
family’s economic status as measured 
by its income and the likelihood it 
has taken on debt. Only about half
the families with incomes in the bottom
quintile have any debt at all, as
compared with about 70 percent of
families in the second quintile and
between 85 percent and 92 percent 
of families above the second quintile. 
More than half of all families 
(54 percent) have no credit card 
debt, and less than 30 percent of
families in the bottom quintile have
credit card debt. The data in Figure 
5 refute the notion, often expressed 
in the media, that Americans are
taking on mountains of debt in order
to support consumer buying sprees.
Nonetheless, some families do incur
excessive debt. The rapid rise in debt
held by some American households
could prove troublesome in the long
run. In fact, as shown in Figure 6,
bankruptcies increased in most years
between 1980 and 2003 before
falling dramatically after 2005. 
The steep decline after 2005 followed
passage of federal bankruptcy legislation
making it more difficult for individuals
to declare bankruptcy. Because the
legislation was controversial and took
almost a decade for Congress to enact,
at least some of the rise in bankruptcies
during this period can be attributed
to individuals trying to file before
Congress enacted stricter bankruptcy
laws. The decline in bankruptcies does
not mean that families now have less
difficulty with excessive debt than in
the past. Ironically, they may have
more difficulty because the stricter
bankruptcy law does not allow them
to liquidate debt as easily as was 
once possible. 
Families likely to experience trouble
with excessive debt are concentrated
at the bottom of the income distribution.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between
income and high debt in 2004. High
debt is debt that requires total debt
service payments that equal or exceed
40 percent of income, a widely accepted
threshold above which households
begin occupying dangerous territory.
The relationship between income and
high debt shows a clear pattern: the
lower the income, the higher the rate 
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FIGURE 5
Percent of Families Holding Debt by Type of Debt and Income Group, 2004
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of excessive debt. Whereas only 
2 percent of households in the 
top income quintile have high 
debt ratios, almost 30 percent of
households in the bottom quintile
have problematic levels of debt.
WEALTH MOBILITY 
ACROSS GENERATIONS
How wealth is distributed in the
current generation is important, 
but equally important is whether the
winners in a given generation can pass
their winnings on to their children 
or use their fortunes to boost the
economic prospects of their children. 
When Americans talk about equal
opportunity, they usually mean that
everyone should have a shot at high
earnings as well as the chance to
accumulate the financial and non-
financial components of wealth that
are the symbols of economic success
and the foundation of long-term
economic security. 
As we have seen elsewhere in 
this volume, there is a substantial
relationship between the family
income of parents and children. The
most recent evidence indicates that
about half the difference in income
between families persists into the
second generation.8 Is the wealth of
parents and their children similarly
associated?
Relationship between Parental
and Adult Child Wealth
A first-order question about 
wealth mobility is whether there 
is a relationship between the wealth 
of parents and that of their children.
The tool for producing a compre-
hensive picture of wealth transmission
between parents and children is a
measure called “intergenerational
wealth elasticity”9 This number tells us
“what percentage variation to expect
in the child’s [wealth] in connection
with a percentage variation in the
parents’ [wealth].”10 For example, 
if intergenerational wealth elasticity
were 0.4, then if the wealth of a given
set of parents were 50 percent above
the average of their generation, their
children’s wealth would be 0.4 times
50 percent, or 20 percent, above the
average wealth of their generation.11
Elasticities of between 0.4 and 0.5
indicate that the wealth of children 
is strongly correlated with the wealth
of their parents and that it could 
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FIGURE 6 Bankruptcy Rates per 1,000 People 
between Ages 18 and 65, 1980–2007
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FIGURE 7 Percent of Households with Debt-to-Income Ratios 
Greater than 40 Percent by Income Quintile, 2004
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take several generations for the
influence of wealth on subsequent
generations to disappear.12 Recent
studies have found wealth elasticities
between .32 and .50.13
Another tool for measuring the 
intergenerational correlation of 
wealth is the wealth transition matrix.
As illustrated in Figure 8, the matrix
divides the wealth distribution of
parents and their adult children into
five groups of equal size and then
locates each parent-adult child pair 
in one cell of the matrix. Figure 8
shows that adult children tend to 
fall in the same or adjacent wealth
quintiles as their parents, thereby
indicating a positive correlation 
in wealth between the generations.
As with the income transition matrix
discussed in Chapter I “Economic
Mobility of Families Across Generations,”
Figure 8 shows that there is “stickiness”
at both tails of the wealth distribution,
meaning that the greatest wealth
similarity between parents and offspring
is at the extremes of the distribution.
Thirty-six percent of the adult children
are in the top quintile just as their parents
were at a similar age, and 36 percent
of the adult children are in the bottom
quintile just as their parents were.
Only 7 percent of children born to
parents in the bottom wealth quintile
make it to the top wealth quintile as
adults, much like the 6 percent of
those born to parents in the bottom 
income quintile end up in the 
top income quintile in adulthood 
(see Figure 4, Chapter I).
Despite the clear relationship between
wealth in the two generations, there
was nonetheless movement by adult
children to wealth quintiles other 
than the one occupied by their parents.
Perhaps most notable is that nearly
35 percent of the adult children of
parents in the bottom wealth quintile
moved up to the top three quintiles,
while 41 percent of adult children
with parents in the top quintile moved
down to the bottom three quintiles.
As pointed out by wealth researchers 
at the University of Michigan and 
the University of Chicago, these
results imply a “much greater” level 
of intergenerational fluidity than
“suggested by recent accounts in 
the popular press.”14
Sources of Wealth: The Role 
of Gifts and Inheritances
As the data on wealth transmission
suggest, wealthy parents tend to 
have wealthy adult children and 
poor parents tend to have poor adult
children, but there is nonetheless
movement between generations up
and down the wealth distribution. 
But what is the source of wealth in
the second generation? Parents could
help their children achieve wealth 
by making investments in their
development or by giving them
money directly. By contrast, adult
children could save money, make
investments, start businesses, take
risks, or engage in other enterprising
activities that allow them to build
their own wealth. 
Although no existing data source
allows us to completely separate each
of these possible sources of wealth in
the second generation, it is possible 
to estimate how much wealth in the
second generation comes from transfers
from parents or others and how much
comes from the efforts of the children
themselves. This information is important
because to the extent that transfers
from parents or others comprise most
wealth accumulation in the children’s
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FIGURE 8 Percent of Children in Each Wealth Quintile 
Compared to Parental Wealth Quintile
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generation, wealth mobility could 
be tightly circumscribed. 
Extent of wealth transfers. Wolff’s
analysis of the SCF data for selected
years between 1989 and 1998 shows
that between 20 and 24 percent of 
all households received some type of
wealth transfer at some time.15 Thus,
the majority of families do not receive
substantial gifts or inheritances from
their parents or others. Families that
do receive wealth transfers are the
fortunate recipients of a kind of
windfall financial advantage, but most
families obtain their wealth through
their own enterprising activities.
Value of wealth transfers. Wolff’s
analysis of the SCF shows consistency
in the average value of transfers across
the years, with a low mean transfer of
$50,000 in 1992 and a high of $54,500
in 1998.16 Table 4 describes the
contribution of these transfers to the
wealth of households with various levels
of wealth (including transfers) in 1998. 
As might be expected, although 
the overall probability of a given
household receiving wealth transfers
was a little more than 20 percent, 
the probability varied both with the
amount of wealth transferred and 
the total wealth of the households. 
Only about 10 percent of families
with wealth of under $25,000
received transfers while about 45
percent of households with wealth 
of over $1 million received transfers.
Similarly, the mean value of wealth
transferred increased with household
wealth. Of families with less than
$25,000 in wealth, the relatively 
few that received transfers got about
$53,000 on average. However, families
with wealth of $1 million and over
received transfers averaging more
than $1.3 million. 
Surprisingly, despite the fact that 
the amount of wealth transferred 
is greater for households with more
wealth, expressing transferred wealth
as a percentage of total household
wealth shows an inverse relationship
between total household wealth and
the amount of wealth transferred. 
In percentage terms, households with
relatively less wealth have a greater
boost in wealth because of the wealth
transfers they receive. 
For example, families in the wealth
category of $25,000 to $49,999
receive transfers that amount to more
than 45 percent of their total wealth,
even though the mean amount
transferred was only about $82,000.
But families with total wealth of over
$1 million, that on average received
transfers in excess of $1.3 million,
experienced only about a 17 percent
boost in total wealth from these very
large transfers. A relatively small
wealth transfer provides a bigger
boost to low-wealth families than 
a relatively big transfer provides 
to relatively wealthy families.17
Timing of wealth transfers. Wealth
transfers from parents are more useful
to adult children if they receive the
transfers before they themselves grow
old. With a $50,000 gift from a parent,
a 30-year-old starting a family can
make investments in the continued
well-being of the family. By contrast,
the 60-year-old close to retirement is
likely to be in a better economic
position already. Figure 9, based on
new analyses of the SCF by Desmond
Toohey of the Urban Institute, shows
the percentage of families, divided
into three age groups, that receive
transfers of various types. 
E C O N O M I C  M O B I L I T Y  P R O J E C T : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
W E A LT H  A N D Economic Mobility55
TABLE 4 Percent of Households with Wealth Transfers 
and Amount of Transfers, 1998
* In thousands of 1998 dollars. Zeroes are not included in calculations of means.
** The average level of wealth in the under $25,000 wealth group is so small that the transferred wealth 
is almost 10,000 times greater than the average wealth.
Source: Wolff, 2002, p. 262.
Under $25,000 9.9 % 52.7 ** %
25,000 - 49,999 20.0 82.4 45.5
50,000 - 99,999 19.6 100.8 27.1
100,000 - 249,999 26.0 120.5 19.6
250,000 - 499,999 31.7 180.4 16.5
500,000 - 999,999 35.5 427.4 22.6
$1,000,000 and over 44.9 1,325.9 17.1
Percent of
Households
with Transfers
Mean Amount
of Wealth
Transfer*
Transfers 
as percent of
Total WealthWealth Category
Not surprisingly, both the percentage
of families that receive a transfer and
the average amount of the transfer
increases substantially with age.
While only 12 percent of the families
under age 30 had received a transfer
of any type, over 25 percent of those
over age 50 had received them. Older
adult children are more likely to have
received transfers than young adult
children because the majority of
transfers are given as inheritances 
at the parent’s death and not as gifts
while the parent is still alive. Adult
children are much more likely to
receive money from inheritances 
than from either trusts or from 
gifts during their parents’ lifetime.
The amount of wealth transferred
from parents to adult children in all
the categories identified in the SCF
are substantial, ranging from nearly
$43,000 to over $2 million with 
a mean of around $110,000 for 
those under 30, $131,000 for those
between ages 30 and 50, and
$275,000 for those over age 50.18
Trusts are by far the most valuable,
but they are also the most infrequent
(Figure 9). The general conclusion
from Figure 9 is that although only
between a fifth and a quarter of
families receive wealth transfers,
those who do get a lot of money,
much of which comes during or 
after middle age.
OTHER FACTORS
ASSOCIATED WITH 
WEALTH TRANSFERS
Wealth is a broad measure of 
parent-child persistence in economic
well-being that reflects a number 
of other types of similarity between
parents and their offspring. Several
studies have shown similarities 
between parents and their adult
children in income, asset ownership,
consumption, and years of schooling.
The literature on similarity in income,
a fundamental building block of
wealth, is especially extensive. 
There is also strong evidence that
parents exert genetic influences on
their children’s abilities, not least their
intellectual capacity.19 As discussed 
in Chapter I “Economic Mobility of
Families Across Generations,” studies
show that there is a substantial
correlation between the income of
parents and their adult children.
At least two studies show that in each 
of the other areas of parent-child
similarity—including asset ownership,
consumption, and years of schooling—
there is also considerable similarity
between parents and their adult
children. Particularly remarkable is
the finding in a study conducted at
the University of Michigan, based on
the PSID, that the influence of parents
extends even to the types of assets
held by adult children.20 More
specifically, the researchers found,
controlling for income, that adult
children are similar to parents in
holdings in bank accounts and in 
the probability of stock ownership.
CONCLUSION
The evidence on wealth transmission
and mobility across generations 
shows that many parents in the
United States are able to pass 
along behaviors related to wealth
accumulation, to have several 
types of influence on their children’s
development and behavior that lead
to wealth accumulation (or not), 
and, in some cases, to provide their
children with inheritances or other
transfers of wealth. 
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FIGURE 9 Percent of Adult Children Receiving Transfers by Age 
at Receipt and Type, 2004
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Source: Desmond Toohey of the Urban Institute using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
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There is also good evidence that 
the correlation in income between
parents and children contributes
substantially to their similarity in
wealth. It probably takes four or 
five generations for all influences 
on wealth accumulation that parents
pass on to succeeding generations 
to completely dissipate. Together, 
all of these factors tend to reduce
wealth mobility across generations. 
However, studies also show that 
the wealth of adult children tends 
to move nearer to the mean of 
wealth for all families, either from
above in the case of parents with
above-average wealth or from 
below in the case of families with
below-average wealth. 
Further, not more than a quarter of
families actually receive inheritances
and more than half the wealth owned 
by families in the current generation
is generated by their own earnings
from employment, business ventures,
or investments. Even adult children 
with parents in the lowest fifth 
of the wealth distribution have well
over a 60 percent chance of moving
out of the bottom—and nearly a 20
percent chance of making it to the top
two quintiles of wealth. 
An important implication of 
the research on wealth is that the
American economy continues to
facilitate the production of great
increases in wealth in each generation
and most families along the income
distribution have managed to improve
their wealth in recent years. Although
we might wish that there were even
more wealth mobility, the American
economy continues to reward hard
work and risk-taking.
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NOTES
1 Kennickell, 2006.
2 In certain complex households, the survey divides all individuals living in the household into the “primary economic unit” (PEU) and 
the rest of the household. The PEU is the economically dominant individual or couple and all others in the household that are financially
interdependent with the dominant individual or couple. The interviews last for up to two hours. About 30 percent of those asked to participate
refuse. However, among the wealthiest families, the refusal rate is as high as 90 percent. Because of this problem, the survey actually consists
of two samples, a random sample representative of the population and an over-sample of relatively wealthy families. The two samples are
weighted to produce estimates for the entire population. See Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore, 2006.
3 For more information about the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, see http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu. 
4 Kennickell, 2006.
5 Wolff, 2007.
6 Though beyond the scope of this report, it is interesting to note that there are substantial differences in asset ownership between white and
nonwhite families. In 1994, the value of assets held by the median white family was more than seven times that held by the median nonwhite
family. For more, see Conley, 1999.
7 As Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, recently put it, “Given their weaker credit histories and financial conditions, subprime
borrows default on their loans more frequently that prime borrowers. The consequence of default may be severe for homeowners, who face the
possibility of foreclosure, the loss of accumulated home equity, and reduced access to credit.” See House Committee on Financial Services,
2007.
8 For a discussion of the intergenerational income elasticity, see Sawhill and McLanahan, 2006; and Chapters I and II in this volume.
9 Several recent studies based on the PSID have produced estimates of wealth elasticities. Mulligan, 1997, averaged wealth across several years
for both parents and their adult children to increase the reliability of his wealth measures, examined several different combinations of parents
and offspring, and used a number of approaches to correcting for measurement error to produce four separate estimates of elasticity ranging
from .32 to .50; Mulligan concluded that the most reliable of the estimates was probably closer to .5 (see Mulligan, 1997, especially Chapter
7). In another high-quality study using the PSID, Charles and Hurst, 2002, found that the elasticity of child wealth with respect to parent
wealth was .37. Other studies estimate elasticities between .4 and .5 (Kotlikoff and Summers estimate an elasticity of .46). An early study by
Menchik based on Connecticut probate records reported an elasticity of .75. However, this study is flawed because the data are for one state,
both parents and children had to have died in the same state, only estates of $40,000 or over (over $300,000 in 2007 dollars) were included,
and less than one-third of the children’s generation was found (300 children of 1,050 parents who had children eligible for the sample). See
Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981; Menchik, 1979, and Charles and Hurst, 2003. For an additional explanation of the difference between
intergenerational elasticity and the intergenerational correlation, see note 10 in Chapter II “Trends in Intergenerational Mobility.”
10 Solon’s definition was written to apply to income mobility, but the concepts and the mathematical calculations are the same for wealth
elasticity as for income elasticity; see Solon, 2002.
11 Solon, 2002.
12 It should be noted that these estimates of how many generations income or wealth will continue to have an influence are estimates based 
on mathematical calculations and are not based on actual empirical data.
13 See Mulligan, 1997; and Charles and Hurst, 2003. 
14 Charles and Hurst, 2003, p. 1157.
15 Wolff, 2002. It is difficult to get good information on how many parents contribute to their child’s education, but it appears to be more 
than is captured by the SCF. According to the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, based on interviews with a representative sample 
of students, the percent of parents who provide help with tuition varies greatly by the type of institution their child is attending. The range 
is from 19 percent of parents providing tuition aid for students attending public two-year institutions to 48 percent for students attending
private doctoral and liberal-arts institutions. A substantial number of students also live at home where they probably receive lots of in-kind
assistance. Interestingly, there appears to be an inverse relationship between the percent of parents who help with tuition and the likelihood
that students live at home. For example, although only 19 percent of students attending public two-year institutions receive help with tuition
from their parents, over 65 percent of them live at home. By contrast, although nearly half of students attending private doctoral and liberal
arts institutions receive help from parents with tuition, only 13 percent of them live at home. See Choy and Berker, 2003.
16 Because of some very large transfers, the mean value of the wealth transfers was higher and more variable than the median, rising to over
$345,000 in 1995 from around $312,000 in 1989 and $313,000 in 1992 before falling to $256,900 in 1998. Due to both the changes in the
average amount transferred and the rapid increase in average wealth, especially after 1995, wealth transfers reached a high of 35.5 percent 
of wealth in 1995 before falling sharply to 19.4 percent in 1998. See Wolff, 2002, Table 1.
17 Wolff, 2002.
18 The means were computed based only on the adult children who actually received transfers. Zeroes were omitted.
19 Plomin, 2004.
20 Chiteji and Stafford, 2000.
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ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF
MEN AND WOMEN
BY JULIA B. ISAACS, The Brookings Institution
ver the past generation, 
there has been a dramatic
shift in women’s partici-
pation in the workforce and
contributions to family income. 
With this shift, studies of economic
mobility, which have traditionally
focused on the relationship of men’s
income to those of their fathers, 
have expanded to consider the
experiences of women. 
This chapter describes and compares
men and women’s economic success
and income mobility across the
generations: How have men and
women fared economically over the
past few decades? How do their
incomes compare with incomes of
their own parents? Do parents pass
along their economic advantage or
disadvantage to their sons and
daughters in the same way? 
To address these questions, the analysis
focuses on a sample of 1,271 women
and 1,096 men whose family incomes
have been monitored from childhood
to adulthood through the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID). As
explained in more detail in Appendix
A, these men and women were ages 
0 to 18 in 1968 and had an average
age of 39 in 1995–2002, when adult
family incomes were observed.1 The
first sections of this chapter, however,
use national income and labor data
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current
Population Survey to outline income
growth for men and women over time. 
WOMEN’S INCOMES GREW
WHILE MEN’S INCOMES
STAGNATED 
Women in their 30s today have
substantially higher income than
did women in their 30s in their
mothers’ generation; however,
men in their 30s today have 
not had the same experience 
of upward economic mobility. 
Figure 1, which compares growth 
in median personal incomes for all
women and men in their 30s, offers
generational comparisons: income
growth from 1964 and 1994, and
income growth from 1974 and 2004.2
Over the past several decades, economic
opportunities for women have risen
substantially as women have gained
college degrees in higher numbers,
spent more time in the paid workforce,
and commanded higher hourly earnings
than in earlier times.3 The combination
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of higher labor force participation and
higher wages has led to substantial
increases in women’s personal income.
Between 1974 and 2004, median
personal income for women in their
30s increased from about $5,700 to
$20,000 (in 2004 dollars, see Figure 1). 
As found in previous studies of the
Economic Mobility Project, men 
have not had the same experience.
Inflation-adjusted median income 
for males ages 30–39 increased by
only 5 percent between 1964 and
1994, from about $31,000 to under
$33,000. The story is worse a decade
later. Men in their 30s in 2004 had 
a median income of about $35,000 a
year, which was 12 percent less than
the median income of $40,000 for men
in their fathers’ generation, those who
are now in their 60s. This cohort of men
has not benefited from the economic
“up-escalator” that has historically
ensured that each generation would 
do better than the last. 
Much of the difference in trends 
for men and women is due to flat 
or slightly declining trends in
employment rates, hours worked, 
and wages for men during a period
when all three components of 
annual earnings were increasing 
for women. 
Employment rates. There was a
decline in the proportion of men in
their 30s who were employed, from
91 percent in 1964 to 86 percent in
2004. In contrast, employment rates
for women in their 30s climbed from
39 percent of women in this age
group in 1964 to 70 percent in 2004.4
However, women do still spend more
time than men moving in and out of
the workforce as they balance work
and family responsibilities. 
Hours worked. Among those 
who worked, annual hours worked
declined slightly (by 1 percent) for
men in their 30s, while increasing 
by 25 percent for women in their 
30s over this same time period, 
1964 to 2004.5
Wages. Median hourly cash wages 
for women have increased steadily in
recent decades, while median hourly
wages for men have fluctuated up
and down without improving. For
example, between 1973 and 2005,
median hourly wages for women 16
to 64 rose 29 percent, while median
hourly wages for men actually fell 
by 1 percent. The lack of wage
growth was particularly pronounced
for men at the bottom of the wage
distribution.6 Men’s wages are still
higher than women’s wages, but the
gap has narrowed. Among full-time,
full-year workers, women earned 77
cents on the dollar earned by men in
2005, compared to 57 cents 1973.7
GROWTH IN FAMILY 
INCOME IS DRIVEN BY
GROWTH IN WOMEN’S
INCOME 
The primary focus of these studies 
of economic mobility is family
income, which often involves 
a combination of male and female
personal incomes. In these studies, 
for those who are married, family
income is based on the cash income
of both spouses as well as any other
family members. For single individuals
(who are treated as one-person
families), family income is simply 
the individual’s personal income.
Non-cash contributions to family
income are not included in the
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analysis, but are discussed in Chapter
I “Economic Mobility of Families
Across Generations.” 
Over the past four decades, 
median family income has
increased, despite stagnant 
male wages. 
As shown in Figure 2, on the 
previous page, between 1964 and
1994, median family income for
families containing men in their 30s
has increased by 32 percent (or 0.9
percent per year). A decade later, the
change in family income was much
smaller—9 percent (or 0.3 percent
per year)—but still represented
positive growth. As more women have
entered the workforce and worked at
higher wage levels, family incomes
have increased despite the lack of
growth in men’s incomes. 
At the same time that family 
income growth has become a family
enterprise, family composition has
changed significantly. As shown in
Figure 3, between 1969 and 1998 
the proportion of adults in their 30s
who are living in married families
with children declined from 79 percent
to 52 percent.8 There were increases
in the proportions living in single-
parent families (12 percent in 1998),
as childless couples (also 12 percent)
and as unmarried men without
children (16 percent) or unmarried
women without children (8 percent).9
As a result of these changes as well
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Detailed analysis of marriage rates by parental income
quintile shows some difference by income distribution as
well as gender. As shown in Table 1, there are relatively
small differences in marriage rates between sons and
daughters at each income level, with the notable exception
of sons and daughters with parents from the bottom
quintile. Less than half (47 percent) of women in the
bottom fifth were married in 1996, compared to 61
percent of their male counterparts. Parental marriage
rates are also low for this group (64 percent compared to
91-98 percent for parents in other income groups),
suggesting that the low marriage rates for these daughters
is associated with single-parent status of their parents, as
well as low family incomes.10
All 90% 68% 64%
Parents in top fifth: 98 71 70
Parents in fourth fifth: 97 77 72
Parents in middle fifth: 98 67 68
Parents in second fifth: 91 66 61
Parents in bottom fifth: 64 61 47
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
as fewer children per family, family
size for adults in their 30s was only
3.2 persons, down from 4.5 persons
in 1969. 
A similar generational shift in 
family composition is evident in 
the PSID sample that is used for 
the data analysis described in the
remainder of this chapter. The
percentage of married individuals
fell from 90 percent in the parents’
generation to about two-thirds (68
percent for men and 64 percent for
women) in the children’s generation
(see text box on previous page). 
These changes in family size 
and composition add important
contextual information to the
observed stagnation in male personal
income and the moderate increases
in family income. For example, the
failure for a typical man in his 30s
to earn as much as did men in his
father’s generation may be viewed 
as less problematic if he is not
supporting a wife and children. 
On the other hand, lower levels 
of male personal income may be
contributing to the decline in
marriage rates.11 While the rise in
women’s labor force participation
can be seen as having positive effects
on family economic well-being, it
can also contribute to the added 
time pressures facing families today. 
INTERGENERATIONAL
MOBILITY: RELATIVELY
FEW DIFFERENCES BUT
SOME EVIDENCE OF MORE
UPWARD MOBILITY FOR
SONS 
The PSID provides decades of
longitudinal data that allows the
analysis to move beyond a comparison
of generational averages of family
income to direct comparisons between
individuals and their actual parents.
As reported in other chapters, two out
of three Americans who were children
in 1968 have grown up to have higher
family incomes than their parents
(after adjusting for inflation). How
similar are the experiences of sons 
and daughters?
Sons are slightly more likely 
than daughters to surpass their
parents’ family incomes. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, 69 percent of
sons and 64 percent of daughters grew
up to have family income in 1995–2002
that was higher than their inflation-
adjusted childhood family income in
1967–1971. Moreover, the pattern of
slightly higher absolute incomes for sons
than daughters is present to some degree
across different economic classes.12
As in other chapters, the intergener-
ational analysis addresses relative
mobility—how children move up 
and down in social rank, relative to
their initial starting point or family
background—in addition to the
question of moving up in absolute
terms beyond one’s parents. For the
relative mobility analysis, individuals
are grouped into five equally sized
income groups or quintiles: first
according to their parents’ income
and then according to their own
income as adults. The two rankings
are then compared to see whether 
the advantages of being born to
parents with higher incomes—and 
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the disadvantages of being born to
parents with lower incomes—have 
a similar impact on the economic
prospects for sons and daughters. 
There are relatively few
differences between sons and
daughters with regard to whether
men and women of different
economic backgrounds have an
equal shot of moving up the
income ladder. 
With differences of only a few
percentage points, there are very few
clear patterns to be seen in the full 
set of transition matrices presented in
Figure 5.13 Both sons and daughters
experience the same “stickiness” at
the top and bottom of the income
distribution as is found for all children
in the analysis presented in Chapter I
“Economic Mobility of Families Across
Generations.” For example, 39 percent
of sons and 39 percent of daughters
born to parents at the top of the
income distribution end up at the 
top quintile themselves. Likewise, 
sons and daughters whose parents 
are at the bottom of the income
distribution tend to end up at the
bottom themselves. 
Relative mobility is particularly
low for girls born to parents in
the bottom fifth of the income
distribution.
Close to half (47 percent) of low-income
girls compared to 35 percent of low-
income boys end up in the bottom fifth
upon adulthood. This lack of mobility
is consistent with the findings of lower
marriage rates for women growing up
in low-income families.
As in the Chapter I “Economic
Mobility of Families Across Generations,”
a final section of the data analysis
provides a four-part typology
integrating components of absolute
and relative terms.14 Presented in
detail in Appendix C, the typology
shows the following:
(1) About one-third of both 
sons and daughters are upwardly
mobile in the sense of both getting
ahead of their parents’ family income
and moving ahead of their parents’
income ranking (36 percent of sons
and 33 percent of daughters). 
(2) Another one-fourth of sons
and daughters are riding the tide
and are making more than their parents
but remain in the same economic
position (27 percent of sons and 
26 percent of daughters).
(3) As with all children, there is a
small percentage (5 to 6 percent)
of both sons and daughters who
are falling despite the tide; although
they have more income than their
parents they fall behind their parents’
economic position. 
(4) Daughters appear to be
slightly more likely to be
downwardly mobile than sons.
More than one-third (36 percent) 
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FIGURE 5 Chances of Getting Ahead or Falling Behind in 
Income Ranking, by Parental Income and Child’s Gender 
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%P
er
ce
nt
R
ea
ch
in
g
In
co
m
e
Q
ui
nt
il
e
Bottom
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Middle
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
in the top 
quintile
in the fourth 
quintile
in the middle 
quintile
in the fourth 
quintile
35%
26%
21%
13%
5%
20%
18%
9%
7%
22%
23%
25%
20%
10%
23%
24%
15%
10%
19%
19%
28%
18%
18%
16%
28%
20%
16%
20%
5%
12%
22%
35%
27%
11%
18%
17%
30%
25%
10%
11%
13%
28%
39%
Top
Quintile
47%
28%
Parents’ Income Quintile
in the bottom
quintile
in the top 
quintile
in the fourth 
quintile
in the middle 
quintile
in the fourth 
quintile
in the bottom
quintile
8%
19%
15%
19%
39%
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
Sons: Daughters:
of daughters make less than their parents’
income and fall behind or remain at
their parents’ economic position,
compared to 31 percent of sons. 
FINDINGS FROM THE
LITERATURE 
Other researchers also have 
found few differences between
sons and daughters when
measuring intergenerational
income mobility across the 
full income distribution.
Instead of relying solely on transition
matrices, many researchers compare
the associations of income between
parents and sons and parents and
daughters through a statistical measure
called an intergenerational elasticity
coefficient (IGE).15 Estimates by
Chadwick and Solon (2002) suggest
IGEs in the range of 0.35 to 0.49 
for daughters, compared to 0.54 to
0.58 for sons.16 Lower IGE coefficients
or less association of incomes for
daughters means slightly higher mobility
away from parents (both upward and
downward), but in some comparisons
the differences between daughters and
sons were not statistically significant. A
more recent analysis by Lee and Solon
(2006) finds very little difference between
men and women in income mobility. 
Researchers do find differences
between men and women when they
compare personal earnings rather
than family income. Peters (1992)
found similar levels of mobility when
looking at sons’ income, daughters’
income, or sons’ earnings, but much
higher mobility (less resemblance to
parents) for daughters’ earnings. In
fact, she found almost perfect mobility,
that is, no relationship between parents’
economic class and the level of women’s
earnings. In a more recent study of
administrative data on earnings, Dahl
and DeLeire (forthcoming) also found
that daughters’ earnings had less of 
a resemblance to fathers’ earnings than
was true for sons. Women’s movements
in and out of paid employment—
following labor supply decisions that
may be influenced by their spouse’s
earnings as well as the presence of
children—may explain why daughters’
earnings are less correlated than sons’
earnings with parental earnings. 
Assortative mating, or the
marrying of persons similar in
characteristics and background
to one’s own, plays a large role 
in explaining the resemblance 
of daughters’ family income to 
the income of their parents.
Chadwick and Solon (2002) find that
the earnings of a married daughter’s
husband bear as much resemblance 
to her parents’ income as do her own
earnings. Moreover, his earnings are
usually higher than her earnings, and
so have a heavier weight in shaping
total family income. In other words,
women would have higher rates of
intergenerational mobility—more
movement away from the economic
class of their parents—if it were 
not for the contributions of their
husbands’ earnings. 
Not only who a woman marries, 
but whether she marries (or remains
married) has a substantial effect 
on her economic status and mobility. 
In a study comparing families in 1988
and 1998, Bradbury and Katz (2002)
found more downward mobility over
a 10-year period among families who
lost a husband to death or divorce
than for families losing a wife. They
found that three fourths of families
losing a husband moved down at least
one income quintile compared to only
49 percent of families losing a wife.17
Divorce and single parenthood 
can also influence intergenerational
mobility and may explain some of the
lack of mobility for low-income girls.
The research literature provides some
evidence that the children of divorced
parents are more likely to get divorced
and stronger evidence that daughters
of single mothers are more likely to be
single mothers.18 The trends observed
in Table 1 appear consistent with this
research literature. Absence of a
husband is thus a characteristic that
may be handed down from mother to
daughter, along with the accompanying
lower prospects for economic success.
CONCLUSION 
Median family income has increased
over the past four decades because 
of the sharply rising incomes of
women. Increased employment levels,
wages, and hours worked have
increased personal income for women,
far beyond the incomes of women in
earlier generations, though not to 
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the levels of men. In contrast, men’s
personal incomes have stagnated, 
and in fact, men in their 30s today
have incomes slightly below their
fathers’ incomes.
Regarding personal income, therefore,
women have experienced more absolute
mobility than men. With regard to
family income, however, men and
women’s absolute mobility experiences
are much more similar. 
An examination of family incomes of
matched pairs of parents and children
reveals that both sons and daughters
have higher family incomes than their
parents, by a ratio of about two to one.
In fact, sons are slightly more likely
than daughters to exceed parents in
absolute levels of family income. 
An analysis of movements up and
down the income ladder finds that
both sons and daughters benefit from
having high-income parents and are
disadvantaged by having low-income
parents. Most of the differences in
relative mobility between sons and
daughters are small. One notable
exception is in the lowest-income
families, where daughters are even 
less likely than sons to break out 
of the bottom fifth of the income
distribution. 
The same pattern is seen in a
mobility typology that contains
elements of both absolute and relative
mobility measures. Men and women
are fairly similar overall in mobility,
except women are slightly more likely
to be downwardly mobile in the double
sense of making less money and
moving down one or more quintile. 
For men, the intergenerational
transmission is driven by a relatively
strong relationship between the earnings
of fathers and sons. For women, the
general tendency to marry men whose
earnings and income prospects are
similar to those of one’s parents plays
an important role in explaining
observed mobility patterns. 
More generally, the evidence highlights
the importance of recognizing that
economic mobility generally occurs
within the context of families and 
is not solely a result of individuals
operating as lone economic agents. 
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NOTES
1 As explained in more detail in Appendix A, adult family incomes are observed in 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. This 5-year average is
compared to parents’ family incomes in 1967–1971. The adult children ranged in age from 27 to 45 years in the first year of adult income
data (1995) and from 34 to 52 years in the last year of adult income data (2002). 
2 The CPS data analysis focuses on adults in their 30s because economists have found income in one’s 30s to be a better indicator of long-run
income than income at earlier ages, see Solon, 1999. Another advantage of examining adults 30-39 in the CPS is that there is some overlap 
in ages with adults in the PSID sample (who range in age from 27 to 52). Personal income includes before-tax earnings, interest and dividends
from capital, cash benefits from government programs (such as Social Security, welfare, or unemployment compensation), alimony, and other
cash income. It does not include the value of non-cash compensation such as employer contributions to health insurance and retirement
benefits, nor does it include the effect of taxes or non-cash benefits such as food stamps. See “Economic Mobility of Families Across
Generations” for discussion of non-cash contributions to economic well-being. 
3 Kearney, 2006. 
4 Brookings tabulations of data from the Annual Economic and Demographic Supplement of the CPS. Among women 16 and older, labor force
participation has increased from 43 percent in 1970 to 59 percent in 2003. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005.
5 Brookings tabulations of data from the Annual Economic and Demographic Supplement of the CPS. Among women 16 to 64, the percentage
of women workers who work full-time, full-year has increased from 41 percent in 1970 to 59 percent in 2003, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005.
6 Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2007, Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Wages at the 20th percentile for male workers fell by 6 percent, whereas wages 
at the 20th percentile for female workers increased by 16 percent. 
7 See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Table P-40. Based on median earnings of full-time, year-round workers 15 years old and over 
as of March of the following year. 
8 These two years, 1969 and 1998, were selected as the approximate midpoint of the 1967–1971 and 1995-2002 time spans used in the
subsequent PSID data analysis. 
9 About two-thirds of unmarried individuals without children live alone or with unrelated individuals; the remaining one-third live with 
their parents or other relatives. 
10 Note that although both generations show low marriage rates in the bottom quintile, there is an important difference between the
generations in the income analysis. Whereas low marriage rates among parents can be a direct influence on parental family income as well 
as vice versa, low marriage rates in the children’s generation cannot be seen as having a direct causal influence on the income levels of their
parents some 30 years earlier.
11 McLanahan, 2004. 
12 The difference between men and women overall is statistically significant (p=.010). None of the differences between men and women in 
the individual quintiles are significant with 95 percent confidence, but the pattern of differences is significant under a joint test (p=.048). 
13 A chi-squared test shows that we can reject at the 99 percent level of confidence the hypothesis that boys and girls have identical expected
distributions.
14 John E. Morton and Ianna Kachoris of Pew’s Economic Mobility Project collaborated with the author in developing the mobility typology
presented in Appendix C.
15 The intergenerational elasticity (IGE) measure comes from a linear regression equation estimating the relationship between children’s 
and parents’ income, with both child and parental income expressed in logarithmic measures. It measures the percentage difference in
expected child income associated with a one percent difference in parental income. To interpret the IGE, imagine a group of parents whose
income is 80 percent higher than average. If they are in a society with an IGE of 0.5, then their children would, on average, have incomes 
40 percent higher than average (80 percent x 0.5). And at the extreme of an IGE of 0, any large group of children would have average
incomes unrelated to the income of their parents.
16 See Chadwick and Solon, 2002. Their IGE estimates are based on analysis of PSID data. 
17 The 75 percent moving down one income quintile is over a base that excludes the bottom quintile (from which downward movement 
is impossible). 
18 See d’Addio, 2007; and McLanahan and Bumpass, 1988.
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ECONOMIC MOBILITY OF
BLACK AND WHITE
FAMILIES
BY JULIA B. ISAACS, The Brookings Institution
he belief that one’s child 
will be better off than 
oneself is a foundation of 
the American Dream. The dream 
that one can rise up from humble
beginnings and achieve a comfortable
middle-class living, if not attain great 
wealth, transcends racial lines. But 
is this a reality for black and white
families alike? 
This chapter explores the differences
between white and black families 
with regard to economic success and
income mobility. As with other chapters
in this volume, it seeks to answer two
main questions. The first, focusing on
absolute mobility, asks about the
economic progress of white and black
families over recent generations. Do
children of black and white Americans
advance beyond their parents in terms
of family income? 
The second question, focusing on
relative mobility, asks about movement
up and down the income ladder. Do
black and white children starting on
similar rungs on the ladder have an
equal shot at rising in society? 
About the Study
As described in the Chapter  V
“Economic Mobility of Men and
Women,” economic mobility is
increasingly a family enterprise.
Accordingly the study focuses on
family incomes. The analysis looks
first at overall income trends, based
on data from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Current Population Survey
(CPS). Then, a direct comparison 
is made between the incomes of
individuals and their own parents, to
measure changes across generations
in both absolute income levels and
relative economic standing. 
The analysis focuses solely on black
and white families because of data
constraints of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), the
longitudinal survey used for the
intergenerational analysis. The 
PSID survey has repeatedly
interviewed a sample of families 
and their descendents since 1968,
allowing comparison of the children’s
income as adults with their family’s
income in childhood.1 To reduce the
effects of year-to-year fluctuations in
income, total family incomes of the
now-grown children are averaged
across five recent years (1995, 1996,
1998, 2000 and 2002) and compared
to the 5-year averages of their
parents’ income in the period
1967–1971.2 Further methodological
discussion of the PSID data sample
and how family income is defined is
provided in Appendix A.
REAL INCOME GROWTH 
OF WHITE AND BLACK
INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES 
Over the past three decades, 
personal income has increased
for both white and black women
in their 30s, while falling for 
both white and black men of 
the same age. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, median
personal income has increased more
than fivefold for non-Hispanic white
women, after adjusting for inflation. 
In 1974, many white women in their
30s were stay-at-home mothers with
little, if any, earnings, and median
personal income was only $4,000.3
Thirty years later, median personal
income was $22,000 for comparably
aged white women. As in other chapters
in this volume, this initial analysis 
of U.S. Census Bureau data focuses 
on personal incomes of adults in their
30s in 1974 and 2004 to facilitate
comparison across a typical generation.
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Income growth was not as large 
for black women ages 30 to 39
because they had much higher 
levels of employment and income
(median of $12,000) in 1974. 
One generation later, median 
personal income for non-Hispanic
black women rose to $21,000, 
or about 95 percent the level 
of non-Hispanic white women. 
Incomes of black men have been
fluctuating without improvement
and were lower in 2004 than 1974. 
During this time period, 1974–2004,
white and black men in their 30s
experienced a decline in incomes, with
the largest decline among black men.
Non-Hispanic black men in their 30s
today earn 12 percent less than men 
in their father’s generation earned.
Median personal income for non-
Hispanic black men for this age
cohort is only 64 percent of median
income for non-Hispanic white men
of the same age. 
Much of the difference between white
and black men is tied to differences 
in wages of full-time workers. Among
full-time workers age 16 and older,
median weekly earnings of black 
men were 78 percent of white men’s
earnings in 2004.4 The black-white
gap in male earnings has declined
historically, with a large decline from
the 1960s to the mid 1970s, but there
has been much less improvement over
the past three decades.5 Blacks also
have lower income than whites due 
to lower employment rates. The
percentage of men 16 and over who
were employed in 2004 was 70.4 
for white men and 59.3 percent for
black men.6
Family incomes have risen for 
both racial groups primarily
because the increase in women’s
incomes has outpaced the decline
in men’s incomes. 
Family income, the primary focus of
this study, often involves a combination
of male and female personal incomes.
For those who are married, family
income is based on the cash income
of both spouses as well as any other
family members. For single individuals
(who are treated as one-person families),
family income is simply the individual’s
personal income. 
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Source: Brookings tabulations of data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the CPS, 1971-2006.
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Note: All men and women ages 30-39, including those with no personal income, are included in these estimates. 
Source: Brookings tabulations of data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the CPS, 1971-2006. 
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There was no progress in 
reducing the gap in incomes
between black and white families. 
Consistent with the trends in individual
incomes, the increase in family
incomes was larger for whites in 
their 30s (19 percent) than for blacks
(10 percent). In 2004, the family
income of blacks ages 30 to 39 was
only 58 percent that of comparably
aged whites ($35,000 compared to
$60,000), as shown in Figure 2.7
Blacks have lower incomes than
whites across all age cohorts, not 
just the cohort aged 30 to 39. 
Income differences are particularly
pronounced at the bottom of the
income distribution. In 2006, close 
to one fourth (24.3 percent) of black
individuals had family incomes below
the federal poverty thresholds, a
poverty rate that is nearly three times
the 8.3 percent rate for non-Hispanic
whites. However, these rates do
represent some progress since 1967,
when black poverty rates were 39.3
percent and white poverty rates 
were 11.0 percent.8
The lack of income growth for
black men combined with low
marriage rates in the black
population has had a negative
impact on trends in family incomes
of blacks in the United States. 
While much of the racial disparity in
family income and poverty rates is a
result of lower earnings and incomes
of blacks, particularly black men,
large differences in family structure
also contribute to differences in family
economic well-being. As shown in
Figure 3, blacks are less likely than
whites to be in married-couple families,
and both races have seen a decline in
marriage across the generations. Low
marriage rates undoubtedly contribute
to low family incomes; high percentages
of blacks in their 30s are single
parents with children or single men
and women, and so are largely reliant
on income from only one adult in 
the family.9 At the same time, many
researchers believe that the low
personal income of black men 
plays a role in explaining low
marriage rates.10
Many of the racial patterns in family
income and composition evident in
the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual
surveys are also found in the
longitudinal data in the Panel Study
on Income Dynamics (PSID), the
sample used in the intergenerational
analyses that follow. Although the age
cohort is broader in the PSID and
there are other differences between
the data sets, the broad trends in
family income are similar, as shown
in Table 1.11 Trends in family
composition are also similar.12
Black children grow up in families
with much lower incomes than
white children. 
Median family income for parents 
of black children was $27,100 in
1967–1971, compared to $61,100 for
parents of white children, in inflation-
adjusted dollars. The lower economic
status into which black children are
born is also evident in the fact that
nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of black
children were born to parents in the
bottom fifth, or quintile, of the overall
income distribution. Only 8 percent 
of black children were born to parents
in the middle fifth of the income
distribution, compared to 22 percent 
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of white children. Note that there
were too few black parents in the top
quintile to generate income or mobility
statistics for this group of children.13
As documented in Chapter I
“Economic Mobility of Families
Across Generations,” parental income
has a strong influence on childhood
economic success. Given the lower
economic circumstances of black
children, it does not seem likely that
black and white children have equal
chances of economic success. Indeed,
median family income for the second
generation was much lower for blacks
than whites, $41,900 for blacks and
$78,800 for whites. 
But the further question here is
whether blacks and whites with
parents of similar income levels have
equal experiences of mobility. The
study explores both how overall
trends in economic growth translate
into upward movement in absolute
dollars (absolute mobility) and 
how families move up and down the
income ladder relative to others in 
the population (relative mobility). 
ABSOLUTE MOBILITY:
BLACKS ARE LESS LIKELY
THAN WHITES TO ADVANCE
BEYOND PARENTS AT EACH
INCOME LEVEL
As reported earlier in this volume,
two out of three Americans who were
children in 1968 grow up to have
higher incomes than their parents,
after adjusting for inflation. But is
this equally true for both black and
white children? 
Using the data in the PSID sample,
direct comparisons can be made
between the family incomes of
individuals and their own parents,
providing a new measure of mobility
that goes beyond the simple
comparisons across generations.
When the data are not controlled
for income, blacks and whites
have similar chances of having
adult incomes higher than their
parents. 
About two-thirds of blacks and 
whites have higher family incomes, 
as shown in Figure 4 (the difference
between the two racial groups is 
not statistically significant). This
outcome, however, is driven by the
disproportionate number of blacks 
in the lowest quintile, where the
probability of surpassing low parental
income is high for both whites and
blacks (90 percent for whites and 
73 percent for blacks). 
When the data are controlled 
for parental income quintile, 
at each income level, black 
adult children are less likely
than their white counterparts 
to have higher income than 
their parents. 
The difference is particularly
pronounced for the middle-income
group. After adjusting for inflation,
the analysis found that two out of
three white children from the middle
quintile grow up to have higher real
family incomes than their parents. 
In stark contrast, only one out of
three black children from the same
income group surpass their parents 
in absolute income levels. In other
words, a majority of black children
born to parents in the middle quintile
grow up to have less family income
than their parents in inflation-
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* Interpret data with caution due to small sample size. ** Too few observations to report estimate. 
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data on family income 1967–1971. 
Median Family Income of Parents, 
1967–1971 (In 2006 Dollars) $61,100 $27,100 $55,600
All
Children
Black
Children
White
Children
TABLE 1 Parents’ Income of White and Black Children 
in PSID Sample 
Parents in top fifth:
($81,200 or more) 23 % ** % 20 %
Parents in fourth fifth:
($65,100--$81,200) 23 7* 20
Parents in middle fifth:
($48,800-$65,100) 22 8 20
Parents in second fifth:
($33,800-$48,800) 19 23 20
Parents in bottom fifth: 
(0 to $33,800) 13 62 20
All Children 100 100 100
Percentage of Children Living in Each Income Quintile, 
based on Parental Income 1967–1971
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adjusted dollars. Outcomes are better
for black children from other income
groups, but still substantially below
outcomes for white children.14
The comparison of children’s income to
their own parents’ income is extended
in Figure 5, which reports the median
family income of adult children for
each racial and parental income group.
Children from middle- and 
upper-middle-class black families
experience a generational drop in
income that is in sharp contrast to
the traditional American
expectation that each generation
will do better than the one that
came before it. 
With the exception of children born 
to parents in the top quintile, white
children end up having higher
incomes than their parents. Only two
groups of black children—those in 
the two lowest income groups—also
experience income growth above 
their parents, though not as large 
as do white children born to parents
in the same quintiles. Black children 
in the third and fourth quintiles 
end up with lower median income
than their parents—by 7 percent 
and 16 percent, respectively.15
RELATIVE MOBILITY:
BLACKS EXPERIENCE LESS
UPWARD MOBILITY AND
MORE DOWNWARD
MOBILITY THAN WHITES 
For every parental income group,
white children are more likely
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FIGURE 4
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* Interpret data with caution due to small sample size. ** Too few observations to report estimate. 
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
67%
63%
44%
67%
49%*
68%
31%
78%
52%
90%
73%
**
FIGURE 5 Children’s Income, by Race, Compared to 
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than black children to move 
ahead of their parents’ economic
rank, while black children are
more likely than white children 
to fall behind. 
The intergenerational analysis tracks
the extent to which children move to
different income quintiles from those
occupied by their parents.16 The
analysis reveals that black children
and white children do not have equal
chances of moving up the income
ladder, even after controlling for
initial placement. 
This racial difference can be seen by
examining movements of children in
the middle-income group, depicted in
the central bars of Figure 6. More
than one-third (37 percent) of white
children born to parents in the middle-
income group move upward to the
fourth or fifth quintile, compared 
to only 17 percent of black children
whose parents have approximately
the same levels of income. 
Achieving middle-income 
status—with parental incomes 
of about $49,000 to $65,000 in
2006 dollars—does not appear to
protect black children from future
economic adversity the same way
it protects white children. 
A startling 45 percent of black 
children whose parents were solidly
middle income end up falling to the
bottom income quintile, while only 16
percent of white children born to parents
in the middle make this descent. 
Similar trends are found in other
income groups as well. In another
disturbing example, 48 percent 
of black children and 20 percent 
of white children descend from the
second-to-bottom income group 
to the bottom income group. In
addition, black children who start
at the bottom are more likely to
remain there than white children 
(54 percent compared to 31 
percent).
In general, white children in the
sample are roughly twice as likely 
as black children to rise to the top
quintile after controlling for parental
income levels. Black children are
much more likely to fall to the bottom
quintile. 
NEW MOBILITY TYPOLOGY
REINFORCES FINDINGS 
As a final step in the analysis, 
the absolute and relative mobility
measures presented in this chapter
were integrated in a combined
analysis that shows the chances 
that white and black children move
beyond their parents in both absolute
income levels and relative economic
standing.17 As shown in detail in
Appendix D, this integrated mobility
analysis reinforces the findings
already reported on absolute mobility.
When the data are not controlled for
income, there is not much difference
in the mobility experiences of black
and white Americans. However,
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FIGURE 6 Chances of Getting Ahead or Falling Behind in Income Ranking, 
by Parental Income and Race  
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within income groups, there 
are large differences, with white 
children more upwardly mobile 
than black children. This apparent
contradiction is explained by the 
fact that outcomes for blacks are
strongly influenced by the large
number of black children in the
bottom fifth of the income
distribution—and low-income
children of both races have good 
odds of surpassing their own 
parents’ income. 
FINDINGS ARE 
CONSISTENT WITH
AVAILABLE LITERATURE 
BUT UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS REMAIN 
Many readers will want to know 
more about the robustness of these
findings, as well as the underlying
factors contributing to the sharp
differences in both absolute and
relative mobility experiences of 
white and black families. Are the
findings reported for this sample 
true of black families more generally? 
And would the differences remain 
if the analysis controlled not just 
for income, but also for educational 
and occupational status, family
wealth, family structure, health
status, neighborhood, parental
attitudes and behaviors, and 
other variables? 
While the literature on
intergenerational mobility by 
race is limited, similar black-white
differences are emerging in other
studies (see Appendix E). A few
studies also suggest that the racial
gap is reduced but not eliminated
when additional factors are included
in the analysis. 
It is important to note that the 
literature is uniformly hindered 
by the small number of minority
households in the longitudinal
surveys. In addition, the PSID, 
which is the data source for this 
study and much of the research 
on intergenerational mobility, has
been criticized for having insufficient
documentation of the procedures 
used to sample low-income minority
households.18 Analysis of additional
data sets (including administrative
data sets with larger sample sizes), 
as well as more extensive research 
on the factors contributing to racial
differences, is needed to better
understand the differences in 
mobility experiences uncovered 
in this analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
While incomes have grown for 
both white and black families since
the early 1970s white families still
have considerably higher incomes
than black families. Some of the
differences in economic outcomes
reflect the persistent effect of 
income differences from the early
1970s passed down from parents 
to children. In addition, the mobility
analyses presented here show that 
even within income groups, white
children have better economic
outcomes than black children. In
terms of absolute, relative, and
integrated mobility measures, 
white children have substantially
more upward mobility than black
children of comparable incomes. 
The findings for black children 
in the bottom fifth present a 
sobering picture, but one familiar
from the broad literature on black
child poverty. Namely, black 
children who are born into the
bottom fifth of the income
distribution have a hard time
escaping upward, and a harder time
than poor white children. What is 
not usually reported, however, is that
low-income children—both black 
and white—have fairly good chances
of exceeding their parents’ income. 
The findings for black children 
born to middle-income parents 
may be more startling. Many 
middle-income black parents have
seen their children’s incomes fall
below their own; and disturbingly
high numbers of black children have
fallen from the middle to the bottom
of the income distribution. Economic
success in the parental generation—
at least as measured by family
income—does not appear to protect
black children from future economic
adversity the same way it protects
white children.
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NOTES
1 This analysis focuses on black and white families, without separate analysis of other races, due to the sample size constraints of the PSID. 
Individuals of other races are included in the totals and in the full income distribution that was used to create income quintiles, but not in the black 
or white subgroups. The terms “blacks” and “whites” are used in keeping with the terminology recommended by the Office of Management and
Budget for statistical reporting for Census Bureau and other reports, see p. xxxvii of National Research Council, 2001. 
2 Family income is defined as the cash income of all family members including the family head, spouse and other family members. All incomes 
are reported in inflation-adjusted dollars, using the Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS). Cash income does not include the value of 
non-cash compensation such as employer contributions to health insurance and retirement benefits, nor does it include the effect of taxes or non-cash
benefits such as food stamps. (For further discussion of non-cash contributions to economic well-being see “Economic Mobility of Families Across
Generations.”) 
3 Personal income is based primarily on an individual’s own earnings, but it also includes income from interest and dividends, cash benefits, child
support, and other cash income. 
4 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007, Table 630. 
5 Welch, 2003. 
6 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005, Table 3. 
7 In Figure 2, as in Figure 1, the unit of analysis is all adults in their 30s, not just family heads. The family income of adults in their thirties may
therefore include the income of older (or younger) spouses, as well as other family members. Single adults are counted as a family of size one and
included in family incomes reported throughout this study. 
8 DeNavas-Walt, 2006. The poverty data in 1967 is for all whites; whites were not categorized by Hispanic origin in 1967.
9 Note, however, that single parents with children and single individuals may be living with their parents or other adult relatives, whose income would
count toward family income. 
10 Berlin, 2007; and Wilson, 1987. 
11 The ages in the PSID are 27–52 rather than ages 30–39. The sample includes all 1,607 white individuals and 730 black individuals who were children
in 1968 and were still in the sample in 1995–2002, when data was collected on their family incomes as adults. The PSID sample differs from the CPS
sample not just in age of adults under analysis, but in other ways. For example, the income data are from slightly different time periods: 1967– 1971 
for the parents’ generation and 1995–2002 for the children’s generation, based on data availability. Also note that in the PSID sample, white and black
families may be of Hispanic origin, but the sample is limited to those who were in the country in 1968 and thus does not represent the large numbers 
of Hispanic families that have immigrated more recently. See Appendix A for further description of the PSID sample. 
12 The PSID sample shows a similar black-white differential in family composition to the differences in Census Bureau data shown in Figure 3. 
For example, in 1968, 94 percent of the white parents were married, compared to 66 percent of the black parents. The gap was even wider among 
the younger generation (71 percent of whites and 35 percent of blacks were married in 1996).
13 The sample of 730 black individuals includes only 4 observations with parental income in the top quintile (income above $81,200 in 2006 dollars,
based on a ranking of parental family incomes for individuals of all races); and 24 observations with parental income in the fourth quintile (from
$65,100 to $81,200). The small number of observations in the fourth and fifth quintiles is partly due to the underlying income distribution in the
population, but also reflects the fact the minority oversample in the PSID was concentrated on low-income households (with weights used to adjust the
final statistics for this purposeful oversampling). No statistics are reported for the top quintile; statistics for the fourth quintile are flagged as imprecise
due to small sample size. 
14 Note that there are relatively few blacks in the middle three quintiles (24 in the fourth quintile, 50 in the middle quintile, 153 in the second quintile).
Even so, differences between blacks and white are statistically significant (at 95 percent confidence for the bottom, second, and middle quintiles, and
between 90 and 95 percent confidence for the fourth quintile, where, as noted, estimates are imprecise due to small sample size). Also note that the
differences between blacks and whites would be reduced but not eliminated if incomes were adjusted for family size. Finally, note that black parents
have somewhat lower incomes than white parents, even when grouped by quintiles. However, the difference in parental incomes in the middle income
quintile is not large: $55,800 median for white parents in the middle quintile and $53,700 median for black parents in the middle quintile. 
15 The intergenerational drop in income in both the middle and fourth quintiles is statistically significant. 
16 For the parents’ generation, the bottom quintile includes those with incomes less than $33,800, the second quintile is from $33,800 to $48,800, 
the middle quintile is from $48,800 to $65,100, the fourth quintile is from $65,100 to $81,200, and the top quintile is families with income above
$81,200. For the children’s generation, the bottom quintile includes individuals with family incomes less than $40,300, the second quintile is from
$40,300 to $62,000, the middle quintile is from $62,000 to $84,000, the fourth quintile is from $84,000 to $116,700, and the top quintile is
individuals with family incomes above $116,700. All incomes are in 2006 dollars. 
17 John E. Morton and Ianna Kachoris of Pew’s Economic Mobility Project collaborated with the author in developing the mobility typology presented 
in Appendix D. 
18 See Solon, 1992; and Brown, 1996 for more on the PSID’s oversample of low-income minority neighborhoods. As noted in Appendix A, this analysis
includes only one-third of the original low-income observations because two-thirds of the low-income sample observations were dropped from
interviewing in 1997. Thus the sample here is the regular cross-sectional sample, plus one-third of the low-income sample, weighted to be nationally
representative. Supplemental analyses conducted by the author find that the black-white differences remain largely unchanged if the minority low-
income sample is dropped from the analysis. In fact, the differences are slightly larger. For example, when the low-income or “SEO” sample is
dropped, 61 percent of blacks have income higher than their parents, compared to 63 percent under the full sample.
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Most economists believe that immigration, liketrade, is on balance good
for America. But the term “on balance”
masks an important issue: whether
immigration, like trade, hurts some
Americans while helping others.
More specifically, what is the impact
of immigration on inequality and
economic mobility in America?
TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION
Recent debate reflects the concern
many Americans have about 
both the scale and character of
immigration to the United States. 
As Figure 1 shows, according to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, the number
of legal immigrants has been rising
steadily since the 1960s, from about
320,000 per year to nearly a million
per year in both the 1990s and 2000s.
In addition to these legal entrants,
over 500,000 immigrants arrive or
remain illegally in the United States
each year.1 So, in recent years, a total
of about 1.5 million immigrants have
arrived in the United States annually,
more than a third of them illegally.2
One result of these high immigration
rates is that the percentage of U.S.
residents who are foreign-born
increased from 4.7 percent in 
1970 to 12.7 percent in 2003.3
Because many immigrants tend 
to be in their prime child-bearing
years, and because they tend to have
more children than non-immigrants,
the percentage of resident children
who have foreign-born parents is
even higher, at about 20 percent.4
In addition to these major increases 
in the number of immigrants, the
source countries of immigrants have
been changing. As compared with
the 1960s, the share of immigrants 
from European nations or Canada
has declined from about half to
under 20 percent, while the fraction
from Asian, Latin American, and
Caribbean nations has increased
from about half to nearly three-
quarters.5 Relative to the average
American worker, immigrants from
Latin America and the Caribbean
are poorly educated, largely unskilled,
and earn low wages when they enter
the United States.
Even so, the overall mix of educational
attainment of immigrants upon arrival
in the United States has remained
fairly constant over the last four
decades. Figure 2 shows that the
proportion of immigrants with 
a bachelor’s degree has actually
increased over the last 35 years; 
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FIGURE 1 Annual Number of Legal U.S. Immigrants
by Decade and Region of Origin, 1960–2005
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but otherwise the proportion of
immigrants with advanced degrees
and those with a high school degree
or less has stayed approximately the
same since before 1970. Recently,
the percent of immigrants with a
bachelor’s degree or higher has
increased, while those with a high
school diploma or less has decreased. 
However, as seen in Figure 3,
educational attainment varies
significantly based on an immigrant’s
region of origin. Educational attainment
for immigrants from Latin America
stands in stark contrast to the other
regions of origin, with half arriving
with less than a high school diploma.
By contrast, about half of immigrants
from Asia arrive with a bachelor’s
degree or higher. 
A major question regarding
immigrant education is how their
educational attainment compares
with that of non-immigrants. Figure
4 provides such a comparison.6 The
first set of bar graphs shows that about
five times as many first generation
immigrants, as compared with non-
immigrants, have less than a ninth
grade education. The second set of
bar graphs shows that first generation
immigrants are also less likely to
have a high school degree. 
However, as shown in the last set of
bar graphs, first generation immigrants
are actually more likely to have
advanced degrees than non-immigrants.
Clearly, the distribution of immigrants’
educational attainment is complex:
while nearly one-third of recent
arrivals have less than a high school
diploma, more than 10 percent have
an advanced degree.
Another remarkable part of the
immigrant experience depicted in
Figure 4 is that second generation
immigrants exceed the educational
attainment of the first generation  
by a considerable margin.7 In the 
case of advanced degrees (above 
a bachelor’s degree), they actually
exceed the attainment of both first
generation immigrants and non-
immigrants. As we will see, education
is one vehicle that immigrants use 
to help their children get ahead. 
Further, education is one of the most
important determinants of wages
and income in the United States.
According to the Census Bureau, in
2005 high school graduates earned
FIGURE 2 Educational Attainment of First Generation Immigrants
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about $8,000 more than high school
dropouts, college graduates earned
about $19,000 more than high
school graduates with no college,
and those with professional degrees
earned about $36,000 more than
those with a bachelor’s degree.8
IMMIGRANT WAGES
Given the low educational attainment
of a large number of immigrants, it
is not surprising that average immigrant
wages are low and falling relative to
those of non-immigrants. Figure 5,
developed from recent work by
George Borjas of Harvard University,
shows the average hourly wages of
first generation immigrants relative
to non-immigrant workers in selected
years covering six decades. 
Relative wages of the first generation
show steady decline. In 1940 the
average first generation immigrant
earned 5.8 percent more than the
average non-immigrant worker, 
but relative wages fell to only 1.4
percent more in 1970, and then
dropped precipitously by 2000 
to almost 20 percent less than those 
of the typical non-immigrant worker.9
Figure 6 reveals another striking
wage pattern, already suggested by
the improved educational attainment
of second generation immigrants
illustrated in Figure 4: second
generation immigrants not only
exceed the wages of first generation
immigrants but also exceed the wages
of non-immigrant workers. This
pattern demonstrates clearly that
there is impressive upward economic
mobility from the first to the second
immigrant generation.10
But before we conclude that the great
American wage escalator for immigrants
is working well, we should note the
pattern of relative wages for the second
generation across the three time periods
shown in Figure 6.11 More specifically,
relative wages of the second generation
dropped consistently over the period
from 17.8 percent to 6.3 percent
above those of non-immigrant workers.
Thus, the pattern of declining relative
wages of first generation immigrants
is associated with a similar pattern
of declining relative wages in the
second generation. Second generation
mobility is still in operation, but the
second generation is earning relative
wages that are lower than those of
previous second generation workers.
If the relative wages of both first 
and second generation immigrants
are falling, the question arises: where
might this pattern lead in the future?
Figure 7 compares the relative wages
FIGURE 4 Educational Attainment for First and Second Generation
Immigrants and Non-Immigrants, 25 Years and Over, 2004
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of first generation immigrants in 
1940 and 1970 with wages of workers
in the second generation who are in
the same cohort as the children of 
the respective 1940 and 1970 first
generation workers.12
The first set of bar graphs, for
example, compares the relative wages
of the generation of foreign-born
workers who were in the United
States in 1940 with the relative wages
of second generation workers who
were in the United States 30 years
later and were roughly the same age
as the children of the 1940 cohort of
first generation workers. Comparing
the heights of the bars shows that the
second generation in 1970 exceeded the
relative wages of the parent generation
by almost 9 percentage points. 
However, three decades later, the 
relative wages of second generation
workers were greater than those of
the 1970 first generation workers 
by less than 5 percentage points. 
If the decline in second generation
relative wages continues apace with
the decline in first generation wages,
we can expect that second generation
workers in 2030 will earn substantially
less than non-immigrants just as workers
in their 2000 parent cohort did. If
low wages persist into the second
and subsequent generations for
substantial numbers of immigrants,
economic hardship may persist beyond
the first generation and economic
assimilation into American society
may become more difficult.
A contentious debate has emerged
over whether immigrants have an
impact on the wages or employment
levels of non-immigrants. The respective
sides in the debate are led by Borjas,
who argues that low-wage immigrants
have a negative impact on poor 
non-immigrant workers, especially
blacks, and David Card of Berkeley
who argues that they do not.13 The
crux of the argument for Card and
economists who agree with him 
is that immigrants not only supply
labor, but they also consume goods
and services. It follows, based on 
the economic theory of supply and
demand, that there is no inherent
reason why immigrants should hurt
non-immigrant workers. In a word,
the great American job machine can
accommodate millions of immigrants
because their consumption will
further stimulate the economy 
and the job machine. 
Another important argument on
Card’s side of the debate is that the
American economy needs immigrants.
A recent report by Rob Paral of the
Immigration Policy Center shows
FIGURE 6 Second Generation Age-Adjusted Wages
Relative to Wages of Non-Immigrants, 1940, 1970, 2000
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that immigrants are a major presence
in about one-third of U.S. job categories
and that most of these job categories
would have contracted during the
1990s if it had not been for immigrants.14
And as pointed out in a recent New
York Times Magazine feature about
the Borjas-Card debate, there are 21
million immigrants who hold jobs in
the United States and only 7 million
unemployed workers.15 Thus, it cannot
be the case that the overwhelming
majority of immigrants took jobs
away from Americans.
But the real issue, responds Borjas, 
is not the overall impact of immigrants
on the economy; the issue is their
impact on particular segments of 
the job market. Because recent years
have seen an increase in immigrants
(especially from Mexico) with low
education and low skill levels relative
to those of non-immigrants, the low-
wage portion of the U.S. job market
is disproportionately affected. Card
responds with data showing that some
cities with a large influx of immigrants
actually saw increased wages at the
bottom of the wage scale. 
The most recent entrant in this
ongoing and lively argument is a
study published this year by Borjas
along with his colleagues Jeffrey
Grogger of the University of 
Chicago and Gordon Hanson of 
the University of California at San
Diego, based on 40 years of U.S.
Census Bureau data.16 Examining
the census employment data within
skill groups and controlling for a
number of factors that might affect
their results, the authors found that
“as immigrants disproportionately
increased the supply of workers in 
a particular skill group, the wage 
of black workers in that group 
fell, the employment rate declined,
and the incarceration rate rose.”
Linking immigrants with both 
black unemployment levels and
incarceration rates, already delicate
topics among scholars and policy
makers, is likely to raise the volume 
of the Borjas-Card debate. 
When economists who are greatly
respected by their colleagues disagree
sharply over an issue like the impact
of immigration on employment and
wages, it seems wise for outsiders 
to resist forming a strong conclusion
and simply say, instead, that the jury
is still out. Thus, we make no claims 
about whether immigrants have an
impact on the wages of low skilled
non-immigrants.
IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION 
ON INEQUALITY
Given that average relative wages 
of immigrants are falling, it seems
likely that immigrants are contributing
to widening income inequality in the
United States. But as Robert Lerman
of American University has argued,
this standard view of the impact of
immigrants on inequality is somewhat
misleading because it ignores the
impact of immigration on the
economic status of immigrants
themselves.17 
Economists typically measure growth
in income inequality by comparing
some measure of the distribution of
income at two points in time. These
calculations invariably reveal that
the growing income inequality in the
United States is aggravated by the
declining wages of each succeeding
wave of immigrants. 
However, because these calculations
are based on random samples of the
U.S. population at two points in time,
they ignore the condition of immigrants
before they arrived in the United
States. Because of the rapid increase
in immigration, the more recent
sample will include more immigrants
than earlier samples. 
Moreover, because immigrants are
increasingly from low-wage countries
like Mexico, the immigrants selected
in the more current sample will
have, on average, lower education
levels and lower relative wages than
immigrants in the earlier sample.
Thus, immigrants contribute to 
the growing economic inequality 
in the United States. 
But Lerman’s point is that if we had 
a measure of the new immigrants’
wages in their native country, we
would find that, on average, they
have greatly improved their wages
by entering the United States. The
economist Mark Rosenzweig, for
example, has recently estimated that
Mexican workers with a high school
degree earn seven times as much in
the United States as in Mexico.18
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Lerman recommends calculating 
the impact of the American economy
on changes in measures of economic
well-being and inequality by including
estimates of the income immigrants
would have received in their home
country.19 According to Lerman,
such a calculation reveals that the
growth of income inequality is about
two-thirds less than it is when the
income immigrants would have earned
in their home country is ignored. 
IMMIGRANT MOBILITY
By considering immigrants’ income
before they enter the country we may
conclude that the American economy
provides a huge boost to the mobility
of first generation immigrants. Indeed,
this conclusion is consistent with the
most basic rationale for immigration
between nations throughout human
history— the prospect of greater
economic opportunity.
But what about the mobility of
immigrants from various nations 
and their children once they reach
the United States? To examine 
this question, we turn again to the
seminal work of Borjas, who has
developed a useful method for
examining the intergenerational
mobility of immigrant groups 
from various nations. First, he
computes the relative wages (again,
relative to non-immigrant workers)
of male immigrants from selected
nations in 1970 based on U.S.
Census Bureau data. Then he 
repeats the computation for 
second generation immigrants 30
years later for the same national
origin groups. Table 1 compares the
results for both generations of
immigrants from selected countries.20
Borjas finds that immigrant groups
from industrialized nations tended to
earn more than average non-immigrant
workers. Immigrants from France,
for example, earned 19.8 percent
more than average non-immigrant
workers. By the second generation 
in 2000, the relative wages of workers
from industrialized nations had
moved closer to the average of non-
immigrant workers. In other words,
they experienced downward relative
mobility in the second generation. 
By contrast, first generation
immigrants from less industrialized
countries earned less than typical
non-immigrant workers. For example,
immigrants from Mexico earned
almost 32 percent less than non-
immigrants in 1970. Thirty years
later, second generation workers
from less industrialized nations had
also moved closer to the average wages
of non-immigrant workers, but in
this case by rising above relative 
first generation wages. In the case 
of second generation immigrants
from Mexico, for example, relative
wages moved from 32 percent less
than non-immigrant workers in the
first generation to only 15 percent
less than non-immigrant workers 
in the second generation. With few
exceptions, first generation immigrants
from various nations start at different
levels in the U.S. wage distribution
and second generation workers from
the respective nations show wage
mobility by moving in the direction 
of mean wages—moving down if 
the first generation had wages above
the mean and moving up if the first
generation had wages below the mean.
Despite the considerable movement
of wages between first and second
generation immigrants, the question
TABLE 1 Age-Adjusted Relative Wages of Immigrants 
from Selected Countries
Source: Borjas, 2006, p. 62.
Canada 18.5 % 16.8 % -1.7%
France 19.8 5.9 -13.9
India 30.8 27.1 -3.7
Germany 24.9 19.5 -5.4
Dominican Republic -37.0 -18.9 18.1
Haiti -21.7 10.6 32.3
Mexico -31.6 -14.7 16.9
Jamaica -22.8 1.2 24.0
Relative 
Wage of
Immigrants 
in 1970
Relative 
Wage of
Second
Generation 
in 2000
Wage
Improvement
or Decline 
in Second
Generation
(Percentage
Points)
Country 
of Origin
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arises of whether the characteristics
of first generation immigrants influence
the wages of the second generation.
To examine the relationship between
the wages of first and second generation
immigrants, Borjas computes the
intergenerational correlation between
the relative wages of first generation
workers from selected nations and
those of second generation workers 
from the same nations. 
He finds that, based on 30 national
origin groups, the intergenerational
correlation between the 1940 and
1970 generations is .42. The correlation
between the 1970 and 2000 cohorts,
based on 61 national origin groups, 
is similar.21 These correlations across
generations are comparable to 
those reported for native-born
American families. In other words,
non-immigrants and immigrants
pass along approximately the same 
degree of economic advantage or
disadvantage to their children. In
common sense terms, according 
to Borjas, correlations of this magnitude
mean that about 40 percent of the
wage differences between any two
national groups in the first generation
persists into the second generation.
But what happens to these
correlations if they are adjusted 
for the education level of the various 
national groups? Borjas finds that
the correlations in wages between
the first and second generations 
are considerably diminished when
adjusted for the education level 
of the various national groups. 
This finding suggests that one
pathway by which the correlation 
in wages is passed on through the
generations among the national
groups is educational achievement.
Given the low educational
achievement of many immigrants
now arriving in the United States, 
it might be expected that average
wages in the second generation 
will continue to drop in the future.
Although today’s immigrant 
population is arriving with a mix 
of educational backgrounds that 
are similar to that of earlier
immigrants, the increase in the
absolute number of immigrants 
with low levels of education, coupled
with the relatively high correlation
between the wages of first and 
second generation immigrants, 
suggest that it may be increasingly
difficult for second generation 
immigrants to surpass the wages 
of non-immigrants. First generation
immigrants certainly experience 
economic mobility by coming to 
the United States, but the mobility
of second generation immigrants 
is constrained by the characteristics 
of first generation immigrants that
are passed to second generation
immigrants, primarily education.
CONCLUSION
It is a remarkable achievement, 
considering the low wages immigrants
would have made in their own
countries, that America offers such
rich opportunities for immigrants to
improve their income and standard
of living. Further, second generation
immigrants continue to earn more
than first generation immigrants,
though wages of second generation
immigrants have been falling relative
to those of non-immigrants over the
last three generations. Moreover, 
the economic prospects of second
generation immigrants are very much
tied to the characteristics of first
generation immigrants, most notably
to level of educational attainment. 
Economic assimilation appears to 
be working well, although the country
is now in the process of incorporating
a distinctly different, and lower-wage,
immigrant population from that of
previous generations. With wages in
the United States strongly correlated
to both education levels and to
parental incomes, the children of 
low-wage, poorly educated immigrants
may well have an uphill climb to
continue reaching economic parity
with non-immigrants. 
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NOTES
1 Martin and Midgley, 2006, p. 3. Most researchers who have tried to estimate the number of illegal entrants or the total number of illegal
residents who live in the United States at any given moment would agree that it is impossible to get an exact count. Even so, some estimates
are more reasonable than others. Most observers seem to agree that the most reliable numbers have been produced by Jeffrey Passel (2006) of
the Pew Hispanic Center in Washington, D.C. Martin and Midgley use Passel’s estimates. Although it receives little attention, the United States
also has emigration. The Census Bureau estimates that between 1995 and 1997, 220,000 foreign-born residents of the United States
emigrated to other countries each year. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2004. 
2 All data presented in this report, unless otherwise noted, are based on analysis of the U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey that
includes both legal and illegal immigrants in the sample. However, the survey does not allow researchers to identify the legal status of
immigrants and therefore cannot be used to analyze legal versus illegal immigrants.
3 Borjas, 2006. 
4 Non-immigrants include residents of the United States who are third generation immigrants, as well as generations subsequent to the third
generation. Reardon-Anderson, Capps, and Fix, 2006.
5 Martin and Midgley, 2006.
6 As noted above, non-immigrants include residents of the United States who are third generation immigrants, as well as generations
subsequent to the third generation.
7 During each of the years shown in Figures 4 through 7, the Census Bureau interviewed random samples of people residing in the United States. Because
the interviews of first and generation immigrants were conducted during the same year, the second generation in each year cannot represent the children’s
generation of first generation immigrants. However, as shown in Figure 7, it is possible to compare the first generation in a given year with the second
generation several decades later to gain a rough idea of how the offspring cohort of the earlier cohort of first generation immigrants are doing.
8 U.S. Census Bureau, 2007, “Educational Attainment in the United States, 2006: Detailed Tables,” Table 8.
9 The data points in Figure 5 are log wage differentials multiplied by 100 to convert them to percentages. Borjas and Friedberg (2006) show
that the relative wages of immigrants have increased somewhat in the last half of the 1990s due primarily to an increase in highly-educated
immigrants such as engineers and doctors and to a decline in the wages of non-immigrant workers at the bottom of the wage distribution,
primarily high school dropouts.
10 Given that the years between 1940 and 2000 saw significant changes in the relative education, country of origin, and other characteristics 
of immigrants, the wage differences between first and second generation immigrants in Figures 5 through 7 reflect many differences between
the two samples.
11 The data points in Figure 6 are log wage differentials multiplied by 100 to convert them to percentages.
12 Workers in the sample of second generation workers are not the actual children of the particular individuals in the first generation sample. 
In the year they were interviewed they were roughly the same age as children of first generation workers. The data points in Figure 7 are log
wage differentials multiplied by 100 to convert them to percentages.
13 Card and Lewis, 2007.
14 Paral, 2005.
15 Lowenstein, 2006.
16 Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2006.
17 Lerman, 1999; and Lerman, 2003. 
18 Rosenzweig, 2006. There appears to be some disagreement among economists about these U.S.-Mexican wage differentials. Gordon Hanson,
2006, for example, has estimated that the wages of Mexican high school graduates who come to the United States are around three times
greater than the wages of high school graduates who stay in Mexico. Even so, there is no disagreement that by moving to the United States,
Mexicans and other workers from Latin American nations (and most other nations as well) can greatly increase their wages.
19 Lerman’s approach involves estimating immigrants’ income at time 1 in relation to average income in their country adjusted for education 
and other individual characteristics. As his measure of inequality in the United States, Lerman uses Census Bureau data to compute the ratio of
incomes at the 10th percentile to incomes at the 90th percentile; lower ratios indicate higher income inequality. For all families, the traditional
approach of ignoring the income of immigrants at time 1 (in this case 1979) yields a Gini coefficient of .299 at time 1 and .344 at time 2
(1997), representing a substantial increase in inequality. By contrast, using Lerman’s method of estimating what the income of immigrants
would have been in their home country at time 1 reveals that the Gini coefficient at time 1 was .329, only slightly lower than the .344 at time 2.
20 The data in Table 1 show a clear pattern of what statisticians call “regression to the mean.” This term simply means that if the parent’s
generation has scores above or below the population mean, scores of the children’s generation would tend to be closer to the mean. Thus, we
would expect the relative wages of second generation workers from selected countries to be closer to the mean of all workers than the relative
wages of the parent’s generation. The probability of regression to the mean increases as average relative wages in the parent generation depart
further from the mean of all workers. The countries presented in Table 1 are selected from a larger set of countries studied by Borjas. Not all
the countries in Borjas’s samples show regression to the mean.
21 Borjas, 2006, p. 64. The intergenerational correlation differs somewhat from the intergenerational elasticity measure presented in other
chapters, as explained in note 10 in Chapter II “Trends in Intergenerational Mobility.” Note also that Borjas examines wages rather than
income and uses differences between first and second generation immigrants by nation of origin as a rough proxy for data on father-son pairs.
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EDUCATION
AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY
BY RON HASKINS, The Brookings Institution
ost Americans believe 
that the road to achieving
the American Dream 
passes through the schoolhouse door.
This chapter examines evidence of the
returns to schooling in the American
economy, changes in the average 
level of education by various groups
of Americans during the twentieth
century, and the role of education 
and family background in promoting
economic mobility.
RISING EDUCATION LEVELS,
INCREASING GAPS
Figure 1 shows the median annual
family income since the mid-1960s 
of high school dropouts, high school
graduates, college graduates, and
those with an advanced degree.1
The figure shows striking differences
in income by level of education.
Completion of each degree from high
school, to college, to professional or
graduate leads to greater income. The
gaps between each level of education
are substantial—the gap between 
a high school degree and a college
degree was over $29,000 in 2005.
Equally interesting is the pattern 
of income changes over time. Although
those with a high school degree earn
considerably more than those without
a high school degree, the income of
both groups has been more or less
stagnant since at least the early 1980s.
By contrast, those with a college degree,
despite a few brief periods of decline
or stagnation, increased their income
by one percent per year over the period
while those with graduate or professional
degrees did even better. 
The strong correlation between
education and income supports 
the belief held by most Americans
that getting an education is a good
way to get ahead. No wonder, then,
that the educational attainment of
Americans increased dramatically
over the course of most of the
twentieth century. 
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FIGURE 1 Median Family Income of Adults Ages 30–39 
with Various Levels of Educational Achievement, 1964–2005
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However, the educational attainment
was not uniform. Figure 2, based on
an extensive analysis of educational
trends during the twentieth century
by Claude Fischer and Michael Hout
of the University of California at
Berkeley, shows the years of schooling
completed by Americans at the 80th
percentile, the median, and the 20th
percentile of the education distribu-
tion.2 At every level, years of schooling
rose continuously for the first seven
decades of the twentieth century. 
But note that the median, after 
two decades of catching up with the
top 20 percent before World War II,
fell well below the top 20 percent
over the three decades following 
the war and the century ended as 
it began—with big gaps between 
the top and the middle and bottom 
of the distribution. 
The increase in educational
attainment during much of the
twentieth century is also reflected 
in high school graduation rates for 
all demographic groups. As indicated
in Figure 1, although the economic
return to achieving a high school
degree has been stagnant for the 
past 30 years, a high school degree
provides a substantial boost to income.
The panels in Figure 3 show changes
during the twentieth century in the
percentage of men and women and
various ethnic groups who graduated
from high school. 
A striking feature of both panels 
is the impressive increases in high
school graduation rates among all
demographic groups. Unfortunately,
however, blacks and Hispanics made
only modest progress in closing the
gap between themselves and both
whites and Asians.
Figure 4 shows that the growth in
college graduation rates is similar in
many respects to the growth in high
school graduation rates, albeit at a
much lower level: in 2000, about 
25 percent of Americans had a college
degree while 85 percent had a high
school degree. Whites and Asians have
opened a large gap between themselves
and both blacks and Hispanics. These
gaps appeared early in the century
and expanded during the course of
the century. Thus, despite the fact
that blacks and Hispanics made good
progress in increasing their college
graduation rates, they did not increase
rapidly enough to keep up with whites
and Asians. By 1970, the share of
whites who graduated from college
was twice the share of blacks and
Hispanics, while Asians were three
times as likely to earn a college
degree. Since 1970, both gaps, but
especially the gap between Asians 
and all the other groups, have 
opened even further.
EDUCATION AND 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY
ACROSS GENERATIONS
If, as shown in Figure 1, education
contributes so substantially to income,
it seems reasonable to expect that 
it could also contribute to economic
mobility across generations. Moreover,
it might be expected that education
would, as ironically as it might seem,
be a barrier to mobility—or at least
an important factor in accounting for
why some groups get or stay ahead
while others are left behind. 
To understand the relationship
between educational attainment 
and economic mobility, we consider
two key questions. 
FIGURE 2 Years of Schooling Completed by Adults 
at the 20th, 50th, and 80th Percentiles, 1900–2000
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First, does educational attainment
contribute to economic mobility?
That is, do adult children earn more
than their parents? If so, are those
with more education more likely to
surpass their parents’ income than
those with less education?
Second, does education contribute 
to relative economic mobility? That
is, does educational attainment help
the second generation move up the
income scale relative to the position
occupied by others in their generation?
Figure 5, based on the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID), tracks
the mobility of adult children by
comparing their income at roughly
age 40 with that of their parents at
about the same age.3 In the three
decades between measurement of 
the parents’ income (averaged over
the period 1967–1971) and that 
of their adult children (averaged 
over selected years between 1995 
and 2002), median family income
grew by 29 percent, after adjusting
for inflation.4 It follows that there 
was likely to be substantial income
mobility between generations over 
the period. After all, somebody had 
to get that additional money.
The bar graphs in Figure 5 show 
that many adult children, regardless
FIGURE 3
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FIGURE 4
College Graduation Rates by Gender and Ethnic Group
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of whether they have a college 
degree and regardless of their parents’
income quintile, had higher median
family incomes than their parents.
Clearly, there was significant
economic mobility across these two
generations—mobility that was made
possible largely by economic growth
during the period.
In addition, more of those with a
college education in each quintile
exceeded their parents’ income than
did those without a college education.5
As shown by the “All” bars, 74 percent
of adult children with a college degree
had incomes greater than their parents,
while 63 percent of adult children
without a college education had
incomes greater than their parents. 
Both adult children with and without
college degrees were more likely to
exceed their parents’ income if their
parents were lower in the income
distribution as shown in Figure 5. 
In the case of adult children with a
college education, for example, 96
percent of adult children with parents
in the bottom quintile exceeded their
parents’ income, but only 57 percent
of those with parents in the top quintile
exceeded their parents’ income. Those
in the middle three quintiles fell
between 79 and 86 percent.6
Figure 5 shows there was substantial
upward mobility between the parental
generation of the 1960s and 1970s
and their adult children and that this
mobility was more likely to occur if
parents had lower income and if their
children attained a college education.
From these findings it follows that
both education and family background
played a role in accounting for the
degree of mobility between generations.
Education and Relative Mobility
Besides affecting whether adult
children earn more than their parents,
educational attainment affects how
adult children move up or down 
the income distribution relative to
their peers. 
To understand this relative movement,
we divide the distributions of parental
income and adult child income into
quintiles of equal size based on family
income. We then count the number 
of adult children from each parental
income quintile who land in each 
of the five quintiles defined by the
incomes of adult children in their
generation. Figure 6, based on the
PSID, shows the income quintile
location of adult children relative 
to the income quintile location 
of their parents. Separate charts 
are presented for adult children 
with and without a college degree.
Consistent with findings described 
in other chapters, both sets of bar
graphs show considerable relative
economic mobility between generations.
Regarding adult children without 
a college degree, reading from the
bottom to top quintiles of parental
income respectively and computing
the sum of all adult children who
moved out of their parents’ income
quintile, we see that 55 percent, 76
percent, 77 percent, 69 percent, and
77 percent of adult children move up
or down relative to their parents’ income
quintile; that is, they land in an
income quintile in their generation
that is different than the income
quintile occupied by their parents.
The role of a college degree.
Note, however, the difficulty that
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FIGURE 5
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
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adult children had moving out of 
the bottom quintile. Without a college
degree, 45 percent of adult children
with parents in the lowest income
quintile remained at the bottom, more
than twice the level that would be
expected if there were no relationship
between parents’ and adult children’s
income. By contrast, only 16 percent
of adult children with a college degree
remained in the bottom quintile.7 In
this case, education contributed to 
a boost in economic status for adult
children from poor families.
Another solid piece of evidence 
that college contributes to relative
economic mobility is the finding 
that adult children of parents in all
five quintiles are much more likely 
to make it to the top two quintiles if
they achieve a college degree. Only 
14 percent of the adult children
without a college degree from the
bottom quintile of parental income
reach the top two quintiles. By
contrast, 41 percent of adult 
children from the bottom quintile
make it to the top two quintiles if
they earn a college degree.8
Achieving a college degree also 
helps those born into wealthier
families retain their high position. 
By finishing college, the adult
children of parents in the next-to-top
income quintile improve their chances
of staying in the top two quintiles
from an already considerable 47
percent without a college education 
to 75 percent; the respective figures
for adult children from the top
quintile are 43 percent and a
whopping 81 percent. 
These analyses point to an important
role for education in helping adult
children from both relatively poor
families and relatively wealthy
families move up the income
distribution relative to their peers.
The role of family background.
On the other hand, one of the ways
family background contributes to the
economic success of adult children 
is that relatively wealthy parents 
can help their children get a good
education. In fact, if it were not for
the nation’s education system, it
might be more difficult for wealthy
parents to pass along their income
advantage to their children. Without 
a college education, only 23 percent
of the adult children of parents in the
top quintile themselves make it to the
top quintile. This 23 percent is only a
little higher than would be expected 
if the children of wealthy parents
were equally likely to wind up in all
five income quintiles. By contrast,
with a college education 54 percent 
of the adult children of parents in 
the top quintile themselves make it
into the top income quintile.9 Family
background is important, but adult
children from the bottom can move
up if they attain a college degree, 
and adult children from the top 
risk falling if they do not attain 
a college degree.
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FIGURE 6 Chances of Getting Ahead for Children with and without a College Degree, 
from Families of Varying Income
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
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Perhaps the most dramatic example
of the importance of family background
is shown by comparing adult children
of parents in the top quintile who did
not attain a college degree with adult
children of parents in the bottom
quintile who did attain a college degree.
Children of parents in the top quintile
have a 23 percent chance of winding
up in the top quintile even though
they fail to earn a college degree. Adult
children of parents in the bottom
quintile have only a 19 percent chance
of winding up in the top quintile even
when they get a college degree. Hard
work can help students from poor
families get ahead, but children from
wealthy families nonetheless seem to
have an advantage.
Given the powerful effect of a college
education on the income of adult
children from all levels of family
income, the effects of family background
and college education could be difficult
to separate if parents with more income
are more likely to have children who
attain a college degree. Figure 7, which
is similar to many other reports in the
literature, shows that wealthier parents
are indeed more likely to have children
who attain a college degree.10 Only 
11 percent of children with parents 
in the bottom income quintile attain 
a college degree as compared with 53
percent of children with parents in
the top income quintile. These results
are consistent with the conclusion that
one way relatively wealthy parents
pass along their advantages to their
children is by ensuring that they
attend and graduate from college. 
DOES EDUCATION
INCREASE MOBILITY
SUFFICIENTLY?
The evidence shows that both
education and family background
have an impact on absolute and
relative mobility. Despite the fact 
that family background helps adult
children get ahead or stay ahead, high
educational attainment can make a
difference by boosting the fortunes of
poor children and allowing them both
to earn more than their parents and
even to surpass the income of many
of their peers from wealthier families. 
Because education has the potential 
to boost the economic mobility 
of poor children, it is important to 
ask whether the nation’s educational
systems do enough to promote
economic mobility.
When they believe the game is not
rigged, Americans generally are not
alarmed by the nation’s growing
income inequality: Americans want 
to be certain that everyone who works
hard and plays by the rules has a
decent shot at a good education and
the income mobility that will result 
in most cases. Although it would be
difficult to achieve consensus on
precisely how much economic mobility
would be ideal, most Americans would
probably agree that more mobility is
good and that it would be consistent
with American values if more children
from low-income families had a 
better chance of moving up the
economic ladder—especially through
educational achievement—than 
they do now.11
Thus, it seems fitting that at least
since the Civil War, parents, the
public, and politicians have made
great efforts to create educational
institutions that would promote
economic growth and give all children
a good chance to achieve economic
mobility. Those efforts have produced
good results: as we have seen, the
twentieth century was marked by
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FIGURE 7
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
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huge increases in the average level 
of education, and this improvement
was characteristic of both males and
females and of all racial and ethnic
groups. Even so, substantial differences
in educational attainment remain,
with blacks and Hispanics trailing
badly behind whites and Asians, 
and with children from low-income
families trailing as well. 
The question remains: Can the nation’s
educational institutions do more to give
children from families with widely
different incomes and children from
all ethnic and racial groups an equal
opportunity to advance? To answer
this question, we examine the evidence
on the effectiveness of preschool
education, K-12 public education,
and college and university education
in boosting economic mobility.
Preschool Education12
There is now strong evidence that
performance differences on tests 
of intellectual ability between children
from poor and minority families as
compared with children from more
advantaged families are apparent 
by three years of age.13
To address these gaps in learning
during the preschool years and 
in intellectual achievement and 
social behavior once children enter
the schools, the fields of preschool
education and developmental
psychology have long believed that
high-quality preschool programs can
ameliorate both the gaps in readiness
for schooling and in school achieve-
ment. In addition, they believe quality
preschool programs can have positive
impacts on development that show 
up throughout the child’s school 
years and even into adulthood.14
How solid is the evidence that these
preschool optimists are correct? Many
studies have shown that preschool can
have immediate impacts on test scores
and social behavior; a large, but smaller,
number of studies have shown that
high-quality programs can produce
impacts that last through the elementary
school years, especially by reducing
placements in special education classes
and reducing grade retentions; and at
least three major longitudinal studies
have shown that high-quality preschool
programs can have lasting effects 
on school performance as well as on
important developmental milestones
related to economic mobility.15
Table 1, taken from the work of two
leading researchers, summarizes the
impacts of three of the best preschool
programs and Head Start on teen
parenting rates, adolescent well-being,
criminal activity, and the net earnings
gain in adulthood from participation
in these high-quality programs. 
It is not difficult to conclude that 
the types of impacts of preschool
programs summarized in Table 1
would serve to increase economic
mobility. If young boys and girls can
avoid teen pregnancy, arrests and
incarceration, drug use, or serious
health problems, their chances of
increasing their employment and
earnings would clearly be enhanced.
Even more impressive, all three of
these studies produced direct estimates 
of net earnings gains of adult children
who had participated in their respective
preschool program. All are in excess
of $30,000, and one reaches nearly
$40,000. 
The results from these three remarkable
studies support the conclusion that
high-quality preschool can produce 
a range of positive outcomes on
children’s development, not the least
of which is boosting their economic
mobility. However, the most telling
criticism of this optimistic conclusion
is that two of the programs were
small scale (less than 125 families
each), leading some researchers to
suggest that these compelling results
might not generalize to a larger
program, let alone a national
preschool program that could help 
all or nearly all poor children.
The third study, the Chicago Child-
Parent Centers, was conducted with
well over 1,500 children and was 
part of the routine operation of the
Chicago Public Schools. That major
impacts relating to economic mobility
could be achieved by a preschool
program as large as the Chicago
Child-Parent Centers is encouraging.
On the other hand, a recent national
evaluation of Head Start, a program
with national scope, found modest
impacts on school readiness measures
and social behavior at the end of the
program.16 There is some evidence that
Head Start produces long-term effects,17
but the results of the national evaluation
raise doubts about the size and potential
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permanence of the gains produced 
by Head Start. As shown in Table 1,
there is no evidence that Head Start
produces the effects on earnings
achieved by the big three model
programs.18
Most of those who study preschool
programs agree that the evidence that
preschool programs produce immediate
impacts on development is overwhelming
but that the evidence for longer-term
impacts is more tenuous. Very good
studies show that remarkable long-
term impacts are possible, but whether
a program of national scope would
produce large impacts is less certain.
As two leading preschool researchers
concluded after a thorough review 
of the evidence, expectations about
the impact of preschool on economic
mobility “should be modest.”19
K-12 Education20
Since publication of the justly famous
Coleman Report in 1966, an enormous
body of literature has accumulated that
reinforces the Coleman conclusion that
the greatest single influence on school
achievement is family background.21
Figure 8 provides a clear picture 
of the influence family background
exerts on school achievement.22
Based on the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress, the figure
shows that at every measurement
point between 1978 and 2004, 
17-year-olds who had parents 
with higher levels of education
out-performed adolescents who 
had parents with less education. 
Of the four levels of parent education
(high school drop-out, high school
graduate, some college, college degree),
there was no overlap in the scores of
their children at any of the nine testing
occasions between 1978 and 2004.23
Fortunately, there was some progress:
those whose parents did not graduate
from high school closed part of the
gap between their math scores and
the scores of the other three groups. 
These differences in educational
attainment between poor and more
advantaged students are important
for understanding economic mobility
because, as Figure 1 illustrates, 
there is substantial evidence of a
strong correlation between schooling
and earnings. But as they now function,
the nation’s K-12 school systems
provide only a modest boost to poor
and minority children’s chances of
moving up the economic ladder.24
Of course, some children manage 
to use the public schools as a stepping-
stone to further education and then 
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TABLE 1 Effects of Selected Preschool Programs 
on Adolescent and Adult Behaviors
*These data entries mean that the average child in the comparison group committed .37 felony assaults
while the average child in the program committed only .17 assaults.
Table entries are percentages unless otherwise noted.
Source: Barnett and Belfield, 2006, p. 84.
Control or
Comparison
Group
Group
Receiving
Preschool
Program
Teenage Parenting Rates:
Abecedarian 45% 26 %
Perry Preschool 37 26
Chicago Child-Parent Centers 27 20
Well-being:
Health problem (Perry Preschool) 29% 20 %
Drug user (Abecedarian) 39 18
Needed treatment for addiction (Perry Preschool) 34 22
Abortion (Perry Preschool) 38 16
Abuse/neglect by age 17 (Chicago Child-Parent Centers) 9 6
Criminal Activity:
Number of felony violent assaults (Perry Preschool)* 0.37 0.17
Juvenile court petitions (Chicago Child-Parent Centers) 25 16
Booked or charged with a crime (Head Start) 12 percentage 
points lower
Net Earnings Gain from Participating 
in Early Childhood Programs:
Abecedarian $35,531
Perry Preschool $38,892
Chicago Child-Parent Centers $30,638
Head Start No effect
Preschool Programs and Outcomes
to economic advancement, but on
average the K-12 schools do not do
much to boost relative mobility. One
recent review concluded that the “U.S.
public schools tend to reinforce the
transmission of low socioeconomic
status from parents to children.”25
This conclusion should be tempered
somewhat by the finding, shown clearly
in Figures 5 and 6 above, that some
children from poor families make it
into college and that many of the
students from poor families who graduate
from college will move ahead of their
peers from more advantaged families.
Although we might wish that the
public schools did more to boost 
the prospects of students from poor
families, there is some reason to
believe that the schools could become
more effective in the future. Since 
at least the 1983 publication of 
A Nation at Risk, a prominent report
that grabbed headlines by concluding
that American schools were failing
miserably, public education has been
more or less in a state of permanent
reform.26 Major experiments have 
been launched to study classroom
size, teacher quality and preparation,
school accountability for achievement,
new reading and math programs,
vouchers, charter schools, and 
many other reforms. 
In addition, the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 imposed
major accountability requirements 
on public schools and threatened
serious penalties against schools that
failed to perform. Further, to improve
the quality of educational research, 
in 2002 Congress created the Institute
of Education Sciences which now funds
a host of well-designed, large-scale
studies of educational interventions. 
Despite all these reforms, as shown 
by Figure 8, educational achievement
for the nation as a whole has not
improved much. Moreover, the
achievement gaps between students
from poor or minority families and
students from wealthier or white
families have closed only modestly.27
The conclusion that public K-12
education does little more than
reinforce the differences children
bring to the schools seems apt.
Nonetheless, the American K-12
education system has seldom been
under such pressure to perform,
research on education has never 
been as abundant or of as high
quality as it is today, and the public
schools have probably never had 
as many innovations under way as 
they do now. It is possible to remain
hopeful that the future will bring
more effective ways of improving 
the educational achievement of 
all students. 
Colleges and Universities28
Adults with a college education 
have much higher family income 
than high school dropouts or high
school graduates. There is also strong
evidence that a college education boosts
economic mobility of adult children
from poor and low-income families. 
It should follow that if adolescents
from poor and low-income families
manage to attend and graduate from
college at high rates, income mobility
in the United States would receive 
a dramatic boost. But as we have 
seen (Figure 7), adolescents from
poor families are much less likely 
to attend college than are adolescents 
from wealthier families. 
Figure 9, based on work conducted 
at Harvard,29 shows the percentage 
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FIGURE 8 Trends in Average Mathematics Scores for 17-Year-Olds 
by Parents’ Highest Level of Education, 1978–2004
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of students from the top and bottom
quartiles of family income who entered
a vocational or two-year college or 
a four-year college. Although children
from low-income families were more
likely to enter two-year institutions
than children from wealthier families,
the evidence that these institutions
boost subsequent employment and
income is modest.30 By contrast,
children from wealthier families 
were more than twice as likely to
enroll in four-year colleges, which
greatly increases the likelihood that
their earnings would place them 
in the upper income quintiles.
Differences in college graduation 
rates between children from poor 
and more advantaged families are
even greater than differences in
college enrollment. Researchers 
at the University of Wisconsin used
the PSID to examine the probability
that students with family income in
the bottom quartile, as compared
with students from families in the 
top quartile, would attend and 
would graduate from a four-year
college. Although both their data 
set and their methods were different
than those used in the Harvard study,
their findings on enrollment in four-year
colleges—22 percent versus 28 percent
for poor students and 71 percent
versus 66 percent for wealthier
students—are roughly similar. 
But the Wisconsin study found 
an even greater difference in college
graduation rates. Less than 6 percent
of students from the bottom income
quartile, as compared with over 42
percent of students from the top
quartile, actually graduated from
college. Thus, although college 
would have a major impact on 
the jobs and incomes of students 
from poor and low-income families,
relatively few of them attend college
and even fewer of them graduate.
Part of the reason for lower college
attendance and completion by students
from low-income families may be 
that they are less prepared for college. 
As our review of evidence on the
achievement levels of poor students
from at least the age of three shows,
these students on average perform well
below the level of students from
wealthier families. 
Even so, recent studies have shown
that a large number of students from
poor families have high SAT scores
yet do not attend good four-year
colleges.31 Although low educational
achievement is certainly one reason
many students from poorer families
do not attend four-year colleges, 
there must be other factors at work,
for a large number of academically
qualified students from poor families
are not attending four-year institutions.
Even those who do enter these
institutions have a much lower
completion rate than their ability
would predict. 
A recent exhaustive review of the
evidence showed that at every step in
the process of preparing for, applying
to, attending, and graduating from
four-year universities, students from
poor families are at a substantial
disadvantage.32 They are ill prepared
for college by their high schools; they
have less knowledge about and receive
less help in searching for appropriate
schools and filling out the application
forms; and they have more difficulty
applying for and receiving financial
aid (which they need more than do
students from wealthier families).
Thus, like preschool education and 
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K-12 education, the nation’s colleges
and universities contribute less than 
they might to the economic mobility 
of disadvantaged students.
CONCLUSION
Previous chapters have shown that
family background exerts a strong
influence on the position adult
children reach in the income distribution
and on both their absolute and relative
mobility. However, the evidence
presented here shows that education
can boost the mobility of children
from poor and low-income families
(and from wealthier families as well),
because each additional level of
attainment, from a high school
degree, to a college degree, 
to a professional or graduate degree
adds substantially to income. 
These effects are powerful enough 
to boost the income of adult children
from relatively poor families not 
only well past the income achieved 
by their parents but also past the
income achieved by many of their
peers with more advantaged family
backgrounds who did not obtain
equivalent education. 
While the American faith in 
the capacity of education to boost
economic mobility is well placed,
there is a complicating factor. 
At every level from preschool, 
to the K-12 system, to the nation’s
college and universities, education 
has only modest economic impacts 
on the average low-income child 
or adolescent. Although education
can and sometimes does boost the
achievement and later the income 
of children from relatively poor
families, the average effect of
education at all levels is to reinforce
the differences associated with the
family background that children 
and adolescents bring with them 
to the classroom. 
There is good reason to expect 
that education will continue having
only a moderate impact on economic
mobility in the United States until
more poor children develop school
readiness skills during the preschool
years, until K-12 schools are more
effective in imparting basic skills 
and in helping more poor children
complete high school, and until 
more poor students enter and
complete college.
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NOTES
1 Social scientists are careful not to draw causal inferences from correlational data of the type shown in Figure 1. The major reason Figure 1
does not prove that education causes higher income is that, although education and family income are correlated, other variables besides
education that are correlated with education could account, at least in part, for the observed correlation. For example, people with more
education tend to come from families with more income and education, to marry people who also have higher education and income, to have
more stable marriages, and to live in better neighborhoods. All of these factors may contribute to the relationship between education and
income shown in Figure 1.
2 In Figures 2, 3, and 4, the data points shown on the abscissa include people who turned 21 in each of the respective years and were between
ages 30 and 59 regardless of which census contained data for individuals who met the age criteria. See Fischer and Hout, 2006. Figures 2, 3,
and 4 include data only from native-born Americans regardless of ethnic background.
3 These analyses are based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). PSID investigators have repeatedly interviewed a sample of
families and their descendents since 1968, allowing comparison of the children’s income as adults with their family’s income during childhood.
To reduce the effects of year-to-year fluctuations in income, total family incomes of the adult children are averaged across five recent years
(1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) and compared to the 5-year averages of their parents’ income in the period 1967–1971. The sample
used here includes 2,367 individuals. The mean age of adult children when their income was measured was 39.4; the mean age of parents was
40.9. For further details, see Appendix A.
4 After 1996, the PSID interviewed its sample every second year rather than every year in order to save money. Because we wanted to average
adult children’s income over five years as we had done with parents’ income, it took more years to accumulate five years of income data.
5 The differences between adults with and without a college education are statistically significant overall and for each of the five quintiles 
of parents’ income. 
6 The difference between the bottom quintile and middle three quintiles in the percentage of college graduates who surpass their parents’
income (96 percent compared to 84 percent, 86 percent, and 79 percent) is statistically significant under a joint test, but not all of the individual
comparisons are statistically significant.
7 The difference between 45 percent and 16 percent is statistically significant.
8 The difference between 14 percent and 41 percent is statistically significant.
9 The difference between 23 percent and 54 percent is statistically significant.
10 See note 29.
11 Jencks and Tach, 2006. Although parents might agree in the abstract that more mobility is good, parents with high incomes will nonetheless
do everything they can to prevent downward mobility from striking their own children.
12 This section is based in part on Barnett and Belfield, 2006. 
13 Lee and Burkam, 2002.
14 Haskins, 2006; Sawhill and Ludwig. 2007; Karoly, Kilburn, and Cannon, 2005; Lazar et al., 1982.
15 These three major studies are Campbell et al., 2002; Reynolds et al., 2001; Schweinhart et al., 2005. See also the references in note 14.
16 Westat, 2005. 
17 Garces, Thomas, and Currie, 2002; and Currie and Neidell, 2007.
18 Many Head Start advocates would argue that Head Start could produce greater impacts if teachers were better trained and if regulations 
on quality were more effectively enforced.
19 Barnett and Belfield, 2006, p. 91.
20 This section is based in part on Rouse and Barrow, 2006.
21 Coleman et al., 1966; Jencks and Phillips, 1998; and Mosteller and Moynihan, 1972. 
22 National Center for Education Statistics, 2005. 
23 Similarly, in an analysis of the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988, Rouse and Barrow, 2006, found striking differences in the
expected direction between students from families in the lowest and highest quartiles of socioeconomic status on several measures including
test scores, share of students reporting being held back in grade, school dropout rates, and share graduating from high school.
24 Sawhill, 2006.
25 Rouse and Barrow, 2006, p. 116.
26 National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983. 
27 Murnane, 2007.
28 This section is based in part on Haveman and Smeeding, 2006. 
29 Ellwood and Kane, 2000. The Ellwood and Kane study is based on data from the High School and Beyond study.
30 Haveman and Smeeding, 2006.
31 Carnevale and Rose, 2004; and Winston and Hill, 2005. 
32 Haveman and Smeeding, 2006.
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APPENDIX A The PSID Sample and Family Income
The sample for this analysis is 2,367 individuals who were between the ages of 0 and 18 in 1968 and have been tracked
into adulthood through the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), an annual survey collecting information on family
income and other characteristics. The PSID core sample includes an oversampling of low-income households (commonly
referred to as the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample) in addition to a regular cross-sectional national sample
(the Survey Research Center (SRC) sample). Both components of the sample were included in the analysis, although two-
thirds of the low-income sample observations were dropped from the sample in 1997 as a cost-savings measure and thus
were excluded from the analysis. 
The unit of analysis is the individual child. Individual survey weights were used to adjust for the likelihood of sample
selection (given the purposeful oversampling of low-income households and the subsequent sample reduction) and also to
adjust for non-random attrition. Despite these adjustments, the sample may suffer from non-random attrition, that is,
individuals who have dropped out of the sample may differ from those who remain in the sample. The sample does not
include immigrants who entered the country since 1968, nor does the analysis focus on generations born before 1950 or
after 1968. 
Family cash income is the focus of the analysis, including taxable income (such as earnings, interest and dividends) and
cash transfers (such as Social Security and welfare) of the head, spouse and other family members. The PSID definition of
family, used in this analysis, includes single-person families and unmarried cohabiting couples who share resources, in
addition to families related by blood, marriage or adoption. As discussed in Appendix B, family cash income does not
include the value of non-cash compensation such as employer contributions to health insurance and retirement benefits,
nor does it include the effect of taxes or non-cash benefits such as food stamps. All incomes are reported in 2006 dollars,
using the CPI-U-RS to adjust for inflation. 
Parental family income is based on total family income averaged over five years, 1967–1971, following family income
for the head of the family in which the child resided in 1968. This income is referred to as the child’s parents’ income,
although the sample includes children living with grandparents or other relatives and it includes income of all members of
the family (head, spouse, and other family members). Average age of the children’s parents was 40.9 at the time of survey
interview (1968–1972). Five-year averages are used as a proxy for lifetime income. 
Children’s adult income is based on total family income (of the family in which the adult child resides), averaged over
five years of income. Because the PSID shifted from annual to biennial data collection in the mid 1990s, the five years of
data are collected over a seven-year interval (income in 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002). Family income data are
collected at ages 27–34 for the youngest children in the sample (those born in 1968) and ages 45–52 for the oldest
children (those 18 in 1968). Average age of the children was 39.4 at the time of survey interview (1996–2003). 
Negative and zero incomes are bottom-coded to $1, and individuals with missing data for two or more years in either
five-year period were dropped. As noted above, this restriction resulted in dropping the portion of the SEO sample that
was discontinued in 1997. 
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APPENDIX B Non-Cash Contributions to Family Economic Well-Being
Economic mobility is measured in this series by tracking changes in families’ cash income. While more comprehensive than
earnings, family cash income does not account for fringe benefits, taxes, non-cash assistance and other factors affecting
economic well-being. To what extent would mobility trends differ if these contributions were included?
• Absolute mobility would be higher with inclusion of the value of fringe benefits such as employer-provided health
insurance, retirement benefits, vacation and sick leave. Employer contributions to retirement and health insurance
were higher in the children’s generation than the parents’ generation, totaling 7 percent of wages and salaries in
1967–1971 and 13 percent in 1995–2002 according to aggregate national data.1 The inclusion of these benefits
would increase upward mobility the most for those at the top; jobs at the top of the income distribution are more
likely to provide these health and retirement benefits. Workers in the bottom half of the distribution have suffered
from substantial declines in health insurance and pension coverage since 1979.2
• Overall mobility is largely unchanged after an adjustment for federal taxes, but inequality is somewhat lessened.
Taxes reduce disposable income, with the effect varying by family income. On average, federal taxes reduced average
family income by 22.4 percent in the 1995–2002 time period, varying from 27.5 percent for the top fifth to 5.7
percent for families in the bottom fifth, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The effective federal tax
rate has fluctuated somewhat over time, but was roughly the same in 1979, the earliest year in the CBO study as in
1995-2002 (22.2 compared to 22.4 percent). In other words, overall mobility is largely unchanged after adjustment
for federal taxes, but inequality is somewhat lessened. Families at the bottom have experienced the largest reduction
in tax rate, due to the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit.3 State and local sales, property and income taxes
take a further bite out of family income, with a tax burden that is more evenly distributed across the income
distribution.4
• Non-cash transfers, such as food stamps and subsidized housing, increase disposable income for the poorest
families. Federal spending on food and housing benefits increased dramatically during the five-year period in which
parental income was measured (1967–1971) and has continued to grow since then. Spending per household on food
and housing benefits grew by 53 percent between 1973 and 2003, a growth rate slightly higher than that for family
incomes in the PSID sample.5 In 2002, 5.6 percent of households received food stamp benefits averaging $1,784 over
the year, 7.1 percent of households received a school lunch benefit averaging $695 and 4.6 percent of households
received housing assistance averaging $2,390.6
• Other adjustments that are included in some measures of disposable income can be both positive (such as returns
to home equity and capital gains) and negative (such as child care and other work expenses). 
In sum, these additional measures add some refinement to the mobility picture. Comprehensive measures that include
fringe benefits and non-cash government benefits suggests slightly higher growth rates than seen from cash income alone.
In addition, post-tax, post-transfer measures suggest somewhat less inequality than depicted by pre-tax measures. 
1 Council of Economic Advisers, 2007, Table B-28, p. 262. If one adds in employer contributions to government insurance, the ratio of non-wage
compensation to wage compensation rises from 11.6 percent in 1967–1971 to 20.7 percent in 1995–2002.
2 See Katz and Autor, 1998, Section 2.3, “Total Compensation Inequality vs. Wage Inequality”; see also Pierce, 2001.
3 Congressional Budget Office, 2006.
4 McIntyre et al., 2003.
5 Author’s calculations based on expenditures from Congressional Research Service, 2006, Table 5 and population data from Census Bureau, 2007, Table 57. 
6 Census Bureau, 2004. Table 7. Income of Households from Specified Sources, by Poverty Status: 2002. 
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However, the broader income measures show similar trends to cash income measures, namely, average family incomes
have grown between the generations, with the most rapid income growth at the top fifth of the income distribution. For
example, the CBO measure of after-tax, comprehensive household income shows a growth in annual income of 41 percent
between 1979 and 2004, with a rate of 69 percent for the top fifth and 6 percent for the bottom fifth. Mean household
income under CBO’s disposable income measure was $62,900 in 2004, ranging from $14,700 for the bottom fifth to
$155,200 for the top fifth.7
7 Congressional Budget Office, 2006. Incomes are reported in 2004 dollars. The after-tax measure incorporates the effects of four major federal sources of
revenue: individual income taxes, social insurance (payroll) taxes, corporate income taxes, and excise taxes. Comprehensive cash income is the sum of
wages, salaries, self-employment income, rents, taxable and nontaxable interest, dividends, realized capital gains, cash transfer payments, and retirement
benefits plus taxes paid by businesses (corporate income taxes and the employer’s share of Social Security, Medicare, and federal unemployment insurance
payroll taxes) and employee contributions to 401(k) retirement plans. Other sources of income include all in-kind benefits (Medicare, Medicaid, employer-
paid health insurance premiums, food stamps, school lunches and breakfasts, housing assistance, and energy assistance).
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APPENDIX C Four-Part Typology of Economic Mobility 
of Sons and Daughters 
It is important to demonstrate how men and women move beyond their parents in both absolute and relative terms. As
shown in the Chapter V “Economic Mobility of Men and Women,” sons are slightly more likely than daughters to surpass
the family incomes of their parents (69 percent compared to 64 percent), and there are fewer differences between men
and women in relative movement up and down the income distribution. These two measures of mobility are integrated in 
a four-part mobility typology, presented in the table on the next page. It shows the following:
• About one-third of both sons and daughters are upwardly mobile in the sense of both getting ahead 
of their parents’ family income and moving ahead of their parents’ income ranking (36 percent of sons and 
33 percent of daughters). 
• Another one-fourth of sons and daughters are riding the tide and are making more than their parents 
but remain in the same economic position (27 percent of sons and 26 percent of daughters). 
• As with all children, there is a small percentage (5 to 6 percent) of both sons and daughters who are
falling despite the tide; although they have more income than their parents they fall behind their parents’ 
economic position. 
• Daughters appear to be slightly more likely to be downwardly mobile than sons. More than one-third 
(36 percent) of daughters make less than their parents’ income and fall behind or remain at their parents’ economic
position, compared to 31 percent of sons. 
Much of the observed differences between men and women are concentrated in the experiences of children in
the bottom fifth. Almost two-thirds of men born to parents in the bottom fifth are upwardly mobile, while only half of
women are. 
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Bottom
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Middle
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Top
Quintile
Parents’ Family Income RankM E N
Upwardly Mobile
Higher income and up 1 or more quintiles 65 % 55% 35% 27% N/A1 36%
Riding the Tide
Higher income and same quintile 20 20 28 35 35 27
Falling Despite the Tide
Higher income and down 1 quintile N/A2 2 4 10 13 6
Downwardly Mobile
Lower income and lower/same quintile 3 15 23 34 29 52 31
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
All
Children
Children’s Chances of Experiencing both Absolute and Relative Mobility, 
by Parents’ Family Income and Gender (Percent in Each Category)
Bottom
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Middle
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Top
Quintile
Parents’ Family Income RankW O M E N
Upwardly Mobile
Higher income and up 1 or more quintiles 53 % 49% 37% 25% N/A1 33 %
Riding the Tide
Higher income and same quintile 27 21 19 30 33 26
Falling Despite the Tide
Higher income and down 1 quintile N/A2 1 10 8 6 5
Downwardly Mobile
Lower income and lower/same quintile 3 20 29 34 37 61 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
All
Children
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 
1 Those in the top quintile cannot meet this definition, because there is no quintile above the top quintile. 
2 Those in bottom quintile cannot meet this definition, because there is no quintile below the bottom quintile. 
3 Any observation with income exactly equal to parents is also classified as downwardly mobile. Source: PSID tabulations.
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APPENDIX D Four-Part Typology: Economic Mobility 
of White and Black Families
As a supplemental step in the analysis, the absolute and relative mobility measures presented in Chapter VI, “Economic
Mobility of Black and White Families,” were integrated in a combined view to describe more fully how black and white
Americans experience economic mobility. 
When the data are not controlled for income, there is not much difference in the mobility experiences 
of black and white Americans.1
• Overall, slightly more than one-third of both black and white children are upwardly mobile in the double sense of
rising above their parents in dollar levels and moving up at least one income quintile, as shown in the table below. 
• About one-fourth of both racial groups are riding the tide, that is, rising above parental income levels in inflation-
adjusted dollars, but without moving up an income quintile. 
• A small group of individuals (6 percent of white children and 2 percent of black children) are falling despite the
tide. They get ahead of their parents’ income in absolute terms but fall back one quintile. 
• Finally, one-third or more are downwardly mobile, dropping below parents in both income level and income
quintile. 
However, within income groups, there are large differences, with white children more upwardly mobile than
black children.
This contrast is illustrated by comparing children in the middle-income group. More than one-third of white children whose
parents are in the middle quintile are upwardly mobile and one-third are downwardly mobile. Among black children from
the middle quintile, however, only 17 percent are upwardly mobile and more than two-thirds (69 percent) are
downwardly mobile. Similarly, white children in other income groups have higher rates of upward mobility than black
children, while black children fall more heavily into the downwardly mobile category.2
How is it possible for blacks to be so similar to whites in the overall mobility findings when they lag behind whites in
upward mobility within income groups? As noted when discussing mobility findings in the chapter, the positive mobility
results for all black children are driven by the large number of children in the bottom fifth of the income distribution,
where likelihood of exceeding low parental income is fairly high for both racial groups. 
1 There is no statistical significance between blacks and whites in the “overall” column, with the exception of the “falling despite the tide” category, where 2
percent of blacks is statistically different from 6 percent of whites. 
2 The differences between blacks and whites in both upward mobility and downward mobility are statistically significant for every quintile except the
fourth, where, as noted, estimates are imprecise due to small sample size.
A P P E N D I C E S Economic Mobility111
E C O N O M I C  M O B I L I T Y  P R O J E C T : An Initiative of The Pew Charitable Trusts
Bottom
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Middle
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Top
Quintile
Parents’ Family Income RankW H I T E S
Upwardly Mobile
Higher income and up 1 or more quintiles 69% 58 % 37 % 26 % N/A(1) 34 %
Riding the Tide
Higher income and same quintile 21 19 23 33 34 27
Falling Despite the Tide
Higher income and down 1 quintile N/A(2) 1 7 8 10 6
Downwardly Mobile
Lower income and lower/same quintile (3) 10 22 32 33 56 33
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
All
Children
White and Black Children’s Chances of Experiencing both Absolute and Relative Mobility, 
by Parents’ Family Income (Percent Children in Each Category)
Bottom
Quintile
Second
Quintile
Middle
Quintile
Fourth
Quintile
Top
Quintile
Parents’ Family Income RankB L A C K S
Upwardly Mobile
Higher income and up 1 or more quintiles 46% 26% 17% 11*% ** 37 %
Riding the Tide
Higher income and same quintile 27 24 9 22* ** 24
Falling Despite the Tide
Higher income and down 1 quintile N/A(2) 2 5 16* ** 2
Downwardly Mobile
Lower income and lower/same quintile (3) 27 48 69 51* ** 37
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
All
Children
Source: Brookings tabulations of PSID data.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
* Interpret data with caution due to small sample size. ** Too few observations to report. 
(1) Those in the top quintile cannot meet this definition of “upwardly mobile,” because there is no quintile above the top quintile. 
(2) Those in bottom quintile cannot meet this definition of “downwardly mobile,” because there is no quintile below the bottom quintile.
(3) Any observation with income exactly equal to parents is also classified as downwardly mobile. 
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APPENDIX E Research Literature on Black-White Differences 
in Intergenerational Income Mobility
How do the findings in this study on Black and White mobility compare to results of other researchers? And does
multivariate research indicate whether the differences observed in simple cross-tabulations would remain if the analysis
controlled not just for income, but also for a host of other parental characteristics? Preliminary responses to these questions
are provided in the following brief review of the literature on black-white differences in intergenerational mobility. 
Economist Tom Hertz (2005, 2006) finds similar relative mobility patterns to those displayed in Figure 6, in Chapter VI,
“Economic Mobility of Black and White Families.” In fact, his analyses, which include all individuals in the PSID who
were born between 1942 and 1972, show even larger racial disparities, particularly with regard to black children being
trapped in the bottom of the income distribution. From this pattern, he concludes that much of the overall intergenerational
persistence of poverty in America is driven by the experience of black children. More generally, he argues that a key channel
for the overall transmission of economic status from parents to children in the United States is the passing down of skin color
and other characteristics that are correlated with race and that have social and economic consequences for their children. 
Two new studies also report large differences in relative mobility between black and white families. Debopam Bhattacharya
and Bhashkar Mazumder (2007) find that blacks are less likely than whites to transition out of the bottom of the income
distribution, based on analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Dalton Conley (forthcoming)
reports on upward as well as downward mobility by race, and, consistent with this study, finds substantial downward
mobility among black families with high incomes. 
Two studies of sibling correlations in earnings provide somewhat conflicting evidence about mobility differences by race.
Anders Björklund and colleagues (2002) find that correlations in the United States drop from 0.43 to 0.32 (a drop of 0.11),
when moving from the full PSID sample to a white-only sample, suggesting that race explains a sizable amount of the
similarity of income between brothers in the United States. In a similar analysis of data from the National Longitudinal
Surveys, David Levine and Bhashkar Mazumder (2007) find a somewhat smaller drop (of 0.04 to 0.07 depending on the
time period), suggesting a smaller impact of race. 
With regard to the possible factors contributing to black-white differences in income mobility, Hertz (2006) finds that the
income gap between blacks and whites in the second generation is reduced, but only from 33 percent to 28 percent, when
controlling for a vast array of parental attributes—not just parental income, but also parental education, family structure,
annual hours worked by parents, homeownership, and parental attitudes and behaviors, among many others. After a
number of different analyses, Hertz concludes that race itself is helping to determine economic outcomes for black
children. He notes that he cannot distinguish whether this is a result of outright labor market discrimination, differences
in quality of schooling, differential attitudes of children, or other unobserved factors. Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2007)
find that cognitive skills of the second generation measured during adolescence explain much of the mobility gap between
races, although they note their analysis does not explain the source of this difference in test scores. Drawing on the studies
of Hertz and Björklund et al., Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2002) argue that race, along with wealth and schooling,
is one of the three largest channels of intergenerational status transmission in the United States. 
In a review of literature from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Mary Corcoran (1995) also finds some evidence that low-
income status is passed down from black parents to black children, with race-based differences in economic outcomes
only somewhat reduced when controlling for various background characteristics. Dalton Conley (1999) argues that the
wealth gap between black and white families explains much of the persistence of other inequalities that persist across
generations. Not only do blacks have much fewer assets than whites, but intergenerational transmission of wealth from
parents to children is the largest factor explaining why whites have higher levels of wealth than blacks. 
This brief literature review is limited to the literature on intergenerational income mobility and race; the interested reader
is also referred to the much larger literature on black-white differences in economic outcomes more generally. 
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